Abstract
Side-channel attacks compare side-channel leakage predictions or estimations with side-channel leakage measurements. The estimations are based on the exact value of a few select state bits. If it is impossible to calculate the value of the state bits, it is also impossible to estimate the side-channel leakage and a side-channel attack cannot be mounted. The leakage can be measured, but cannot be estimated. In this paper, we first give an analysis of the size of the search space related to the smallest subset of state bits. Then we propose some techniques to make side-channel leakage tolerant architectures. These are architectures of which it is more difficult to calculate the value of the state bits. The architectures still leak side-channel data. Yet, the information content is less easy to exploit
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
