Sextus Empiricus On Simple And Non-Simple Indemonstrables

Pyrrhonian Reflections on Knowledge and Justification (PR) is an examination of contemporary work in theory of knowledge, written from what I call a neo-Pyrrhonian standpoint. This work is Pyrrhonian because it echoes in many ways Sextus Empiricus' Outlines of Pyrrhonism. I call this standpoint neo-Pyrrhonism because I have tried to update the methods of Sextus Empiricus to make them applicable to contemporary debates. The fundamental question of PR is this: How would contemporary practitioners of epistemology fare if a Pyrrhonist is made a party to the discussion? The conclusion arrived at: Not at all well. The suitability of calling these reflections Pyrrhonian depends upon the correctness of a particular reading of the Outlines of Pyrrhonism. Pyrrhonists are often pictured as calling for a suspension of all beliefs whatsoever. Hume attributed such a view to them, as do such contemporary scholars as Jonathan Barnes and Miles Burnyeat.1 This reading is often presented as a prelude to dismissing Pyrrhonism on the grounds that, taken seriously, it would make life unlivable-a line taken explicitly by both Hume and Burnyeat. An alternative reading is that Pyrrhonists did not call for the suspension of belief in all areas, but targeted only dogmatic philosophy and other theoretical activities akin to dogmatic philosophy-where an attempt is made to transcend our customary modes of fixing beliefs in order to achieve something higher. On this reading, the Pyrrhonists imposed no standards of their own. They simply took dogmatists at their word and showed that, by their own standards, their projects failed. The call for suspension of belief had dogmatic philosophy as its primary target, theoretical activities akin to dogmatic philosophy as its secondary target, but was not concerned with common beliefs arrived at in customary ways. This reading has, it seems to me, been given decisive scholarly support

Protagoras was a Presocratic Greek philosopher and founder of sophistic education whose doctrine of skepticism is criticized by Socrates in the Platonic dialogues. Believed to have been born in Abdera, Thrace, Protagoras was educated in philosophy by Democritus, a natural scientist and theorist of atomism. Aside from his career as a teacher, little is known concerning his life or career beyond brief biographical sketches provided by Diogenes Laertius and Sextus Empiricus. During his time in Athens, Protagoras associated with Pericles and other elites while composing a number of treatises on subjects ranging from the art of dialectic argument to wrestling. Diogenes has suggested that Protagoras was invited by Pericles to draft a constitution for the Athenian colony of Thurii in 443 bce. Protagoras’ professed agnosticism caused him to be expelled from Athens, and though tradition holds that his books were publicly burned, contemporary scholars have cast doubt on this claim. He died in exile.

