Should Government Play a Strict or Lenient Role? An Evolutionary Game Analysis of Implementing the Forest Ecological Bank Policy

Abstract

As one of the specific practices of natural resource index trading, the forest ecological bank policy (FEB) is essentially a market-based tool. With the deepening of ecological governance, the FEB policy has also become the main method chosen to solve the economic development problems in ecologically rich “low-lying” areas. However, in the process of implementing the FEB policy, the differences in the demands of various stakeholders were found to have led to a complex game phenomenon, resulting in deviations in policy implementation. This study constructs a multiplayer evolutionary game model between local governments and enterprises of different scales and analyzes the evolutionary stabilization strategy (ESS) in the implementation of the FEB policy. The results show that, under different conditions, there are three stabilization strategies in the evolutionary game system, these correspond to F1 (0, 0, 0), F4 (0, 1, 1), and F5 (1, 0, 0), respectively, the implications are that the strict government role with an active regulatory strategy leads to companies of different sizes refusing to participate (i.e., F5) and the lax government role with a negative regulatory strategy leads to companies of different sizes refusing to participate (i.e., F1) or choosing to participate (i.e., F4). Among them, the strict government role stimulates the companies to participate in the FEB policy through the high intensity of government regulation. In addition, as the policy continues to be implemented, the influence of the strict regulation on the “participation” behavior of the companies decreases. Conversely, the lax government role allows the companies to give full play to their autonomy and obtain higher ecological and environmental benefits.