Social Security Coordination in the EEA: The Limits of Free Movement of Services as a Tool for Homogeneity

This article is a presentation of a legal report published in February 2024, comparing the rulings of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and the EFTA Court on social security coordination. Over the years, the CJEU has ruled on a large number of social security issues, thus covering most legal aspects of the coordination. The EFTA Court, on the other hand, has ruled on 18 cases of social security coordination in total since it was established in 1994. An analysis of all rulings shows that most of them follow the same line as rulings of the CJEU in comparable cases, while some add new elements and deal with questions the CJEU has not so far been asked to rule on. Some could even be seen as going into another direction than the rulings of the CJEU. In this article, two examples of the analyses are included. The first example is a ruling on a regional family benefit, while the second is a ruling on sickness benefits that partly deal with a question that the CJEU has not yet been asked to rule on. Finally, these different analyses are evaluated from a cross-cutting perspective.

Social security coordination for third country migrants coming from third countries to the EU is scattered between EU instruments and national instruments. On the one hand, the EU has concluded agreements with third countries, e.g. Turkey, which includes provisions on social security coordination. The EU has also adopted unilateral measures such as EU Directives on migration, e.g. the Blue Card Directive, which provide for equal treatment in the field of social security. On the other hand, Member States conclude bilateral agreements on social security coordination with third countries. With the purpose of solving this fragmented situation, this paper aims at discussing what a common EU approach to social security coordination with third countries could encompass. It focuses on the social security coordination to be developed with India by using a comparative legal analysis of the EU instruments as well as the Member States’ bilateral agreements with India.

In March 2012, the European Commission adopted a Communication on the external dimension of EU social security coordination. On the one hand, the Commission explained that social security coordination between the EU and rest of the world is dealt with at a national level. On the other hand, the Commission argued that a common EU approach to social security coordination with third countries was under development. This common EU approach to social security coordination consists of a number of elements. One element relates to Association Agreements and Stabilisation and Association Agreements. These Agreements and specific Decisions taken by Association Councils (established by such Agreements) stipulate rules, which govern social security coordination for workers and their families, who move between the EU and the associated country. According to the Commission, once the Association Council Decisions are adopted, the common EU approach to social security coordination will be implemented. Six years after the publication of the 2012 European Commission Communication, questions arise as to whether or not the Association Agreements have been implemented, and the reasons for this.This article seeks to examine and contrast selected Association Agreements and Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAAs), which provide social security rules for the nationals of the contracting parties. These will include the Ankara Agreement concluded with Turkey, the Euro-Mediterranean Agreements with Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, and the SAAs with the Balkan countries. The aim of this article is to provide an overarching overview of the different legal positions that third-country nationals may rely on, based on their nationality, and to explore whether or not Association Agreements have been implemented in terms of social security coordination rules.

In the context of international migration, social security coordination is a technique used primarily by states in order to build bridges between their social security systems for securing the rights of migrants. Migrants who have careers in multiple countries risk losing their acquired rights when moving from one country to another. Currently, the key instruments in EU social security coordination are Regulations 883/2004, 987/2009 and 1231/2010. Contrary to this uniform system, the social security coordination rules applicable to persons moving from a third country to an EU Member State (or vice-versa) can be found in several instruments. This book aims to identify the different instruments of the external dimension of EU social security coordination and proposes two policy options for improving the current patchy solution while developing a common EU approach: the inclusion of social security coordination clauses in agreements with third counties and the draft of a model agreement for future use in bilateral agreement negotiations regarding social security.

Constitutional right to social security

This paper discusses the mutual effects of labour migration, social security coordination arrangements and the welfare states. It analyses country cases outside of the European Union’s coordination rules, but with a tradition of relatively functional social security coordination regimes. The assessment emphasises the importance of social security coordination. Apart from the obvious advantages for migrant workers, it shows clear advantages for both the countries of origin and destination. In that, the content of the social security agreements is equally important. It further identifies key points that require improvement. Finally, the assessment shows that reforms of the national social systems will affect the future of the social security coordination arrangements. The conclusion offers recommendations for policymakers in the region and the EU on how to improve governance of social security coordination.

