Situational deterrence and claim padding: results from a randomized field experiment

Abstract

While it is generally argued that threats of legal sanctions are more effective with offenders involved in economic crimes than with delinquents committing more conventional crimes, such an affirmation rests on weak empirical evidence. Also, most studies supporting this proposition were conducted with non-experimental designs, thus, undermining the interval validity of the results. On the other hand, studies base their predictions on individual factors and do not incorporate contextual factors. To overcome those limitations, a randomized field experiment was implemented in four insurance companies to incorporate contextual factors into the dynamics of deterrence. This study assessed the effect of a written threat (a deterrent letter reminding insured persons of the punishment for insurance fraud) on claim padding behaviours of insured persons filing claims for residential theft. A deterrent-letter project was implemented in four insurance companies, with claims randomly assigned to the experimental or the control group. Cases belonging to the control group were managed as usual, while individuals in the experimental group received the written threat. The experimental design made sure that the deterrent stimulus was exactly delivered to the insured persons when they had the opportunity to exaggerate the value of their claims. Findings demonstrate that claimants in the experimental group were less likely to pad their claims than were those in the control group. The letter was effective, regardless of the means of delivery. In conclusion, the administration of a written threat at the moment of criminal opportunity appears to be an effective strategy for preventing economic crimes.