SLAP — Simple Linear Attack against Perceptron (SLAP)

The power of a statistical attack is inversely proportional to the number of plaintexts needed to recover information on the encryption key. By analyzing the distribution of the random variables involved in the attack, cryptographers aim to provide a good estimate of the data complexity of the attack. In this paper, we analyze the hypotheses made in simple, multiple, and multidimensional linear attacks that use either non-zero or zero correlations, and provide more accurate estimates of the data complexity of these attacks. This is achieved by taking, for the first time, into consideration the key variance of the statistic for both the right and wrong keys. For the family of linear attacks considered in this paper, we differentiate between the attacks which are performed in the known-plaintext and those in the distinct-known-plaintext model.

In this paper we analyze the Habeeb-Kahrobaei-Koupparis-Shpilrain (HKKS) key exchange protocol which uses semidirect products of groups as a platform. We show that the particular instance of the protocol suggested in their paper can be broken via a simple linear algebra attack.

The security issue in cyber-physical systems has attracted growing interests in the last decades. This paper considers how false data injection attack can degrade the estimation quality of a remote state estimation system. In this system, smart sensors measure a dynamic process and send preprocessed data through a communication network to a remote estimator to estimate the process. It is assumed that there are malicious attackers in the communication network, who are able to obtain and falsify all the data sent by the sensors. It is common that the remote estimator is equipped with a residue-based detector to detect potential attacks. We propose a class of deception attack and analyze its feasibility. We show that the proposed attack enables the attacker to inject false data into the remote estimator without being detected. We derive a criterion to judge the optimality of performance of this type of attack in the sense of maximizing the estimation error covariance. Furthermore, we find that a simple linear attack strategy, which flips the sign of intercepted signal, satisfies the optimality criterion. We present numerical examples to illustrate our theoretical results.

In order to improve the robustness and invisibility of watermarking, a digital holographic watermarking algorithm based on DWT-DCT is proposed. First, the watermark image is generated into a digital hologram to improve the security and non-tearability of the watermark, and the I1 image is selected as the watermark image to be embedded. Perform discrete wavelet transform on the original carrier image to extract its low-frequency coefficients; secondly, the low-frequency coefficients are subjected to DCT transformation, and finally the watermark information is embedded in the high-frequency coefficient matrix after DCT, thereby completing the watermark information embedding. This algorithm combines the transformation characteristics of DWT and DCT, makes up for each other’s shortcomings, and makes digital watermarking more robust and invisible. In order to verify the anti-attack ability of this algorithm, different attack tests were performed on the watermark image. The results show that this algorithm is robust against simple linear attacks and noise attacks.