Abstract
Moral realism and moral relativism are two influential dogmas in moral philosophy. This paper examines relativism’s possible position and the burden of justification of a particular form of realism in the problem of moral disagreement. This paper concludes that neither position is morally acceptable, and this paper further offers a hint to a middle way: moral pragmatism.
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