This article provides a general understanding of the main aspects of mobility (no longer referred to as free movement) and social security coordination, in the Brexit international agreements that govern the relationship of the EU with the United Kingdom: the Withdrawal Agreement (WA) and the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA). The article shows that both topics, mobility (or migration) and social security coordination, were relevant to the origins of Brexit. Before analysing both Brexit Agreements, the article gives a comparative overview of them, considering their principal features and their relationship. The article then analyses the mobility and coordination of social security in each agreement from a practical perspective, giving examples and highlighting the significant differences in coverage that they generate for the different citizens included in their personal scope.

This chapter is central for the analysis of the rights to free movement of non-economically active persons in the EEA in relation to the Coordination regime for social security schemes where also rights stemming from Union citizenship are relevant in the EU legal order. The analysis of the EFTA Court case law is undertaken both regarding rights against the host state and rights against the home state. The central starting point is Case E-5/06 Liechtenstein helpless allowance a key case on how the EEA Agreement affects boundaries of national solidarity systems. In Case E-4/07 Porkelsson the favouring treatment of moving individuals requiring special protection even of non-discriminatory rules is demonstrated. Cases E-3/12 and E-6/12 concern both the compatibility of national territorial boundaries of welfare solidarity enshrined in national provisions limiting the export of unemployment benefits and child benefits respectively. The last section concerns administrative practice in this area from the EFTA Surveillance Authority taking similar views as the EFTA Court.

The spike in marginal tax rates associated with the taxation of up to 85% of an individual’s Social Security benefit is termed the “tax torpedo.” In <b><i>How Social Security Coordination Can Add Value to a Tax-Efficient Withdrawal Strategy</i></b>, from the Fall 2021 issue of <b><i>The Journal of Retirement,</i></b><b>William Reichenstein</b> and <b>William Meyer,</b> principals at <b>Social Security Solutions</b>, <b>Inc.</b>, demonstrate how marginal tax rates can spike when a retiree collects both Social Security benefits and income drawn from tax-deferred accounts in the same year. The authors use a series of case studies to model how financial advisors can identify optimal tax-efficient strategies for clients who are able to delay the start of Social Security benefits. In the early years of retirement, income is drawn from tax-deferred accounts, and additional tax-deferred funds are converted to Roth accounts. When Social Security benefits later begin, the Roth accounts can be drawn upon tax-free as needed. This strategy can add significant value to portfolios by reducing income taxes and Medicare premiums.

In 1 2020, there were 1.7 million cross-border workers in the European Union, creating difficulties in determining the applicable legislation for social security matters. The reason for this complexity is that even in cross-border activities, the legislation of only one Member State is applicable according to the Coordination Regulation 883/2004. This article examines the evolving landscape of social security coordination in the European Union. It explores the interplay between the European principle of free movement of workers and the complexities arising from various national social security systems, combined with the increase in telework. The article outlines the foundational legal frameworks underpinning social security within the European Union, including the Coordination Regulation EC 883/2004, and discusses primarily the challenges in applying these rules to cross-border teleworkers. It further analyses the implications of the new Multilateral Framework Agreement, providing a nuanced understanding of its role in offering simplified procedures and legal certainty for habitual cross-border teleworkers. The article also highlights the Agreement's limitations, including its restricted scope and the persisting administrative burdens. The discussion extends to the broader context of ongoing legislative efforts and the need for more flexible and modern social security coordination rules in the European Union. The article aims to shed light on the critical issues surrounding social security coordination in an era of evolving work practices.

This article looks into the meaning of the concepts of sincere cooperation, mutual trust, and mutual recognition in EU social security coordination. It analyses the legislative choice of coordination as the main regulatory mechanism in the field, and examines the role of administrative cooperation. Furthermore, the article highlights the challenges that arise in situations where mutual recognition is required under the Regulations, as in connection with portable documents relating to the posting of workers. It also considers the limits to mutual trust via the principle of prohibition of fraud and abuse of rights established in the case law of the CJEU on free movement. In the last few years, this principle has been extended into the field of social security law, notably in Altun. In this way, the coordination regime does not require totally blind trust: rather, it balances the Member States' interests of maintaining the integrity of their social security systems with the Union interest of simplifying free movement. As in other fields of EU law relating to free movement, the mutual trust between the Member States in social security coordination may therefore be set aside in extraordinary cases.

