Sociology can have laws: the web-of-laws approach in the social sciences

Imagining a Place for Sustainability Management: An Early Career Call for Action

The integration of natural and social sciences has been recognized as a key aspect of Earth System (E.S.) research, a cross-disciplinary field involving the study of the geosphere, the biosphere, and society (IGBP, 2006; Leemans et al., 2009; Pfeiffer, 2008; Reid et al., 2010; Young, 2008). Because of societal and political correlates between environmental change and socio-economic development, the study of the Earth System has been increasingly ascribed social and political dimensions emphasizing the need for greater collaboration between the social and natural sciences (Beven, 2011; Kates et al., 2001; Leemans et al., 2009; Reid et al., 2010; Saloranta, 2001; Shackley et al., 1998). The problem of inter-disciplinary articulation between the social and natural sciences is not specific to E.S. research, and its challenges can be traced back to the very origins of the notions of science and social science (e.g. Comte, 1830-1842; de Alvarenga et al., 2011; Latour, 2000, 2004). To a degree, these challenges could be explained in terms of the increasing gulf between two cultures – those of the sciences and the humanities – as suggested by C.P. Snow (1905-1980) in an instigating essay (Snow, 1990 [1959]), due to the high specialization in science and education, and, not less important, to a “tendency to let our social forms to crystallise” (Snow, 1990: 172). More to the point, the increasing importance attributed to the problem has motivated a growing number of analyses concerning the high level of specialization and fragmentation of science and university education (e.g. de Alvarenga et al., 2011; Moraes, 2005; Snow, 1990), but also the societal and political questions concerning research agendas (e.g. Alves, 2008; Kates et al., 2001; Latour, 2000, 2004; Schor, 2008), the disparities between developed and developing countries not just in affluence level, but also in research capacity (Kates et al, 2001; Pfeiffer, 2008; Schor, 2008), and, finally, from a more methodological point of view, the multiplicity of theoreticomethodological perspectives admitted by the social sciences (e.g. de Alvarenga et al., 2011; Floriani et al, 2011; Giddens, 2001; Leis, 2011; Moraes, 2005; Oliveira Filho, 1976; Raynaut & Zanoni, 2011; Weffort, 2006). Yet, in the E.S. field the problem of bringing together social and natural sciences has been a permanent and still unresolved challenge (Alves et al., 2007; Alves, 2008; Geoghegan et al.,

In this study, we explore the problems and the potential involved in combining social science and legal decision making, drawing primarily on examples from the United States. We also briefly discuss the situation in Israel, which provides an interesting comparison. We suggest that a complex act of translation is needed in order for law to incorporate social science findings, particularly in light of the many differences between law and social science in terms of goals, methods, social roles, and epistemologies. On the one hand, social science has much to offer legal decision makers, both in terms of the information it provides about how society and law operate, and in terms of critical vantages on the law itself. On the other hand, there may be important limits to judges' comprehension of the social science arena, so that caution is necessary in attempting to bring the two fields together. In scrutinizing the institutional dimensions of translation difficulties between social science and law, we can identify a number of core tensions associated with the fields' quite distinct approaches to the reconstruction of facticity. These tensions are not only abstract questions of epistemology; they speak to the core of law's claims to rationality, and thus are particularly significant for any theory of democracy. The first tension, most crucial to democracy discourse, can be termed political or institutional. Simply put, the tension is between the democratic reluctance to delegate adjudicative facticity to expert discourse, on the one hand - and on the other hand, society's interest in adjudication that is based on the “best available” knowledge rather than fragmentary “lay notions” (whose political or ideological character hides behind conceptions of “common sense” or “experience”). The second tension may be termed metascientific and involves the validity conditions of social scientific findings qua science: in other words, it is the concern that courts rely upon and apply valid rather than “junk” science. Here we must deal with the internal dynamics that yield legitimacy within the institution of social science itself. The third tension is both scientific and institutional, resulting from the intersection of social science and law, and emanates from the controversies between different legitimate scientific approaches and findings as they play out in court. As we will see below, the line between the second (metascientific) and third (scientific - institutional) tensions can at times be difficult to discern, when advocates of one competing scientific paradigm attempt to convince the court that their competitor is in fact “junk” rather than legitimate science. Finally, a fourth tension - not dealt with directly here - concerns situations where social science functions ideologically in the background of the case, and where portions of social science have infiltrated and permeated legal discourse. Economics is a case in point, as can be seen in the example of the relatively successful “Chicago School” in several areas. Our discussion begins with an overview of the distinct methods, goals, social roles, and epistemological positions of social science and law, outlining the scholarship discussing this divergence. This necessarily schematic presentation provides a general template for identifying some of the potential difficulties that legal decision makers might encounter in achieving a fruitful marriage of law and social science. We briefly compare the overt tensions that exist in the United States with contrasting situation of law and social science in Israel today. The next section examines the ways in which social science has actually been used in US and Israeli courts to date. What role have social scientists played in mediating data and reconstructing facticity? How has the legal system translated the complex world of social science knowledge? After a brief survey of the wider terrain, in the third section we will focus in on a few “paradigmatic” examples for more in-depth discussion. The final section considers the critical promise of social science, suggesting that a “new legal realism” can emerge from more careful attention to the process of translation between social science and law.