Reviewed by: Pyrrhonism: How the Ancient Greeks Reinvented Buddhism M. Jason Reddoch Pyrrhonism: How the Ancient Greeks Reinvented Buddhism. By Adrian Kuzminski. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2008. Pp. xiv + 155. Hardcover $65.00. Pyrrhonism: How the Ancient Greeks Reinvented Buddhism, by Adrian Kuzminski, is a short monograph of four chapters in which the author argues that Pyrrho of Elis (ca. 365–270 b.c.e.) developed his form of skepticism after coming into contact with Indian philosophers on his journey with Alexander the Great. Although the subtitle suggests that the primary focus of the study will be to develop this argument for historical diffusion, the book is more of an apology for Pyrrhonism, which Kuzminski thinks can be better understood by emphasizing its striking similarities with Buddhism. While presenting a plausible scenario for historical diffusion, he emphasizes parallels specifically with the Mādhyamaka school of Mahāyāna Buddhism in order to provide a better understanding of Pyrrhonism's meaning, purpose, and potential. Kuzminski is persuasive in his use of Buddhism to clarify Pyrrhonism and to correct previous misinterpretations of Pyrrhonism by Western philosophers, but his treatment of historical and philological issues is often neither thorough nor totally persuasive. In what follows, I will present a summary of the book followed by some critical remarks. Kuzminski's focus is on Pyrrhonism, but I will provide more discussion of his treatment of its similarities and contact with Buddhism. In his first chapter, "Why Pyrrhonism is Not Scepticism," Kuzminski argues that in contrast to the dogmatic and nihilist approach of the Academic skeptics who held that truth cannot be known, Pyrrhonism is best understood as a nondogmatic therapeutic philosophy that promoted suspension of judgment. This distinction is supported by the account of Pyrrhonism by Sextus Empiricus (fl. second century c.e.). In order to stress Pyrrhonism's practical and soteriological goals, Kuzminski contrasts ancient accounts of Pyrrho, who is described as living a tranquil and reclusive life, with those of Arcesilaus (fl. third century b.c.e.), the first head of the skeptical Academy, who is said to be somewhat pompous and prone to extravagant displays. Kuzminski blames the confusion between these two schools of thought on a number of prominent modern philosophers and contemporary scholars, including David Hume, Friedrich Nietzsche, M. F. Burnyeat, and Martha Nussbaum. Kuzminski considers Arne Naess the closest to a contemporary Pyrrhonist. In chapter 2, "Pyrrhonism and Buddhism," Kuzminski undertakes his most direct comparison of the two traditions.1 He emphasizes the plausibility of historical diffusion by pointing to both general evidence for sustained contact between Greece and India via trade routes and the Persian empire and possible references to Ionian Greeks in the middle-length discourses of the Buddha. Kuzminski rejects the claims [End Page 424] of Richard Bett, who argues on the basis of a later Greek fragment of Aristocles (fl. second century c.e.) that our sources for Pyrrhonism do not actually go back to the historical Pyrrho and that Pyrrho was more of a nihilist.2 According to Kuzminski, the account is biased and reflects the same misunderstanding many modern scholars have had. Kuzminski's point of departure for his specific comparison of Pyrrhonism and Buddhism is Everard Flintoff's 1980 article in which he argued that a persuasive case could be made for the necessary historical relationship between Pyrrhonism and Buddhism not on the basis of individual parallels but by considering the combination of similarities as a whole.3 Kuzminski, however, is critical of Flintoff on a couple of points such as his claim that the quadrilemma is unprecedented in Greece prior to Pyrrho. When Kuzminski turns to his specific comparison of Pyrrhonism and Buddhism, he refers primarily to Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhyamakārikā and Candrakīrti's Madhyamakāvatāra. Both traditions share the idea that their philosophy is better understood as a method rather than a doctrine, and Kuzminski argues that the Pyrrhonist method of producing contradictory arguments in order to be led to a state of suspension of judgment (epochē) and then tranquility (ataraxia) is paralleled in the text of Candrakīrti. Both consider it necessary to accept involuntary sensory impressions and thoughts but to reject inferences...

The background of the research is based on the author's concern about the rise of apostasy cases that occur in Indonesian society, especially those that occur among public figures in the country. As happened with Lukman Sardi, Asmirandah and others. There has been a pro-contra against this phenomenon, ranging from the phobia of Islam (secular), liberal Islamic groups, radical Islamic groups (Wahhabis), and moderate modernist groups. The crucial point that has become a debate about apostasy is the application of the death law to apostates, which is regulated legally in Islamic law, so that affiliates who reject the total law arise with the pretext of human rights, and groups that defend the law with arguments undeniable. then the writer looks for the midpoint that answers and becomes the solution to this hot issue, by reviewing some classical references (turats), so that a meeting point can be found that can be agreed by both parties. To find the right formula in answering this phenomenon the author uses the Library Research method (library research) by using primary data and secondary data. Data analysis was obtained through library research which was analyzed qualitatively. From this study found answers relevant to apostasy and their consequences in contemporary Islamic law. There are two opinions that seem opposite and contradictory, between the opinions of classical and contemporary scholars. The side of difference is in the legality of beheading for apostates. One group considers it legal with valid arguments while the other group considers it not. Nevertheless there are points of equality in several criteria that justify the execution.

