Abstract
© Oxford University Press, 2013. This chapter locates Sellars's discussion of perception in 'Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind' within the context of his discussion of the myth of the given. It argues that his criticisms of the traditional sense datum theory are insightful but in some respects indecisive. It is further argued that Sellars's account of our thought about perception contains important insights in his treatment of looks-judgments, but that he mis-describes in a fundamental way our understanding of such talk, and that more mistakes creep into his account when he links our thought about perception to the second myth of Jones.
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