Background. Literature indicates that in academic writing, authors are expected to demonstrate a noticeable stance so that they can make their meaning clear. Therefore, differences between native and non-native writers along with cross-disciplinary academic writing assume great significance. Purpose. The interactional, dialogic, and reflective nature of academic writing requires writers to utilize stance-establishing tools in their writing, the most prominent ones being stance nouns. In addition, the that-clause construction plays a vital role in conveying the author’s stance. Studies that compare L1 Turkish writers of English and L1 English writers regarding academic writing are rather scarce. As such, the present paper aims to analyze L1 Turkish writers of English and L1 English writers in eight disciplines from natural and social sciences in terms of the use of stance nouns in that-clause constructions. Methods. The study employs Jiang and Hyland's (2016) functional classification model in exploring the nominal stance in cross-disciplinary writing of L1 Turkish writers of English and L1 English writers. To this end, journals with high impact in eight disciplines from social and natural sciences were scanned and a total of 320 articles were included in the corpus. The social sciences included in the present study cover applied linguistics, history, psychology, and sociology while the natural sciences cover medicine, engineering, astronomy, and biology. In total, a corpus of 2.232.164 words was formed. Results and Implications. The study found significant differences not only in terms of natural and social sciences but also in terms of L1/L2 distinction. In addition, a secondary purpose of the study was to see whether writers in social and natural sciences differed in terms of empiricist and interpretive rationality. The results indicated that writers in social sciences tended to use more status and cognition nouns, indicating that they tend to be more interpretive. With significant differences between Turkish and English writers from a cross-disciplinary perspective, the present study offers important insights into how writers weave their stance in academic writing. Moreover, the present study also confirmed that writers in social sciences, whether L1 or L2, tend to use more stance nouns compared with writers in natural sciences.

Arien Mack Editor’s Introduction WHEN I FIRST BEGAN TO DISCUSS THE THEME OF “ERRORS” WITH MY coeditor for this special issue, Gerald Holton, the question arose as to whether the kinds of “fruitful” mistakes that occur in the natural sciences also occur in the social sciences. While the degree of resem­ blance between the natural and social sciences has long been the subject of discussion within the social sciences themselves, I do not think the question has been much discussed in these particular terms. Since this issue ofSocialResearch attests to the presence of fruitful errors in the natural sciences, we invited several distinguished social scien­ tists to address the question of whether such errors occur in the social sciences. Many of the social scientists from whom I initially requested advice pointed out that, unlike physical laws in the natural sciences, “laws” in the social sciences—if there are any—are often contin­ gent and change as the social and cultural contexts change. In addi­ tion, two of the respondents pointed out, I think correctly, that the prim ary problem in the social sciences is not so much the validity of the claims of social scientists, which may or not be correct, but rather the consequences of those claims for social policies. An obvi­ ous instance of this was Cyril Burt’s claim about genetic differences in intelligence, which led to discriminatory immigration rules and other bad social policy. Fortunately for us at Sodal Research despite the general consen­ sus that “fruitful” errors were not characteristic of the social sciences, several distinguished social scientists agreed to explore the question of social research Vol 72 : No 1: Spring 2005 xl errors in the social sciences and have written interestingly about it for this issue. These articles stand as illuminating complements to the arti­ cles by historians of the natural sciences that also appear, and clarify one more dimension on which the social and natural sciences differ. Arien Mack xii social research ...