The background of the research is based on the author's concern about the rise of apostasy cases that occur in Indonesian society, especially those that occur among public figures in the country. As happened with Lukman Sardi, Asmirandah and others. There has been a pro-contra against this phenomenon, ranging from the phobia of Islam (secular), liberal Islamic groups, radical Islamic groups (Wahhabis), and moderate modernist groups. The crucial point that has become a debate about apostasy is the application of the death law to apostates, which is regulated legally in Islamic law, so that affiliates who reject the total law arise with the pretext of human rights, and groups that defend the law with arguments undeniable. then the writer looks for the midpoint that answers and becomes the solution to this hot issue, by reviewing some classical references (turats), so that a meeting point can be found that can be agreed by both parties. To find the right formula in answering this phenomenon the author uses the Library Research method (library research) by using primary data and secondary data. Data analysis was obtained through library research which was analyzed qualitatively. From this study found answers relevant to apostasy and their consequences in contemporary Islamic law. There are two opinions that seem opposite and contradictory, between the opinions of classical and contemporary scholars. The side of difference is in the legality of beheading for apostates. One group considers it legal with valid arguments while the other group considers it not. Nevertheless there are points of equality in several criteria that justify the execution.

Reviewed by: Quel savoir après le scepticisme? Plotin et ses prédécesseurs sur la connaissance de soi Lloyd P. Gerson Wilfried Kühn. Quel savoir après le scepticisme? Plotin et ses prédécesseurs sur la connaissance de soi. Histoire des doctrines de l’antiquité classique 37. Paris: J. Vrin, 2009. Pp. 471. Paper, €50.00. In this closely argued monograph, the author examines one chapter of Plotinus’s treatise V.3 [49], titled “On the Knowing Hypostasis and That Which is Beyond.” In the fifth chapter of that work, Plotinus makes the case for asserting that knowledge is primarily or essentially self-knowledge. This is certainly not a novel claim in the history of ancient philosophy, as Kühn amply demonstrates. It is a central claim in Aristotle’s epistemology and the later Peripatetic tradition. What is of particular interest for the Plotinian account of knowledge as self-knowledge is that it is made in response to a skeptical argument found in Sextus Empiricus, although it is likely that it did not originate with him. That argument attempts to pose the following dilemma for any “dogmatist” who embraces self-knowledge. Either this self-knowledge is in effect one “part” of the knower knowing another “part,” or else it is one “part” knowing not another “part,” but rather knowing “itself.” The first horn of the dilemma means that self-knowledge is not knowledge at all, since the putative knower would have to be able to show that the first “part” is representing the second part accurately. And this is something that cannot be done without the first “part” knowing the second “part,” not by representing it, but by being identical with it. This leads to the second horn: if the knowing “part” just knows itself and not an object different from itself, then this knowledge will have no content. So, self-knowledge seems to be impossible. All this the author explains with great care, though he does not emphasize a point that seems to me important, namely, that Sextus, like Plotinus and like Aristotle, is assuming that knowledge, as propounded by all dogmatists, is primarily taken to be self-knowledge, in which case the skeptical attack [End Page 522] on the latter becomes all the more serious and justifies Plotinus’s extensive response to it. The reason for this is that apparently only self-knowledge could be infallible, and it is infallibility that characterizes knowledge apart from mere belief. The main part of this book (45–311) is devoted to the structure of the argument in V.3, 5. Along the way, Kühn keeps in focus the historical discussions about knowledge that were the immediate background for Plotinus’s reflections. The last part of the book (313–416) provides a substantial exegesis and interpretation of Aristotle’s account of divine and human self-knowledge, of Alexander of Aphrodisias’s commentary on this account, and on Academic and Stoic epistemological contributions. Kühn argues, against many scholars, that Plotinus’s doctrine of self-knowledge is innovative in claiming that it is an activity and not a relation between a subject and an object. Against the obvious objection that Aristotle, too, conceives of the self-knowledge of the divine as an activity, the author argues that Plotinus relies on Plato’s Sophist in maintaining that the activity of the self-knowing Intellect is in fact that of the intelligible object, that is, the Form. Thus, Kühn is led to find in Plotinus an equivocation in the use of the Greek term for “knowledge,” that is, when applied to the subject for which knowing implies an intentional object, and for the object, for which knowing is a purely immanent activity without such an object. The great strength of this book is its minute attention to every nuance of Plotinus’s text and its aim—largely met—to provide a perspicuous and accurate presentation of the argument. All the relevant scholarship is treated in the footnotes, and all the relevant texts from elsewhere in the Enneads are discussed in their context. The principal weakness of the book is found in the author’s choice to set aside all metaphysical...

