Some Aspects of the World Strategical Situation

Abstract

EVEN the most optimistic recognize that an unstable and dangerous international situation exists. The world is divided into two camps with apparently irreconcilable views and interests. Each side is highly suspicious of the other and a habit of interpreting each other's actions in the worst possible light has been formed. We think that Russia has behaved outrageously since the end of the last war and that her policy and ambitions menace the liberty of what we call the free world. We know also that she is at present in a position of overwhelming military superiority and could certainly overrun large areas of free territory before we could intervene effectively. On the other hand, we should remember that Russia too may be nervous and that the motive behind many acts which appear aggressive to us may be defensive. Twice since I9I4 she has been invaded without just cause-in both cases by Germany. It is possible that the key to her behaviour is a deep conviction that if she does not build up an impregnable military position now, history will repeat itself. Whichever way we regard it-whether we regard Russia's goal as world domination, or merely as the acquisition and retention of an impregnable position-the hard fact remains that we cannot accept our present inferior position. Even in the search for an impregnable military position Russia may try to obtain something which we cannot allow her to take. Under these circumstances what principles should guide our policy? We know that we and our associates desire peace. We will fight only to preserve our liberty, which in practice means if a vital interest is attacked. Even then we have to carry with us the man in the street and convince him that his liberty is at stake. Russia is in a very different position. She is ruled by a small and omnipotent group without any scruples and independent of public opinion. The fact that they are realists is an asset to us because they will not deliberately start a major war unless they think their chances of success are very favourable. On the other hand, very few of the Russian leaders have been outside their own country and they may well misjudge the spirit and temper of their opponents from the evidence which their agents abroad supply. Two principles, therefore, should guide us. First, we should decide on what is vital. For example, could we accept the establishment in India or Burma of governments in the same relationship to Russia as the Chinese