The first full-length defense of social scientific laws to appear in the last twenty years, this book upholds the prospect of the nomological explanation of human behavior against those who maintain that this approach is impossible, impractical, or irrelevant. By pursuing an analogy with the natural sciences, Mclntyre shows that the barriers to nomological inquiry within the social sciences are not generated by factors unique to social inquiry, but arise from a largely common set of problems that face any scientific endeavor. All of the most widely supported arguments against social scientific laws have failed largely due to adherence to a highly idealized conception of nomologicality (allegedly drawn from the natural sciences themselves) and the limited doctrine of descriptivism. Basing his arguments upon a more realistic view of scientific theorizing that emphasizes the pivotal role of redescription in aiding the search for scientific laws, Mclntyre is optimistic about attaining useful law-like explanations of human behavior.

That there are differences between social and natural phenomena is hardly a matter of dispute, and there is little question that these differences result from role of subjective states such as purposes, attitudes, and beliefs in human affairs. The important question is not whether these differences exist but whether they lead to fundamental differences between natural and social sciences. As Bhaskar notes, this is primal question of philosophy of social and it has dominated social sciences since their birth.1 The ardently contested issues raised by question of relationship between social and natural sciences have permeated social-scientific disciplines in disputes that have decisively shaped their development.2 Perhaps it is only a slight exaggeration to suggest that differences between various schools within social sciences are reducible to different ways these issues have been resolved. The framework for discussion of these issues was in large measure work of Max Weber. This is not surprising from a thinker labeled the last universal genius of social sciences3 by an admirer and the greatest social scientist of our century4 by one of his harshest critics. Although Weber's interest in methodological issues was secondary and his writings on subject usually polemical, erudition and insight with which he analyzed character of social sciences have commanded continuing attention. This attention has focused primarily on Weber's insistence that susceptibility of social phenomena to interpretative understanding radically distinguishes them from natural phenomena and creates a unique task for social sciences. This alone, however, says nothing about relationship between social and natural sciences, and no aspect of Weber's thought has been more controversial or more variously construed than nature of interpretative understanding and its significance for logic of sociocultural inquiry.5

This chapter details how Adolphe Quetelet's work on error law provided the inspiration for the most important writers on statistical mathematics of the late nineteenth century. While Quetelet interpreted his discovery as confirmation that variation could be neglected in favor of the study of mean values, James Clerk Maxwell and Francis Galton, among others, saw in it a convenient and valuable tool for analyzing with mathematical precision the nature and effects of natural variation. The mathematics of variation was instrumental for the impressive achievements of the nineteenth-century kinetic theory. It also provided the key in biology to the quantitative study of heredity, leading eventually to what is now the most purely statistical of the natural sciences, quantitative genetics. Beyond its importance for particular natural and social sciences, however, the new understanding of the error law that derived from Quetelet's work proved essential for mathematical statistics itself.

This contribution describes and analyses how Maw Weber's sociology of law was received by German post-war Rechtssoziologie. Since this discipline is covered both by jurists and social scientists, we outline the history of how Weber's sociology of law was received both by jurisprudence (including the history of law and comparative law) and by the social sciences. We begin with 1947, the year when the third edition of Economy and Society was published. Particular attention is paid to the present situation. It becomes clear that Weber is acknowledged as a classical thinker, even though little notice was taken of his sociology of law for a long time. It is only recently, since the Seventies, that a change has taken place in this respect. In the case of jurisprudence in such a way that, with the establishment of the sociology of law as a discipline in university teaching, textbooks and introductions to the sociology of law came on the market which acknowledged Weber and his sociology oflaw. It has also to be stated, however, that it is generally rare for jurists to "work" with Weber. Within the social sciences, Weber's sociology of law has received attention to the extent that the leading interpreters of Weber became involved with the reconstruction of Weber's theory of rationalisation. With a few exceptions, which deal directly with Weber's sociology of law (in the sense of a reconstruction of the legal process of rationalisation, the examination of the theses inherited from Weber, taking up again the questions that he prompted), Weber's sociology of law thus occupies a special place in the social sciences, since it is presented as being embedded in greater theoretical contexts (theories of rationalisation, theories concerning the origins of the modem age). This can be proved with the aid of the theoretical drafts of Habermas, Schluchter and Muench that are presented in this paper. We do not restrict ourselves exclusively to describing the history of its reception, but with the aid of the extensive material we also deal with the question of the conditions for the reception of this classic study by Weber. Attention is also paid to the question of which subjects (e.g. increasing legalization or "explosion of statutory law") have become independent through the reception of Weber's sociology oflaw, and which determine the present discussion in the Federal Republic of Germany.

