Socratic Magnanimity in the Phaedo

Abstract

In his famous treatment of the magnanimous or 'great-hearted' man (i megalOcuxow) in Nicomachean Ethics iv 3, Aristotle remarks that it is a charac- teristic of such a person that he is capable of showing the right sort of contempt: the megalOcuxow is properly katafronthtikOw (1124b4-6, cf. b1-2, b29-30; cf. EE 1232a38-b12). Yet it also seems that Aristotle regarded Socrates as some- thing of a model of the virtue of great-heartedness (megalocuxa). 1 This should not be surprising, because surely a large part of the appeal of Socrates derives from the disdain, or contempt, that he displays for any good, or any considera- tion, that comes into conflict with his acting rightly. Now these observations lead naturally to the question of whether Plato, then, in any of the texts of the dia- logues, deals directly with this great-heartedness of Socrates, either by trying to explain in what it consists, or through giving an account of that on which it is founded. I shall maintain that Plato does both of these things in the Phaedo. He is aware that Socratic 'contempt', as I shall call it, is something that needs to be explained and accounted for, and that it plays a large role in Socrates' being a virtuous man. The Phaedo, then, in this regard makes its own contribution to Platonic ethical theory, worthy of our attention. But, moreover, through our appreciating better Plato's view of the matter, it is to be hoped that we may arrive at a more just understanding of Aristotle's discussion of great-heartedness, and of the large role he accords it in his treatment of the virtues. 2 If Socrates is contemptuous, then surely there is a good sort of contempt, and it is presumably this that Aristotle picks out as characteristic of an important virtue. By 'contempt' I mean an attitude which presupposes that we have divided desires, or goods, into at least two kinds; that we rank one kind higher than another; and that it therefore becomes natural to say, in some contexts, that, in preferring something of the higher kind, we 'count as nothing' something from