Benefit programmes protect individuals against loss of income and provide unemployed individuals the possibility of finding a better match between their qualifications and job vacancies. This positive aspect of inducing workers to achieve better job matches has been shown to increase economic efficiency (Acemoglu & Shimer, 1999; Marimon & Zilibotti, 1999). However, unemployment benefits may also distort incentives by subsidizing long and unproductive job searches. In fact, the generosity of unemployment benefits is generally considered the main factor by which benefit systems affect unemployment. From a societal point of view, therefore, the optimal unemployment benefit system will balance considerations for protection with those for distortion (Feldstein, 2005; Mortensen, 1987). Theory suggests that putting a limit on benefit duration will tend to accelerate job search from the beginning of the unemployment spell and thereby shorten unemployment duration (Pissarides, 2000). Thus, generosity of benefits is determined not only by the amount paid but also by the duration of benefit entitlement. In the US, replacement rates1 are low and duration is short compared to benefit systems in most European countries. In 2005 the maximum duration of unemployment insurance entitlement among OECD countries 2 was shortest in the US at 6 months 3 and longest in Denmark, Norway, Portugal, the Netherlands, France, Finland and Spain, varying between 23 and 48 months (OECD, 2007). At the same time, the gross initial replacement rate was around 50% in the US, while varying between 62% and 90% in the aforementioned European countries. The lower level of generosity of benefits in the US compared to Europe is consistent with the observation of higher levels of active searches and a greater willingness to accept inferior jobs by unemployed workers in the US compared to Europe (Layard, Nickell & Jackman, 2005). As a consequence European policy-makers may be tempted to reduce the generosity of unemployment systems in order to reduce high unemployment levels4. While lowering the replacement rate may be politically intractable (indeed, examples of reductions of benefit rates and amounts are rare), the length of the unemployment benefit entitlement period is often used as a political instrument to improve work incentives for the unemployed. In Spain, for example, the benefit period was altered in 1992, in Slovenia in 1998, in Norway in 1997, in the UK in 1996, in Denmark in 1996, 1998 and 1999, and, more recently, in the Czech Republic in 2004, in Hungary and Portugal in 2006, and in Denmark again in 2010. The important public policy question is whether a more generous unemployment benefit system is causally related to higher unemployment rates. As pointed out in Card and Riddell (1993), there can be several complementary explanations for high unemployment rates, including differences in the fraction of nonworking time that is reported as unemployment (particularly among individuals with very low levels of labour supply), and differences in the overall distributions of working and nonworking time. Recent research on the effect of extended duration of unemployment insurance benefits in the US shows that benefit extensions raised the unemployment rate, but at least half of the effect is attributable to reduced labour force exit among the unemployed rather than to the changes in reemployment rates that are of greater policy concern (Rothstein, 2011). This review will focus on the effect on job finding rates of reducing the maximum duration of entitlement of unemployment benefits, and secondarily on the effects on the quality of these jobs. The intervention of interest is reduction in the maximum duration of entitlement of any kind of unemployment benefit with a known expiration date. The benefits may be unemployment insurance (UI) benefits, or they may be unemployment assistance (UA)/social assistance (SA) benefits as long as they have a known expiration date. In the majority of OECD countries, the UI benefit has a time-limit. In fact, only Belgium has an unlimited UI period. In other countries, the maximum duration varies between 6 months (as for example in the UK and the US) and 36 months (in Iceland). In most OECD countries, a secondary benefit is available for those who have exhausted regular UI benefits. This is known as SA benefits. Unlike UI benefits, SA benefits are generally means-tested without any necessary connection to past employment; they pay a lower level of benefit and are indefinite. We know of only one example of a SA benefit with a time limit: the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) which is available in the US. The federal government requires states to impose between 2- or 5-year limits on TANF (Gustafson & Levine, 1997). In a minority of OECD countries, UA benefits are paid after exhaustion of UI benefits. Like SA benefits, they are generally means-tested, pay a lower level of benefits and, excepting Hungary, Portugal and Sweden, are indefinite. Unemployment benefits with an indefinite time limit or non-financial benefits will be excluded from this review. Search theory offers an explanation for how this intervention might work. According to search theory, one can derive a relationship between the job-finding rate and the parameters of the benefit system, in particular the maximum benefit duration and the replacement rate (Mortensen, 1977). This relationship is driven by adjustments in search effort and reservation wages. The reservation wage is the minimum wage at which the unemployed are willing to accept a job. Forward-looking unemployed workers chose their current search effort and reservation wage in order to maximize the sum of the utility flow realized during the current period, plus the expected discounted future utility flow given that an optimal strategy will be pursued in every future period. The current search effort and reservation wage are thus affected by the future level of benefits. When the benefit period expires, the unemployed person experiences a potentially large drop in income. As the time of benefit exhaustion approaches, the value to that person of remaining unemployed falls, implying a higher search effort and/or a fall in the reservation wage, leading to a higher exit rate out of unemployment (Mortensen, 1977). This non-stationarity implies that unemployed individuals with different lengths of benefit entitlement have different optimal paths of reservation wage and search effort over time (van den Berg 1990). A shorter entitlement period gives the unemployed individual a stronger incentive to quickly gain employment in order to avoid the drop in income after the exhaustion date. How strong the incentive is depends on the magnitude of the income drop. If no secondary benefit is available for those who have exhausted their current benefit, the incentive to gain employment will be stronger. If an increased job finding rate is mainly driven by lowering the reservation wage, a lower job match quality is to be expected, for example, in the form of lower wages and/or lower re-employment duration. A number of factors may have an impact on the magnitude of the expected increase in the job finding rate. In general, the overall labour market conditions (i.e. the vacancy rate5 and, in particular, the unemployment rate) have an impact on the availability of and competition for jobs. If the vacancy rate is high (i.e. the number of vacancies is high in relation to job seekers) we would expect a bigger effect on job finding rates than if the vacancy rate is low. We would further expect a lower effect if the unemployment rate is high, regardless of the vacancy rate. If the vacancy rate is low coincident with a high unemployment rate, competition for available jobs is likely to be high. If the vacancy rate is high coincident with a high unemployment rate, it suggests mismatch in the labour market (i.e., the process by which vacant jobs and job seekers meet is not efficient) (Filges & Larsen, 2000; Pissarides, 2000). Whether compulsory participation in active labour market programmes is part of the unemployment system may also have an impact on the effect of maximum duration of entitlement. The compulsory aspect of activation may provide an incentive for unemployed individuals to look for and return to work prior to programme participation; the so called threat effect. Filges and Hansen (2015) summarize the available evidence on the threat effect of active labour market programmes and report a significant threat effect of compulsory participation in active labour market programmes. Further, actual participation in active labour market programmes may improve some of the participants' qualifications, thus helping them to find a job. Alternatively, active labour market programmes may have negative stigmatization and signalling effects to employers. Programmes associated with participants having poor employment prospect may carry a stigma. Because of asymmetric information, employers do not know the productivity of new workers, some of whom they might hire from the pool of the unemployed. Prospective employers might then perceive participants in such programmes as low productivity workers or workers with tenuous labour market attachment (Kluve et al. 1999; Kluve et al., 2007). A recent systematic review by Filges et al. (2015) investigated the effect of participating in active labour market programmes and found that there is a significant positive effect, although small, of participating in active labour market programmes. The effect reported in Filges et al. (2015) is however a pure post-programme effect of active labour market programmes; it refers to the period after participation in a programme. The net effect of active labour market programme participation on job-finding rates is, however, composed of two separate effects: a lock-in effect and a post-programme effect. The lock-in effect refers to the period of participation in a programme. During this period, job-search intensity may be lowered because there is less time to search for a job, and participants may want to complete an on-going skill-enhancing activity; hence the lock-in effect. The combination of the two effects, lock-in and post-programme, consequently determines the net effects of active labour market programme participation on unemployment duration. These additional effects on the search behaviour and employment prospects when compulsory participation in active labour market programmes is part of the unemployment system may dampen the observed effects of maximum duration of entitlement on job finding rates. Finally, the type of unemployment benefit may have an impact on the effect on the job finding rate. As mentioned above, some countries employ two systems to provide benefits to unemployed individuals: an unemployment insurance system for individuals who typically have a strong labour market attachment (UI benefits) and a social welfare system for individuals who often have other problems in addition to unemployment (SA or UA benefits). The effect size in social welfare systems offering unemployment benefits with a known expiration date is, due to the participants' lower labour market attachment, expected to be less than the effect size in unemployment insurance systems with a known expiration date. In order to reduce high unemployment levels, policy-makers may wish to reduce the generosity of the unemployment system either in amount (the replacement rate) or in maximum potential duration. The positive correlation between unemployment benefit generosity in terms of the replacement rate and unemployment duration is well established at the empirical level (Layard et al., 2005). However, it may be politically intractable to lower the replacement rate, and there are indeed strong efficiency and equity arguments for having a reasonable value of unemployment benefits (Acemoglu & Shimer, 1999; Marimon & Zilibotti, 1999). Search theory suggests that an increase in unemployment benefit generosity, in terms of maximum duration of benefit entitlement, has a negative impact on the job search activities of the unemployed increasing their unemployment duration. There is clear evidence that the prospect of exhaustion of benefits results in a significantly increased incentive for finding work, although the effect is small (Filges et al., 2013). Hence, shortening the benefit eligibility period may reduce the share of long and unproductive job searches somewhat. The conclusion in Filges et al. (2013) however leaves unanswered the question of by how much reducing the maximum unemployment benefit entitlement will decrease unemployment duration. There are many empirical papers on the effect of maximum benefit entitlement on unemployed individuals (Caliendo, Tatsiramos and Uhlendoff 2009; Bennmarker, Carling & Holmlund, 2007; Ham & Rea, 1987; Hunt, 1995; Katz & Meyer, 1990 and Lalive & Zweimüller, 2004), but the empirical research has not been summarized in a systematic review