Abstract
The development of the Internet of Things has made embedded devices widely used. Embedded devices are often used to process sensitive data, making them the target of attackers. ARM TrustZone technology is used to protect embedded device data from compromised operating systems and applications. But as the value of the data stored in embedded devices increases, more and more effective physical attacks have emerged. However, TrustZone cannot resist physical attacks. We propose SoftME, an approach that utilizes the on-chip memory space to provide a trusted execution environment for sensitive applications. We protect the confidentiality and integrity of the data stored on the off-chip memory. In addition, we design task scheduling in the encryption process. We implement a prototype system of our approach on the development board supporting TrustZone and evaluate the overhead of our approach. The experimental results show that our approach improves the security of the system, and there is no significant increase in system overhead.
Highlights
The development of the Internet of Things (IoT) [1, 2] is hailed as the third wave of world information development after computers and the Internet
The processor state has been the normal world, so the malicious code of the cold boot attack runs in the normal world and it cannot tamper with the on-chip memory, which has been partitioned to the secure world
The total size of the on-chip memory is 256K, the size allocated for FMP kernel is 128K, and the size allocated for the monitor SafeG is 64K, so the remaining free space is 64K
Summary
The development of the Internet of Things (IoT) [1, 2] is hailed as the third wave of world information development after computers and the Internet. ARM TrustZone technology plays an important role in information protection and has important applications on mobile embedded devices [5,6,7] It divides hardware resources into a secure world and a normal world and builds an isolated trusted execution environment (TEE) for applications to protect trusted applications from compromised operating systems and applications [8]. We use TrustZone technology to allocate the on-chip memory space to the secure world, and execute TEE OS on the on-chip memory to protect against cold boot attacks. (i) We propose SoftME, an approach that uses the onchip memory to defend against physical attacks This approach allocates the on-chip memory space to the secure world of TrustZone, with no additional hardware support and no need to modify applications.
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