Following an initial discussion of the general nature of interpretation in contemporary psychology, and social and natural science, relevant views of Charles Taylor and Thomas Kuhn are considered in some detail. Although both Taylor and Kuhn agree that interpretation in the social or human sciences differs in some ways from interpretation in the natural sciences, they disagree about the nature and origins of such difference. Our own analysis follows, in which we consider differences in interpretation between the natural and social sciences (psychology in particular) in terms of Ian Hacking's use of Elizabeth Anscombe's conceptualization of actions as intentional acts under particular descriptions. We conclude that both Taylor and Kuhn are correct to point to differences in interpretation between the natural and social sciences. We also argue that in psychology, such interpretive differences, contra Kuhn and pro Taylor, are qualitative rather than quantitative. They arise from the nature of persons as self‐interpretive, reactive beings who act under socioculturally sanctioned, linguistic descriptions. The actions of psychological persons may display qualitative differences over time and across contexts as these descriptions, including social scientific and psychological findings and interpretations, change. In contrast, even when descriptions in natural science change, such changes do not spawn changes in the self‐interpretations and intentional actions of the focal phenomena of natural science. We also make the point that much current confusion surrounding interpretation in science arises from the unwarranted tendency of some commentators to treat interpretation as subjective, in ways that ignore the objective grounding of interpretation within regulated social practices, including scientific practices sanctioned by scientific communities.

Editorial

Social Science and Its Frontiers Myron P. Gutmann (bio) Mark Solovey,Social Science for What? Battles over Public Funding for the “Other Sciences” at the National Science Foundation. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2020. X+ 398pp. Figures, notes, index. $50.00. Americans often date the emergence of a strong commitment to government support of science to the launch of the Soviet Union’s Sputnik 1 satellite in October 1957. That event certainly spurred policy decisions that increased federal investments in education and science, and thus is an appropriate starting point for the popular narrative about science. At the same time, policy developments of the Sputnik era built on earlier events, widely recognized by historians of science. That perspective starts the story with the presentation in July 1946 of Vannever Bush’s report, Science, The Endless Frontier, to President Truman, advocating for a large, organized federal investment in scientific research, based on the role of science and technology in the Second World War. Early efforts to enact legislation based on the Bush report failed (Truman vetoed the first bill that passed because it lacked presidential control over the appointment of the Foundation’s leadership), but in 1950 Truman signed the National Science Foundation Act, establishing an enduring basis for publicly—especially federally—funded scientific research in the United States. The debates about the creation of the National Science Foundation pitted progressives against conservatives and advocates of public and congressional control of science against advocates of exclusive control by scientists.1 One of the topics of debate—although hardly the loudest—was whether the social sciences would be included in the Foundation’s charge.2 Vannever Bush was opposed to their inclusion, sometimes arguing that they should be supported by a separate organization; on the other side, Democratic West Virginia Senator Harley M. Kilgore, a leading sponsor of a more progressive approach, supported their inclusion in the Foundation’s mission. In the end, the compromise legislation that Truman signed in 1950 did not include support for the social sciences, but at the same time did not prohibit such support. The Foundation did not totally exclude the social sciences for long; it hired sociologist Harry Alpert in 1953, and in 1954 introduced a first, extremely modest, program to support the linkage between the social and natural sciences. [End Page 396] The first Social Sciences Division was not established until 1960 (in an era in which the Foundation was divided into four scientific divisions reflecting major disciplinary categories). Later, when the Foundation was reorganized into seven directorates (three of them disciplinary, one for education, and three for administrative activities) in 1975, the Divisions of Social Sciences and Behavioral and Neural Sciences were part of an expanded Directorate for Biological, Behavioral and Social Sciences (p. 179). Only in 1991–92 did the Foundation establish a separate Directorate for the Social, Behavioral and Economic (SBE) Sciences, an organizational status that still exists today. The road from the origin of the Foundation to the creation of the SBE Directorate was not linear, with ups and downs in support for the social and behavioral sciences mostly reflecting political and institutional challenges. This history spanning the period from the first discussions of the National Science Foundation through the end of the 1980s (with an added discussion of recent events and recommendations for the future) is the topic of Mark Solovey’s Social Science for What? Battles over Public Funding for the “Other Sciences” at the National Science Foundation. In this book he builds on his earlier book, Shaky Foundations: The Politics-Patronage-Social Science Nexus in Cold War America (2013), on extensive archival research, and on interviews with surviving participants. Social Science for What? is an impressive accomplishment, capturing the connections between partisan politics, scientific inquiry, tensions among scientific disciplines, and the institutional development of the Foundation. It is instructive for all readers, including for me, who served for four years (2009–13) as one of the Foundation’s Assistant Directors and head of the Directorate for Social Behavioral and Economic Sciences (SBE). Social Science for What? articulates consistent themes that define social science at NSF, along with a lively narrative arc. To define that arc, Solovey divides the main...

