Sino-US strategic rivalry and regional security dynamics in the South China Sea

The purpose of this study is to discuss the impact of growing aggressiveness with the South China Sea (SCS) China on Japan's defense policy as well as overall regional security in the Indo-Pacific region. In response to China's assertive expansion of territorial claims and the military build-up of artificial islands, the Japanese have adapted and advanced in the domains of defense strategy, military capabilities, and regional security positions. This research is intended to help in understanding how Japan has responded to these developments, and what these responses suggest for mutual security cooperation, and in particular the U.S.–Japan alliance, as well as the Quad and ASEAN. Drawing the insights into Japan's evolving defense posture and the role played by the same in maintaining regional stability, we only use the case studies and interviews as well as other documents in this study. Finally, the research will give methodological advice on how to cope with the strain in the South China Sea to guarantee peace and security in the South China Sea long haul for Japan alongside other included nations.

The purpose of this study is to discuss the impact of growing aggressiveness with the South China Sea (SCS) China on Japan's defense policy as well as overall regional security in the Indo-Pacific region. In response to China's assertive expansion of territorial claims and the military build-up of artificial islands, the Japanese have adapted and advanced in the domains of defense strategy, military capabilities, and regional security positions. This research is intended to help in understanding how Japan has responded to these developments, and what these responses suggest for mutual security cooperation, and in particular the U.S.–Japan alliance, as well as the Quad and ASEAN. Drawing the insights into Japan's evolving defense posture and the role played by the same in maintaining regional stability, we only use the case studies and interviews as well as other documents in this study. Finally, the research will give methodological advice on how to cope with the strain in the South China Sea to guarantee peace and security in the South China Sea long haul for Japan alongside other included nations.

Vietnam's interests in the South China Sea may be divided into traditional national security interests, and interests linked to the broader category of human security. This article examines Vietnam's policy in the South China Sea and its use of the Law of the Sea. Vietnam has doggedly upheld its claim to the whole of the Paracel and Spratly areas (Hoang Sa and Truong Sa) and has spent considerable resources in modernizing its naval and air forces. However, there seems to be a move away from a narrow focus on national security to a more broad-based concern for human security. This is connected with a trend towards a greater regional, less nationalist approach, which may give Vietnam a key role in resolving the multiple disputes in the South China Sea. Introduction The disputes in the South China Sea form a permanent threat to Vietnam's national security, to its full integration with the rest of ASEAN, and to farther improvement of its relationship with China. [1] The disputes also threaten regional security and the interests of the populations around the South China Sea, who need to be protected against typhoons, floods, pollution, depletion of fish stocks, piracy, and war. The manner in which Hanoi handles the situation in the South China Sea may have a significant impact on the living conditions of the Vietnamese, and for their country's regional role. Vietnam's aims in the South China Sea may be divided into traditional national security concerns, and aims linked to the broader category of human and regional security. Under the first category are aims such as defending the long S-shaped coast against invasion, defending the sovereignty of the Paracels (Hoang Sa) and the Spratlys (Truong Sa), gaining exclusive control of resources on and under Vietnam's continental shelf, as well as living resources in the sea out to 200 nautical miles, collecting customs duties, and suppressing smuggling, piracy and other illegal activities within Vietnam's 12-nautical mile territorial waters. [2] As long as no formal agreements have been reached on the delimitation of maritime boundaries, attempts to pursue these aims tend to generate conflict between Vietnam and the other nations around the South China Sea. Under the second category are aims such as defending the population against typhoons, protecting mangrove swamps, securing fish stocks for future generations, halting the destruction of coral reefs, preventing pollution, facing the eventuality of major oil spills, building modern and secure ports, maintaining open communications securing regional peace, attracting serious oil companies to explore for oil and gas, and facilitating international trade and investments. These aims entail a need for regional and international co-operation. The means in pursuit of the traditional national security interests are not necessarily effective in achieving human and regional security. National security may be pursued by maintaining considerable military capabilities, entering into alliances with other powers, and conducting nationalistic propaganda domestically and internationally. These means are costly and can lead to a deterioration in relations with neighbouring states, thus endangering human security. In pursuing human security for its population, the Vietnamese Government is finding other means more useful, such as bilateral and multilateral diplomacy, international co-operation in resource management and environmental protection, and activities to further develop an internationally recognized legal regime, on the basis of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). UNCLOS was signed in 1982 and entered into force in November 1994, one year after the sixtieth state had ratified it. This article will test the hypothesis that there is a gradual movement in Vietnamese policy away from a narrow focus on national security to a more broad-based concern for human security. …