to obtain a clearer picture of the available evidence on the employment effect of reducing maximum duration of benefit entitlement. One paper provides a review of the literature on how incentives in unemployment insurance can be improved (Fredriksson and Holmlund 2006). However, it is not a systematic review and, furthermore, the authors do not make the important distinction between exits to employment and exits to other destinations such as such as other kinds of benefits or out of the labour force. Distinguishing between destinations is vital. As shown in Card, Chetty and Weber (2007), the exit rate from registered unemployment increases over 10 times more than the rate of re-employment at the expiration of benefits. The difference between the two measures arises because many individuals leave the unemployment register immediately after their benefits expire without returning to work. There is a great deal of political interest in optimizing the unemployment benefit system so it balances the protection and distortion dimensions. The political interest is to reduce the unemployment level, to prevent exploitation of the unemployment benefit system and at the same time protect the unemployed individuals from the consequences of involuntary unemployment. It is therefore of great importance to establish the effect of reducing maximum duration of unemployment benefit entitlement on employment probabilities. The purpose of this review is to systematically uncover relevant studies in the literature that measure the effects of shortening the maximum duration of unemployment benefit entitlement on job finding rates, and to synthesize the effects in a transparent manner. As a secondary objective we will, where possible, investigate the extent to which the effects differ among different groups of unemployed such as high/low educated or men/women, and further explore from which point in the unemployment spell do unemployed individuals react to the length of benefit entitlement. The title for this systematic review was approved in The Campbell Collaboration on 9. October 2012. Study designs that use a well-defined control group are eligible. The main control or comparison condition is no change in maximum duration of benefit entitlement. Non-randomized studies, where the reduction in maximum duration of benefit entitlement has occurred in the course of usual decisions outside the researcher's control must demonstrate pre-treatment group equivalence via matching, statistical controls, or evidence of equivalence on key risk variables (e.g., labour market conditions) and participant characteristics. These factors are outlined in section ‘Assessment of risk of bias in included studies’ under the subheading of Confounding, and the methodological appropriateness of the included studies will be assessed according to the risk of bias model outlined in section ‘Assessment of risk of bias in included studies’. Studies of the effect of reducing unemployment benefit entitlement typically are estimated on data collected from administrative registers or by questionnaires. Studies that use different data sources for treatment and control groups will not be eligible. Only studies that use individual micro-data are eligible. Studies that rely on regional or national time series data are not eligible, even though micro-econometric estimates of individual effects merely provide partial information about the full impact of shortening the maximum duration of benefit entitlement (Calmfors, 1994; Calmfors, 1995). We will include studies irrespective of their publication status, and their electronic availability. We will include unemployed individuals who receive some sort of time limited benefit during their unemployment spell. The International Labour Office (ILO) definition of an unemployed individual is a person, male or female, aged 15-74, without a job who is available for work and either has searched for work in the past four weeks or is available to start work within two weeks and/or is waiting to start a job already obtained (ILO, 1990); however, different countries may apply different definitions of an unemployed individual, see for example Statistics Denmark (2009). We will include participants receiving all types of unemployment benefits with a known exhaustion date. The only restriction is that the benefits must be related to being unemployed. We will therefore exclude individuals who only receive other types of benefits not related to being unemployed. We will include all unemployed participants regardless of age, gender, etc. who receive some sort of time limited benefit during their unemployment spell. The intervention is reduction in the maximum duration of entitlement of any kind of unemployment benefits. The benefits may be unemployment insurance (UI) benefits or they may be unemployment assistance (UA)/social assistance (SA). The only requirement is that the benefit must have a known expiration date. The UI benefit usually has a known time-limit whereas UA and SA usually are indefinite. Unemployment benefits with an indefinite time limit or non-financial benefits will be excluded from this review. The objective is to determine whether reducing the maximum entitlement to unemployment benefits motivates unemployed individuals to find a job more quickly. Distinguishing between destinations is therefore vital. The primary outcome is exits to employment. Studies only looking at exits to other destinations such as other types of social benefits or non-employment and studies who do not distinguish between destinations are not eligible. We will consider secondary outcomes in terms of the impact that reducing the maximum duration of entitlement of benefit has on the duration of re-employment and on income. This will the done in order to obtain a clearer picture of the effect that reducing the maximum entitlement of unemployment benefit has on the quality of the job. If the duration of re-employment or the wage is low, this could indicate that reducing entitlement forces unemployed individuals to find jobs that do not match their qualifications and therefore they may return to unemployment quickly. Outcomes measured as hazard ratios may be reported as an overall effect on the hazard ratio, or may be reported separate for various unemployment duration intervals. All time points reported will be considered. All types of settings are eligible. Relevant studies will be identified through electronic searches of bibliographic databases, research