Abstract
Once we accept that voters are going to behave strategically, and think of voting rules (with preferences) as games, we can analyze them with game theoretic tools like any other game. In this chapter and the next ones, we will review some prominent attempts to “solve” voting games using familiar or novel equilibrium concepts. As these voting models are very different from one another in their assumptions and conclusions, it is hard to tell, a priori, if a given model is useful in some context or at all. Therefore we included in Section 6.1 criteria by which the various models can be evaluated. The rest of the chapter considers the normal form game induced by a voting rule f and a given population (a preference profile, or a distribution over profiles), and the various notions of equilibrium that may apply to such a game.
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