The subject of the research is the analysis of China's diplomatic strategy towards the countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in the context of two interrelated foreign policy factors: the territorial dispute in the South China Sea and the strategic rivalry between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the United States of America. Special attention is given to how these factors not only influence China's foreign policy but also shape its substantive and tactical features. The study covers issues of security, regional integration, political pressure, and China's diplomatic initiatives in the region, as well as analyzes the responses of ASEAN countries to the Chinese strategy. The relevance of the topic is determined by the fact that Southeast Asia is becoming a theater for large-scale geopolitical transformations, and China's diplomatic approaches to interaction with ASEAN are gaining significant importance for the future of the entire Asia-Pacific security architecture. Thus, the work aims to identify mechanisms of political influence, configurations of partnership, and diplomatic balances in the context of increasing turbulence. The research is based on the application of a systematic approach and the method of comparative analysis, including the study of official documents, scientific publications, and analytical reports in Russian, English, and Chinese. The scientific novelty of the article lies in the comprehensive approach to analyzing China's diplomatic strategy, viewed through the prism of the simultaneous action of two key factors – the territorial conflict in the South China Sea and strategic rivalry with the United States. Unlike several existing studies, this work emphasizes the mutual reinforcement of these factors and their cumulative impact on the formation of China's dual diplomacy – a combination of assertively defending national sovereignty and striving to maintain stable relations with ASEAN. The timeliness of the topic adds additional significance, as issues of stability and security in the Asia-Pacific region are priorities on the international agenda. Among the main conclusions, it is emphasized that China is implementing an adaptive strategy, simultaneously strengthening its military and political presence in the region while initiating confidence-building measures and cooperation with ASEAN. The work highlights the need for a balance between national interests and the building of robust partnerships, which allows for a reduction in the risks of isolation and international confrontation.

A superficial reading of the South China Sea issue, informed by Beijing's propaganda line that the disputes amount simply to bilateral differences over principally Chinese maritime territory, would suggest that it is none of Australia's business. In reality, Australia has substantial stakes in what happens in these waters, where assertiveness and the manufacture of militarized islands have raised concerns about coercion and conflict. As a major trading nation, the world's thirteenth-largest economy, a regional maritime player in the Indo-Pacific, a middle power that benefits from the protection of norms and international law, a partner to its Asian neighbors, and an ally of the United States, Australia has myriad reasons to engage on this important strategic challenge. Historically, it has enacted and gained from freedom of navigation and commerce through this sea and air route. It also has a good record of multilateral diplomacy to reduce regional dangers. Reports of the Royal Australian Air Force quietly exercising freedom of navigation in late 2015 suggest that Canberra will continue to assert its rights and encourage a rules-based international response to tensions. [1] There remains some uncertainty, however, about how far Australia is prepared to go, including in the context of its weighty economic relationship with China. This essay provides an overview of Australian views on the South China Sea and discusses a range of options available for Australia to protect its interests in this important region

Abstract: This book presents a comprehensive analysis of the evolving nexus between geopolitical tensions and resource-based conflicts in the 21st century. It conceptualizes natural resources—oil, gas, water, rare earth elements, and digital infrastructure—as strategic assets embedded in global power structures and examines how their control shapes international behavior, diplomacy, and conflict. Through a multi-theoretical framework combining international relations theory, political economy, environmental security, and strategic studies, the book investigates the transformation of resource competition into a multidimensional phenomenon influenced by climate change, nationalism, and technological militarization. Methodologically, the study adopts a comparative case study approach, incorporating empirical evidence from high-risk zones such as the South China Sea, Nile Basin, Arctic region, and cyber-physical infrastructure networks. The analysis reveals that resource scarcity and asymmetrical access are increasingly weaponized by state and non-state actors, leading to shifts in global alliances, disruption of supply chains, and emergence of new conflict frontlines. Furthermore, the work explores the inadequacies of current governance mechanisms and proposes an integrated framework based on preventive diplomacy, resource justice, and cooperative sovereignty. The key contribution of this volume lies in its interdisciplinary synthesis and forward-looking governance proposals. By bridging academic theory with real-world policy imperatives, the book offers critical insights for scholars, policymakers, and multilateral institutions seeking to navigate the geopolitical challenges of resource interdependence in a rapidly transforming global order. Keywords geopolitical tensions, resource wars, energy security, water conflict, rare earth elements, climate-induced conflict, hydro-politics, cyber-infrastructure, space militarization, resource nationalism, global governance, strategic competition, preventive diplomacy, environmental security, multilateral institutions, AI and conflict, global power realignment, international relations theory, critical resources, conflict prevention