networks, government policy databanks and internet search engines. No language or date restrictions are applied in the searches6. An example of the search strategy for Business Source Elite is listed in Appendix 1.4. The strategy will be modified for the different databases. We will report full details of the modifications in the completed review. Additional searches will be made by means of Google (including Google Scholar) and we will check the first 150 hits. OpenSIGLE will be used to search for European grey literature (http://opensigle.inist.fr/). Copies of relevant documents will be made and we will record the exact URL and date of access for each relevant document. Websites of the following private independent research institutes and economic networks will be searched: IZA -- Institute of the Study of Labor (www.iza.org) CEPR -- Centre for Economic Policy Research (www.cepr.org) NBER -- National Bureau of Economic Research (www.nber.org) MDRC -- the Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation -- (www.mdrc.org) CESifo -- the cooperation between CES (Center for Economic Studies) and IFO (Institute for Economic Research) -- (www.cesifo-group.de/portal/page/portal/ifoHome) are all covered via IDEAS. In addition we will look into the following sites: Danish Economic Councils (www.dors.dk) OECD - the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (www.oecd.org) IMF - The International Monetary Fund (www.imf.org) AIECE - Association of European Conjuncture Institutes (www.aiece.org) ESRC - Economic Social Research Council (www.esrc.ac.uk) Copenhagen Economics (www.copenhageneconomics.com) SSRN -- Social Science Research Network (www.ssrn.com) will also be searched to uncover potential preprint discussion papers. Unpublished theses and dissertations will be searched through the databases: Theses and dissertations and Theses Canada. Copies of relevant documents from Internet-based sources will be made. We will record the exact URL and date of of included studies and of relevant will be of Labor and will be searched for the and the available of of included studies and relevant will be searched for potential new with national and will be considered to and on-going We expect that a of the studies we will have been without of there is no for in labour market This among other from some of of participants due to about of The in these studies without of participants is the of the effect. studies use in benefit or changes of the maximum entitlement period. A policy is to the maximum benefit period when labour market conditions are expected to studies use this policy to the effect on unemployment duration & Rea, 1987; Hunt, and Katz & Meyer, 1990). It is however to rely on such a as these changes any other policy If the of the change are not for it will of the effect will be due to the labour market conditions that to the change in entitlement in the first A more recent & Zweimüller, extended benefit entitlement in and four different in order to the effect of extended benefit entitlement from the impact of labour The extended benefit entitlement was to the labour market problems in and for of The was therefore limited to job seekers aged or in for a limited time period (the after implying that there may be many workers who are to different for time and they different of where no are consider the policy of extended benefit entitlement as thereby to the when it can be that the individuals are not to during the observation period Lalive & Zweimüller, for further The same of apply to all changes to the maximum entitlement period. example the by and of the unemployment insurance system in The reduced the maximum duration of benefits, by half for most groups of the effect, they a strategy and the of employment and after the for those affected with the job finding for those who not avoid bias due to of the from employment to they only consider data for the period of 2 months and 2 months after the The authors further that it is a as the in potential benefit duration to the of the labour market and furthermore, potential benefit duration for different groups of unemployed. In Tatsiramos & the is on a The strategy on a in the maximum duration of unemployment benefits at the of in unemployed who are the with unemployed the gives a measure of the effect of maximum duration of benefits. is the in Lalive on a in the potential benefit duration at and in We will into the of of the studies to determine to whether individuals in groups (i.e. whether individuals may have whether there treatment groups and whether several studies are on the same data included in this review will be for in the of and the of as statistical can when they are When have been we will effect estimates and their & 2011). In where have not applied that control for effects, we will the correlation & and Studies with intervention groups with different individuals will be included in this review. avoid problems with between effect we will apply & However, studies that this around studies included in the data et al., If this number be we will use a effect size (the in order to avoid between effect This provides an of the effect size but the effects applied when effect are better in terms of than do effects 2007). However, of when effect are included are less often than If is not (e.g., the and/or control groups include the same only one intervention group will be and compared to the control group to avoid The of which to include will be on risk of bias We will the that we to have the least risk of bias bias and in of the data will be In some several studies may have used the same of data or some studies may have used only a of a used in We will review all such studies, but in the we will only include one of the effect from each of This will be done to avoid between the (i.e. the estimates of the in the The of which to include will be on risk of bias of the We will the from the that we to have the least risk of bias If two studies are to have the same risk of bias and one of the studies a of a used in or studies, we will include the the full of When the results are measured at time each outcome at each time point will be in a separate with other studies at a time As a these will be according to length of unemployment duration as to less than 6 6 months to more than However, the studies provide for an of relevant and duration for the of we will the the of review two review will first and to exclude studies that are Studies considered by at least one or studies there is in