An argument for the existence of gods given by the Stoic Diogenes of Babylon and reported by Sextus Empiricus appears to be an ancient version of the ontological argument. In this paper I present a new reconstruction of Diogenes' argument that differs in certain important respects from the reconstruction presented by Jacques Brunschwig. I argue that my reconstruction makes better sense of how Diogenes' argument emerged as a response to an attack on an earlier Stoic argument presented by Zeno of Citium. Diogenes' argument as reconstructed here is an example of a modal ontological argument that makes use of the concept of being of such a nature as to exist. I argue that this concept is a modal concept that is based on the Philonian definition of possibility, and thus that Diogenes' argument is a source of important evidence about the use of non-Stoic modalities in the post-Chrysippean Stoa. I conclude by arguing that the objections made against considering Diogenes' argument as ontological are unfounded and that Diogenes' argument clearly resembles modern versions of modal ontological arguments.

Reviewed by: Stoic Theology: Proofs for the Existence of the Cosmic God and of the Traditional Gods Michael Papazian P. A. Meijer . Stoic Theology: Proofs for the Existence of the Cosmic God and of the Traditional Gods. Delft: Elburon, 2007. Pp. xii + 256. Paper, $39.90. Meijer's book, a comprehensive study of Stoic theological arguments, defends the thesis that the Stoics were not narrowly interested in proving the existence of a god. The theology of the Stoa began with its founder, Zeno of Citium, presenting arguments that the cosmos is an intelligent being, though Zeno himself seems not to have explicitly identified that intelligent being as god. A clear statement equating the cosmos with god had to wait until the rise of the third head of the school, Chrysippus, though Meijer acknowledges that there is no reason to think that Zeno or Cleanthes, the second head, would have opposed the proposition that the cosmos, or at least the rational fire that pervades it, is god. Confusion about the true intent of Zeno's arguments is due to their distortion in the sources, for example, by Sextus Empiricus, who, Meijer contends, presents several of Zeno's arguments for the rationality of the cosmos as if they were intended as arguments to establish the existence of god. As a result, Sextus is an unreliable witness for determining the point of these arguments. Further confusing matters is the existence of a set of arguments attributed to Zeno that aim to establish the existence of the traditional gods. Meijer insists that a clear distinction be drawn between these two types of Stoic arguments, a distinction that the sources and later scholars have often not observed. Arguments that conclude that the gods exist because they may be reasonably honored or because otherwise virtues like piety or practices such as prophecy would be discredited served a different purpose than the arguments for the intelligence of the cosmos. The former arguments were advanced, according to Meijer, as a defense against the charge that the theistic naturalism of the Stoics was impious. To acquit themselves, the Stoics presented these arguments for the existence of the Greek pantheon. This need not imply any insincerity, since Cleanthes, whose hymn to Zeus is carefully analyzed by Meijer in an appendix, seems to have been a rather earnest believer, even to the point of charging Aristarchus with heresy for his heliocentrism. Under the pressure of the attacks of the Academic Skeptics and others, Stoic theology became more sophisticated. Meijer devotes a chapter to the parabolai or parodies of the dialectician Alexinus, whose pithy variations of the Stoic arguments were rhetorically effective, though met by the able replies of later Stoics such as Diogenes of Babylon. Of particular interest among the counterarguments are the "soritical arguments" of Carneades against the existence of gods. Meijer's chapter on these is especially strong and provides an interesting contrast of the two sources for this class of argument, Cicero and Sextus. Along with the appendix on Cleanthes' hymn, the book closes with two shorter appendices on the question of the place of the cosmos in the void and on Alexinus's parodies. Meijer's book is a helpful contribution to the scholarship on Stoic theology. But while Meijer provides a salutary counterbalance to the scholarship on Stoic theology that has [End Page 467] tended not to be as attentive to the distinct purposes to which these arguments were first put, Meijer may have gone too far in the other direction. One may wonder whether some of these distinctions were even observed by the Stoics themselves. For example, the Zenonian argument that the traditional gods exist because they are worthy of honor was rescued from Alexinus's parody by Diogenes' proof that the gods are of such a nature as to exist. A plausible reading of being of such a nature as to exist is to understand it as some kind of necessary or essential existence. This has led some commentators to see shades of an ontological argument in Diogenes' response to Alexinus. But while it may make sense to attribute necessary existence to the cosmic god, it is dubious in the case of the traditional...