Abstract: The dispute over the Spratly Islands is an important indicator for the management of future relations in the Asia Pacific region. The Spratlys are claimed in whole or in part by China, Vietnam, Taiwan, Malaysia, the Philippines and Brunei. This is a particularly sensitive issue due to the strategic importance of the South China Sea, and the Spratly Islands in particular. The central argument of the article is that the development of multilateral regional cooperative security approaches to the territorial disputes in the South China Sea could assist in the maintenance of peace and stability in the sub-region. There are three primary questions that need to be addressed in order to effectively develop multilateral security cooperation in the South China Sea. The first is whether the claimants are willing to compromise their claims in order to attain a peaceful settlement of the dispute. Second, will the claimants be willing to adopt confidence-building measures that restrict their capability to respond to crises before a final resolution to the dispute has been achieved? Finally, can the claimants reach an agreement on the rules and norms for state behavior in the disputed territory. It is argued that cooperative security approaches offer the most appropriate mechanisms for the eventual resolution of the Spratlys dispute. A high level of enmity still exists among the claimants but this is primarily focused against the People’s Republic of China. China is seen as a threat to regional security because it has not renounced the use of force to resolve the dispute. The Chinese have also been reluctant to enter into multilateral dialogue over the issue as they feel they can gain more in bilateral meetings and fear being isolated on the issue in an international forum. The evolutionary nature of cooperative security approaches, however, offers the opportunity for others to convince the Chinese of the benefits of participating in multilateral institutions. The Workshops on Managing Potential Conflict in the South China Sea is also put forward as the best forum to deal with the Spratlys issue. The workshops adopt a cooperative security approach of promoting dialogue on regional security issues while also encouraging low level confidence-building among the littoral states through the development of joint development and research projects in the disputed area. The question remains, however, whether an informal process can develop sufficient habits of cooperation among the claimants to effectively spill over into a formal dialogue on sovereignty?

Japan’s principal security interest in Southeast Asia is the safety and security of regional sea lanes. Over the past several years, Japan has expressed growing concern at rising tensions in the South China Sea and the lack of progress by the claimants to negotiate effective conflict management mechanisms. Japan is not a claimant in the dispute, but as a major maritime trading nation, it is a significant stakeholder. Japan has two major concerns over the South China Sea. First, that instability has the potential to disrupt the free flow of maritime trade on which the country’s economic prosperity depends, and, second, that if China is able to persuade or coerce other Asian nations into accepting its claimed ‘historic rights’ in the South China Sea, existing international legal norms would be undermined. Moreover, Tokyo is alarmed at China’s increasingly assertive posture in the maritime domain, and views the disputes in the South and East China Seas as linked. To mitigate its concerns over the South China Sea, Japan is pursuing a number of strategies: it raises the problem at regional security forums; it seeks to enhance cooperation with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations on issues of maritime security and encourage unity within the organization on the South China Sea; it discusses the problem bilaterally with Southeast Asian countries and has started to provide capacity-building support to selected claimants (principally, the Philippines); and it seeks closer ties with other external stakeholders that share its concerns.

In exploring hidden risks to the international system, this issue has covered a variety of functional, regional, and theoretical topics; however, with U.S. foreign policy focus shifting to Asia, it is not surprising that many authors draw their attention to the South China Sea. Marvin Ott’s “Southeast Asia’s Strategic Landscape,” Charles Doran’s “Power Cycle Theory and the Ascendance of China,” Chris Ford’s “Soft on Soft Power,” and Ian Bremmer’s interview all touch in some way on potential conflict in the South (and East) China Seas. As Sino-Taiwanese relations warm following the January 2012 re-election of Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou, who has made strengthening ties with the mainland a priority of his administration, the South China Sea will become the preeminent focus of U.S.-China watchers who study potential military clashes between the two countries. Given the shifting attention to the issue, the risk of conflict in the South China Sea is not particularly “hidden.” Indeed, over the last two years, the United States has paid increasing attention to the region, most evident by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s reassertion of U.S. interests there at the ASEAN ministerial meetings in Hanoi in July 2010 1 and President Obama’s emphasis of the same concerns at the November 2011 East Asia Summit. 2 The essential dynamics are well-covered by popular media and clearly understood from traditional theories of international relations: a rising power, China, competes with a status quo hegemon, the United States, for influence in a complicated multipolar regional context across a variety of military, diplomatic, and economic fronts. The South China Sea is particularly well-suited for such competition as, beyond its large economic and strategic importance as a global crossroads, it is a source of vast, untapped natural resources. Though the overarching risk of tension in the South China Sea is not hidden, policymakers in Washington should be clear on the actual dangers posed by conflict as they begin to consider future U.S. competition with