MoveS analytical report 2018 - Social security coordination and non-standard forms of employment and self-employment: Interrelation, challenges and prospects

This chapter covers regulations that may be cited as the Immigration and Social Security Coordination (EU Withdrawal) Act 2020 (Consequential, Saving, Transitional and Transitory Provisions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020, which come into force at the time and on the date when paragraph 2(2) of Schedule 1 to, the Immigration and Social Security Coordination (EU Withdrawal) Act 2020 comes into force. It discusses the amendment of Immigration Act 1971, which includes provisions on assisting unlawful immigration to member State. It also points out that Section 25B of the Immigration Act 1971 will continue to apply where an order is in force excluding an individual from the United Kingdom. The chapter considers a relevant national as a person who is not an Irish citizen. It describes a person who is entitled to enter or remain in the United Kingdom by virtue of an enforceable EU right.

In the present paper we are discussing about legal migration inside U.E and the rights it confers. All the states members are facing migration, which is a complex of challenges, including demographic, political and economics -one of the most important, the decrease in the labour market. Every country needs to attract skills and knowledge from abroad. Innovation and transition to a green and sustainable economy is a priority for all. We also approach the peculiarities and the characteristics of European digitalisation in social security coordination in all institutions in E.U., including Romania. In 2023, more than are 17 million of Europeans citizens are working or living abroad. European Union provides information for all the workers: equal treatment, E.U. legislation, rules for each one, rights in each country and also for family members. The countries implement the European interoperability for social security institutions, to make easier the electronic exchange between the institution from all Europe. Using this type of communication, mandatory for all members countries, gradually will be removed the documents on paper support by electronic one. This is part of green economy. EESSI (Electronic exchange of social security information) is use in different branch of social security such as unemployment, old age pension, accidents at work or sickness benefits, family benefits, or maternity and paternity benefits. Labor migration is a very important aspect of European Politics. Thus, the growing flow of foreign workers, who must benefit from all the rights conferred by European citizenship, accelerate the process of using these programs, to facilitate access to all this in shortest possible time and no additional costs.