The analysis concerns the lemma μεταξύ, namely “middle” or “intermediate” entity between two different or opposite realities. Aristotle uses it in order to elaborate a metaphysical concept in a double hermeneutic- polemic context. Firstly, with reference to the Presocratic thought he speaks of three physiological types, that’s (a) between air and water, or (b) water and fire, or (c) air and fire. This description turns out to be an anachronistic interpretation of what was originally conceived as a mere “other” (ἄλλο) or “different” (ἔτερον) one from the well-known four elements (the earth and the above mentioned three). Such a beginning witness, referring no specific and explicit name of its possible author, provokes the two following traditions: the skeptical one through Sextus Empiricus who individualizes Ideus of Imera as its theorist, perhaps at the basis of a geographical Aristotle’s allusion (Ἰταλικοί); the peripatetic-neoplatonic one which is very complicated and stratified. Nikolaos of Damascus maintains the μεταξύ air/fire against that air/water, preferred by Aristotle, and appeals to Diogenes of Apollonia as its author. This thesis is totally accepted by Porphyry against Alexander of Aphrodisia, who formerly reestablished the original peripatetic tradition with the type air/water and appealed even to Anaximander so that his conception of ἄπειρον is explained through the aforesaid posterior notion. At the end Simplicius joins up the notices from Nikolaos-Porphyry and Alexander, even if he denies that Diogenes supposed the μεταξύ as exclusive principle of the entire reality in the manner, Anaximander would have determined it. According to Simplicius the epigone had described only something totally united, including every element of whichever type, whereby the same in its absolute unity continuously diversifies itself and reunifies itself. The so-called mathematical μεταξύ, attributed to Plato by Aristotle, is not attested, because in the Platonic vision there is no middle entity of this nature with the function to mediate between the intelligible and the sensible. At the end of the VI Book of Republic, especially at 511d2, the only original text, where the term is used in a mathematical context, indeed Plato exclusively deals with a methodological approach of ‘dianoetic’ sciences (mathematics, geometry, astronomy), which, in order to demonstrate their axioms, need supports of empirical representations (as a particular material drawing of triangle used by a geometer in order to deduce its universal, intelligible proprieties of geometric nature), but have no function of mediation between the two ontological dimensions (the intelligible and the sensible).

The Parva Naturalia are a collection of nine short treatises devoted by Aristotle to the study of the affections and of the operations of the soul. Whereas contemporary scholarship regards the Parva Naturalia as an important source for the study of Aristotles psychology, in the late ancient and medieval Peripatetic tradition this collection was rather neglected. Albert the Great (ca. 12001280) is the first commentator who gives a central place to the Parva Naturalia in the reconstruction of the Peripatetic science of the soul. The entire collection of Alberts writings related to the Parva Naturalia was highly successful in the late Middle Ages and has wide manuscript dissemination. This chapter focuses on the structure of the manuscript tradition of Alberts commentaries on De sensu et sensato and De memoria et reminiscentia , of which the author is preparing the critical edition. Keywords: Albert the Great; Aristotle; De memoria et reminiscentia ; De sensu et sensato ; Parva Naturalia

Contrary to the conventional view that the doctrine of unconscionability requires procedural defects and is based on bargaining inequality, this paper argues that, in principle, substantive unconscionability alone shall be sufficient to constitute unconscionability and so vitiate a contract. It is also my contention that Aristotelian idea of contract of exchange as an act of voluntary commutative justice explains the two sources of unfairness. They are not understood by contemporary legal scholarship, namely, economic unfairness and involuntariness. Economic unfairness prevents gross disparity, which alone triggers unconscionability; it has been observed that when a transaction is truly stupid or one-sided, courts will set aside the contract as unconscionable. When a contract violates the autonomy of a party by hiding offensive or oppressive terms in a boilerplate, relief is given by both the Second Restatement of Contracts and European Directive. Yet, there is no doctrinal basis in our theoretical framework that justifies either one of the two reliefs. We stand a better chance of having a coherent doctrine of unconscionability by understanding what unfairness means and seeing contract of exchange as an act of voluntary commutative justice as in Aristotelian tradition.