It investigates how the Indo Pacific region has escalated tensions between China and Russia from the perspective of Power Transition Theory by analyzing how a rising power confronts a hegemon. Using the focus on China’s rise and the emergence of new U.S. strategic engagement in the Indo-Pacific, the study explains casting light on the changes of Sino-Russian relations, which to the home on the alliance pattern, balancing behavior and the mutual threat perception. Utilizing a qualitative methodological approach, the research draws on case studies, policy documents, official speeches, and expert interviews to assess the nature and extent of Sino-Russian coordination. It explores whether their partnership constitutes a deliberate balancing coalition aimed at contesting U.S. dominance or a fragile alignment born out of geopolitical expedience. Special attention is paid to regional flashpoints such as the South China Sea, Central Asia, and joint naval operations to illustrate the practical implications of their cooperation. The findings indicate that although rhetorical convergence and selective coordination are evident, deep-seated mistrust and divergent strategic ambitions inhibit the formation of a unified strategic front. Taken as a whole, what Power Transition Theory has offered is a useful framework for apprehending changing geopolitical architecture of the Indo-Pacific that stubbornly combines strategic competition with good neighborly cooperation. Keywords: Indo-Pacific, Power Transition Theory, China-Russia relations- Strategic cooperation- Regional security.

Contents: Part I Introduction: Maritime security in the South China Sea: cooperation and implications, Wu Shicun and Zou Keyuan. Part II Securing Navigation in the South China Sea: Good order at sea in the South China Sea, Sam Bateman Maritime trade development in Asia: a need for regional maritime security cooperation in the South China Sea, Hong Nong Maritime security cooperation in the South China Sea region, Andrew S. Erickson Myth and reality: the rise and fall of contemporary maritime piracy in the South China Sea, Xu Ke Commentary: a regional perspective on South China Sea passage security, Wu Shicun. Part III Regional Cooperation Combating Maritime Terrorism and Piracy: Regional maritime security initiative (RMSI) and enhancing security in the Straits of Malacca: littoral states' and regional responses, Yann-huei Song Crackdown on piracy in Southeast Asian seas: need a more effective legal regime?, Zou Keyuan Southeast Asian SLOC security, Joshua H. Ho The United States response to maritime terrorism, Kristen G. Juras Commentary: enhancing Sino-US maritime cooperation for regional security, Bao Hongjun and Zhu Huayou. Part IV Environmental Security and Maritime Rescue: The development of oil spill preparedness and response in China, Xu Shiming Regional cooperation for marine pollution contingency response in the South China Sea, Zhang Xiangjun International submarine rescue: a constructive role for China, Lyle J. Goldstein and William S. Murray Commentary: search and rescue in South China Sea and regional cooperation, Zhang Jie Index.

This chapter examines the dynamics of the strategic competition between the United States and China over the South China Sea (SCS) in recent years. We suggest a “bargaining dilemma” argument to offer a new explanation that will shed some light on the US–China competition in the SCS. We argue that the simmering tension between the US and China in the SCS reflects an unsettled bargaining game between a rising power and the existing hegemon for power and dominance in the region. The bargaining strategies of the two states in addressing their information and commitment problems will shape the success or the failure of the negotiations between the United States and China in the SCS. While multilateral institutions might be helpful, the future of the SCS will largely depend on the wisdom of policy makers in both countries in finding a balance between skillful compromise and hard bargaining.

Japan’s defence modernization is a major shift in its defence doctrine, driven primarily by the changing regional threats and regional strategic realignment. This study looks into the factors influencing the Japanese defence policies such as, geopolitical tensions with China and North Korea, technological developments, and further deepening alliances with the United States and other regional partners and tries to analyse how such developments influence the security dynamics of East Asia using qualitative content analysis. The findings reflect Japan's changing approach from a classical pacifist state to a more proactive security role, strengthening deterrence while fuelling regional stability concerns and possible competition in the arms race. Japan's defence modernization enhances the capability of its defence, rewriting its geopolitical role and standing as a crucial player in maintaining regional stability. Still, balancing national security and historical pacifist commitment leaves the complex set of challenges. The study emphasizes the need for strategic diplomacy and multinational cooperation to mitigate tensions and maintain the stability of the security environment in East Asia.

