Abstract

A common complaint about conciliatory approaches to disagreement is that they are self-defeating or incoherent because they ‘call for their own rejection’. This complaint seems to be rather influential but it isn’t clear whether conciliatory views call for their own rejection or what, if anything, this tells us about the coherence of such views. We shall look at two ways of developing this self-defeat objection and we shall see that conciliatory views emerge unscathed. A simple version of the self-defeat objection leaves conciliatory views untouched. A subtle version of the objection contains a subtle but overlooked flaw. If the conciliatory view is right, it might be right to be dogmatically conciliatory (i.e., to continue to be conciliatory however objectionable this might seem to ourselves and to others).

Highlights

  • What should you do if you and a recognized peer discover that you disagree about some proposition? According to a simple version of a conciliatory view, you and & Clayton Littlejohn cmlittlejohn@gmail.com

  • If the objection has any force against a hedged and limited conciliatory view (CV hereafter), it threatens a broader class of conciliatory approaches and tells us something important about epistemic norms in general

  • I would like to make a general point about any argument about epistemic norms that appeals to ERw and any norm like evidentialism or CV that tells us that we ought to believe things about norms when we acquire evidence against them

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Summary

Introduction

What should you do if you and a recognized peer discover that you disagree about some proposition? According to a simple version of a conciliatory view, you and. On one way of developing this view, you and your peer each acquire a defeating reason. It undercuts the rational force of the evidence that you both took to support your positions. The conciliatory view I have in mind is restricted in a number of ways that will simplify discussion. It pertains to full belief, not partial belief or degrees of belief. It tells us nothing about cases where one peer believes and the other suspends judgment.

The simple self-defeat objection
The subtle self-defeat objection
The subtle flaw in the subtle argument
Conclusion
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