A. Kenny’s Metaphysics of Mind : 25 years later To mark the 25th anniversary of A. Kenny’s The Metaphysics of Mind , this article discusses some of the central arguments of this book, in particular, it discusses Descartes’ dualism, the notion of soul or Aristotle’s psyche , human and animal language, voluntary action, the self, the mind-brain relation, thinking and intentionality, and determinism and free will. The author holds that, although Kenny’s book offers valid and substantial arguments inspired in Wittgenstein’s thought and the Aristotelian tradition, he occasionally fails to appreciate the depth of basic concepts in the Aristotelian tradition such as that of psyche and the immateriality of the human intellect. Despite this, the book constitutes one of the best efforts to break off with Descartes’ and the empiricists’ ideas, and to incorporate the Aristotelian tradition to the contemporary philosophy of mind.

Is there a problem about justifying deduction? Why shouldn't there be? There is, after all, a direct analogue of Hume's dilemma for induction which applies, presumably with equal force, to deduction: We cannot justify deduction inductively since it would be far too weak to say, what such a justification could at best say, that usually when the premisses of a valid deductive argument are true, then the conclusion is true as well. But neither can we justify deduction deductively, because such ajustification would be circular. This much, it seems to me, is enough to think the issue worth raising. But if there is a genuine concern here, it is safe to say that few philosophers have paused long to worry about it. One of the reasons for this is that with the exception of Sextus Empiricus, J.S. Mill and a few others, philosophers have not been willing to entertain the notion that there is, or even that there could be, anything drastically wrong with deductive reasoning.

At Outlines of Pyrrhonism (PH) 2.227–8, Sextus Empiricus argues that certain entities which his adversaries hold to be one and the same for different individuals are in fact not. This he does by, among other things, considering the truth-value of sentences of which the subject is a common noun, thereby drawing an interesting connection between metaphysics and semantics. In this article, I provide a careful analysis of Sextus’ arguments at PH 2.227–8 and explore the origins and limits of such a connection. In particular, I argue that Sextus’ argument at PH 2.227 probably reflects a Stoic argument against Aristotelian essences, thereby relying on specifically Stoic doctrines about universals and common nouns, whereas his next argument at PH 2.228 targets accidents. If this is true, it follows that the overall structure of PH 2.227–8 fits well with the typically Aristotelian distinction between essence and accident.

In ancient philosophy, there is no discipline called “logic” in the contemporary sense of “the study of formally valid arguments.” Rather, once a subfield of philosophy comes to be called “logic,” namely in Hellenistic philosophy, the field includes (among other things) epistemology, normative epistemology, philosophy of language, the theory of truth, and what we call logic today. This entry aims to examine ancient theorizing that makes contact with the contemporary conception. Thus, we will here emphasize the theories of the “syllogism” in the Aristotelian and Stoic traditions. However, because the context in which these theories were developed and discussed were deeply epistemological in nature, we will also include references to the areas of epistemological theorizing that bear directly on theories of the syllogism, particularly concerning “demonstration.” Similarly, we will include literature that discusses the principles governing logic and the components that make up arguments, which are topics that might now fall under the headings of philosophy of logic or non-classical logic. This includes discussions of problems and paradoxes that connect to contemporary logic and which historically spurred developments of logical method. For example, there is great interest among ancient philosophers in the question of whether all statements have truth-values. Relevant themes here include future contingents, paradoxes of vagueness, and semantic paradoxes like the liar. We also include discussion of the paradoxes of the infinite for similar reasons, since solutions have introduced sophisticated tools of logical analysis and there are a range of related, modern philosophical concerns about the application of some logical principles in infinite domains. Our criterion excludes, however, many of the themes that Hellenistic philosophers consider part of logic, in particular, it excludes epistemology and metaphysical questions about truth. Ancient philosophers do not write treatises “On Logic,” where the topic would be what today counts as logic. Instead, arguments and theories that count as “logic” by our criterion are found in a wide range of texts. For the most part, our entry follows chronology, tracing ancient logic from its beginnings to Late Antiquity. However, some themes are discussed in several eras of ancient logic; ancient logicians engage closely with each other’s views. Accordingly, relevant publications address several authors and periods in conjunction. These contributions are listed in three thematic sections at the end of our entry.