This paper examines current military modernisation trends in Asia, and seeks to explore whether this process of military modernisation could evolve into an arms race in coming years. It explores security dilemmas related to the crises in the South China Sea and East China Sea, and examines how these are promoting a degree of reactive modernisation. It examines the potential role of an information-led Revolution in Military Affairs as a next step in military modernisation, and examines how rapid change in the character and conduct could lead to regional arms racing. It argues that an arms race, emerging from current modernisation, appears increasingly likely. 2014 HERDC submission. 摘要：本文審查當前軍事現代化的趨勢在亞洲，並力求探索是否這軍事現代化的進程在未來幾年可以演變成一場軍備競賽。它探討了安全困境與相關的在中國南海和東海、危機和檢查如何這些都促進了一定程度的無功現代化。審查資訊主導軍事革命下一步的在軍事現代化方面的潛在作用，並就檢查如何迅速變化的特徵和行為可能導致區域軍備競賽。它認為軍備競賽，擺脫當前現代化，出現的可能性越來越大。

ASEAN’s Stakes:The South China Sea’s Challenge to Autonomy and Agency Alice D. Ba (bio) The South China Sea has come to involve important stakes for all involved. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is no different—though its situation is also notably distinct. The South China Sea occupies what Michael Leifer once characterized as the geographic “heart of Southeast Asia.”1 Geography alone means that whatever happens in the South China Sea affects ASEAN states the most directly. Moreover, as smaller powers, these states confront much greater vulnerabilities when it comes to great-power demands, even as they may be particular beneficiaries of great-power association. China’s activities in the South China Sea have no doubt underscored these dilemmas as the ASEAN states all try to navigate between the strategic vulnerabilities and the economic opportunities associated with a rising, more confident China. Nor are ASEAN states’ great-power dilemmas limited to China: the latter’s activities in the South China Sea have also precipitated heightened attention from the United States. ASEAN’s challenge is thus compounded by the fact that the South China Sea has become an important focal point of rivalry and tension between the ASEAN region’s two most important great-power relationships. Maintaining a space between China and the United States—one in which Southeast Asian states can enjoy some range of maneuver and choice—may prove to be the greatest challenge confronting the ASEAN region. This essay considers what is at stake in the South China Sea disputes for ASEAN’s coalition of smaller powers, with special attention paid to institutional interests and constraints. It considers not only the more immediate challenges created by territorial disputes but also the more general great-power dilemmas that heightened tensions have recently thrown into sharp relief. [End Page 47] ASEAN’s Immediate Challenges Most immediately, China’s physical and jurisdictional assertions create the challenge for ASEAN of agreeing on a collective response. This challenge, however, is made more complicated by the fact that it is an intergovernmental organization. Tus, while other governments may have to manage a constellation of domestic interests and agencies, ASEAN as an institution is the expression of ten distinct sovereign actors. States differ not just in the importance they attach to the disputes but also in their relations with China and the kinds of regional responses they prioritize. ASEAN’s unprecedented and very public failure to produce a joint communiqué at its 2012 annual foreign ministers’ meeting chaired by Cambodia in Phnom Penh dramatically illustrated this challenge. Additionally complicating ASEAN’s response is the fact that critical differences exist even among the grouping’s four claimant states. The Philippines and Vietnam have been the most vocal and active in responding to China’s activities, while Brunei and Malaysia—even with recently growing Malaysian concerns—have generally favored softer approaches. Such differences challenge ASEAN’s efforts to adopt a collective position as well as implement possible ad hoc workarounds that might facilitate a way forward. In its response to the South China Sea disputes, ASEAN as a collective has prioritized the pursuit of a regional code of conduct (CoC) because it keeps attention on the principles of international law, as well as existing codes of conduct like ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. Following the embarrassment of ASEAN’s 2012 meeting, Indonesia quickly moved to facilitate ASEAN’s Six-Point Principles on the South China Sea. This statement identifies the “early conclusion” of a CoC and the “full implementation” of both ASEAN’s 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea and the 2011 guidelines as important priorities alongside self-restraint and the nonuse of force by all parties, “full respect” for the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and the peaceful resolution of disputes. These six principles continue to provide ASEAN states with an important basis for consensus and action. Indonesia’s moves to quickly correct the failures of the 2012 ASEAN ministers’ meeting under Cambodia’s chairmanship are indicative of the understood risks that the South China Sea disputes pose to the organization. Notably, however, the CoC is “not meant...