In German primary schools, natural sciences and social studies are learned and taught in an integrative manner within a subject called Sachunterricht. To teach Sachunterricht in a high-quality manner, it is reasonable to assume that primary school teachers themselves require—among other things, such as knowledge about pedagogy, teaching Sachunterricht, and the various content areas of Sachunterricht—a distinct interest, academic self-concept, and sense of belonging regarding natural and social sciences. Furthermore, they should possess a solid interdisciplinary competence that enables them to teach natural and social sciences in an integrative way. In the present study, we conducted a longitudinal survey of pre-service primary school teachers from a German university over a period of 2 years to investigate the changes in their (self-evaluated) interdisciplinary competence; the changes in their interest, academic self-concept, and sense of belonging regarding natural and social sciences; and the correlations between these constructs. Our data analysis revealed a decrease over time in participants’ sense of belonging to natural and social sciences, as well as their (self-evaluated) interdisciplinary competence, while their academic self-concept in natural and social sciences remained stable. Participants’ interest in social sciences decreased, while their interest in natural sciences increased. Moreover, we found varying degrees of correlation between these constructs. In summary, the results of the present study provide important insights into the professional development of pre-service primary school teachers within university-based teacher education for teaching natural and social sciences in primary school. The implications of these findings are discussed in detail at the end of this paper.

The article is devoted to the study of social sciences and social capital in the system of higher education and economy of Ukraine. The article aims to solve two tasks: The first - is to discuss the, not simple, relationship between the natural and social sciences in stimulating technological innovations; The second - is to show how the new concepts of social and cultural capital are connected to economic development. The main results of the article are presented in a study of scientific works devoted to the relationship between the social and natural sciences and how this relationship relates to educational and economic development. The methodological basis of the research is the methods of comparative analysis of scientific research in the field of social and natural sciences, the authors of which investigated human, social and cultural capital. The article also examines the main scientific discussions on the role of social and cultural capital. These are relatively new topics that are increasingly recognized as important components of development. It is stated that the humanities and social sciences should occupy a prominent place in education because, paradoxically, these subjects stimulate technological innovation and economic growth in modern knowledge economies. This view coincides with the school of New Institutional Economics (New Institutional Economics) and the school of "human relations" (human relations) in the field of management, which emphasize social and cultural factors for the effective functioning of organizations and economic development. The technocratic or scientific management paradigm has reached the limits of its usefulness in education, innovation, and economic progress. This paradigm now needs to be supplemented by more open educational systems and organizations, whose functioning is enhanced by cultural and social capital.

The schools of natural science, especially since Newton, have continuously influenced the social science in two ways. As seen in the example of the systems theory or social Darwinism, many social scientists have got insights from the ideas of natural science. It is quite natural that a scientist discovers a new way of thinking or an implication from a different academic discipline; however, the mainstream social scientists have trapped themselves by confining their science with the methodology obtained from natural science in order to validate it. This paper aims to reveal this methodological trap of social science by showing the influence of natural science to social science in the context of validation and by contrasting the differences between social and natural science issue by issue. The issues raised in this paper include the possibility of the monology and the normal science in social science, the debate over fact-value dichotomy and obtaining objectivity in social science, and the role of science and methodological reductionist issue. Considering such idiosyncrasies of social science, it is claimed that social science should keep its methodological uniqueness and autonomy.