Some Sub-Atomic Particles of Logic1

Abstract

I can best begin this contribution to the articulation of speech acts with a consideration of the Fregian 'assertion-sign', or, to speak more accurately, 'judgement-stroke'. This correction itself warns us that there is not just one kind of sign that has to be examined, but several, and that an elucidation of this difficult subject has to begin with a careful distinction between them. Only then can we see which of these signs are necessities, or even possibilities, for logic-that is, what we are to say about Wittgenstein's complete dismissal of Frege's sign in Tractatus 4.442 and subsequently as 'logically quite meaningless'. I submit this discussion as a penance for having failed to make the necessary distinctions clear in my first book The Language of Morals, in spite of being at least partially aware of them at the time.2 I later made some of them in print, especially that between what I shall be calling signs of subscription and signs of mood.3 In spite of this, the distinction is still often neglected; in particular, both Michael Dummett's and Donald Davidson's discussions would have been a great deal clearer if they had been more attentive to it.4 I should perhaps add that I have found Dummett's treatment of assertion rewarding, and agree with most of it. Let us then look at some of the different things that are done by what I called in that book the 'neustic'. I am going to start with the easiest customer. I do not think that anybody could, on reflection, deny that a logical notation needs a sign of mood, if it is to handle sentences or speech acts. or different kinds of things that are said. in different moods. This is