Should we attempt to justify induction?

Abstract

IN THE broadest sense, an inductive inference is any non-demonstrative inference to a matter of fact. An inductive rule, then, would be any nondeductive rule of inference for drawing matter of fact conclusions, provided that such a rule does not sanction drawing self-contradictory conclusions from any consistent set of premises (including the null set). I regard the problem of justifying induction as the problem of justifying a choice from among the wide variety of possible inductive rules. The question whether past experience is to be a guide to the future is included in the problem thus formulated, for among the possible rules are some which render evidence about the past irrelevant to predictions of the future.* In recent years a rather large number of philosophers have argued that the attempt to justify induction ought to be abandoned. They have supported this claim by arguments designed to show that a justification of induction is either impossible or unnecessary or both. Within this paper