Serbian Press and Eastern Orthodoxy in Serbia in the 1980s

Nearer, My God, to Thee

Religion has always had a special impact on man's attitude towards animals. In this context, this paper explores the correlation between animal welfare and Orthodox Christianity, with specific reference to the position of the Serbian Orthodox Church on this issue. The research has been conducted with the aim of examining the links between animals and Orthodox Christianity, establishing whether the official position of the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) promotes animal welfare, and whether its activities embody the recognition and protection of animal rights. For the purposes of this paper, the author has applied the sociological, legal-dogmatic, and historicalcritical methods. The conducted research shows that the Serbian Orthodox Church does not have an official position on animals; thus, the correlation between animal welfare and Orthodox Christianity cannot be precisely determined. Yet, due to the impact of the canons of the Holy Scriptures, it is quite certain that the Serbian Orthodox priests formally advocate for animal welfare and observance of animal rights, and officially condemn any cruel treatment against animals. On the other hand, man's love for animals must be moderate and never above man's love for God and other human beings. Orthodox Christianity does not prohibit the use of meat and fish in nutrition, nor does it consider killing animals an immoral act. Such an approach is also pertinent to Islam and Judaism, while Buddhism advocates respect for all forms of life by promoting the principle of ahimsa (non-violence), which applies to all living beings. It is clear that Orthodox Christianity does not advocate for the recognition of animals' rights to life, nor does it recognize animals as legal subjects. The twelve-year application of the Animal Welfare Act in the Republic of Serbia has shown that a number of factors hinder a better protection of animal welfare. The Serbian Orthodox Church largely contributes to such a situation by failing to promote animal welfare, protection and a more humane treatment of animals (particularly stray or abandoned animals) in its regulatory acts and social activities.

The Making of Arab Americans: From Syrian Nationalism to U.S. Citizenship

The Making of Arab Americans: From Syrian Nationalism to U.S. Citizenship

The unexpected reconciliation of the Serbian Orthodox Church with the Macedonian ‘schismatics’, which took place in May 2022, determines the relevance of the retrospective analysis given in the article of this church conflict that has lasted more than half a century in the Republic of North Macedonia. Using the historical-genetic method, the underlying reason is revealed and the dynamics of the conflict that unfolded between the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Macedonian Orthodox Church – Archdiocese of Ohrid – is traced. With the use of the realistic approach to international relations and the hypothesis of maintaining a close connection between the church and state in the Balkans, the author identifies the key parties to the conflict, which, in addition to Serbia and the Republic of North Macedonia, include Bulgaria, Greece, the Patriarchate of Constantinople, and describes the evolution of the strategies chosen by these parties to conduct. At the same time, the focus of the study is not the theological dimension of the subject in question, but its foreign policy implications. The history of the church schism is considered in the broader context of the political elites of the Republic of North Macedonia finding the solution to the task of integration into Euro-Atlantic structures, the possibilities of using the church factor in the reaching of geostrategic goals are shown. It is stated that the reasons that pushed the hierarchs of the Serbian Orthodox Church to reach agreements with the Macedonian ‘schismatics’ lie in the dimension of foreign policy, and the discussion of the status of the Ohrid Archdiocese was one of the elements of the struggle for influence in the Balkans, both regional and non-regional players. By its decision to support the autocephaly of the Macedonian Orthodox Church – Archdiocese of Ohrid, the Serbian Orthodox Church has demonstrated the recognition of a specific Slavic-Macedonian national identity, which is questioned in the official historical narratives of Greece and Bulgaria, and, at least on the Balkan track, the papist aspirations of the Patriarchate of Constantinople were limited. Ultimately, the pragmatic position of the Serbian Orthodox Church did not allow the Macedonian Orthodox Church – Archdiocese of Ohrid to be turned into an instrument for realizing the interests of the Phanar supported by Western countries and took away the conflict potential from the topic that could contribute to the political demarcation of Serbia and the Republic of North Macedonia. Nevertheless, in the prognostic part of the conclusion, a high probability of ‘church wars’ resuming is stated, but with a new, not united by Orthodoxy, list of participants, namely containing representatives of the Albanian and Macedonian communities.

Orthodox Perspectives on Peace, War and Violence

Orthodox Churches in Central and Southeastern Europe, marginalized during the communist period, have been no strangers to controversy since the fall of communism. Though circumstances differ significantly from country to country, Orthodox Churches in Southeastern Europe have been intimately and historically connected with the region’s dominant pre-communist and post-communist ideology (nationalism), and have often been actively engaged in politics.1 The key to this politico-religious character is the structural organization of Orthodox Churches, which makes it possible that a “national” Church with specific national characteristics can develop. With no centralized structure within Orthodoxy (unlike Catholicism), these Churches can become one of the key symbols of national being. While by no means alone (one can point to distinctly national characteristics of the region’s Islamic communities, such as in Kosovo and Macedonia, and Catholic Churches, in particular in Croatia), Orthodox Churches in the Balkans have tended to align themselves with political parties and governments that are equally nationalist in character. Perhaps the most striking example is that of the Serbian Orthodox Church, which has sought to preserve and promote Serbian national interests in peripheral territories regarded by Serbian nationalists as “theirs.” In both Macedonia and Montenegro, for example, the Serbian Orthodox Church has blocked recognition of the autocephaly of the local Orthodox Churches—in short, negating the existence of those respective nations.KeywordsDemocratic PartyReligious InstructionLiberal Democratic PartyHate SpeechReligious AffairThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

The Orthodox community in Ukraine is bitterly divided amongst three churches, two of which are supportive of autocephaly but divided by personal factors. Over six years into independence the largest Orthodox church in Ukraine remains subordinated to the Moscow Patriarchate as an autonomous church. Attempts at creating a 'state church' during the Leonid Kravchuk era failed and served only further to divide the Orthodox faithful in Ukraine. Although his successor, President Leonid Kuchma, radically changed religious policies and halted any government support for a national church he has accepted that the state has a role to play in regulating these questions during Ukraine's postSoviet transition. Although both Kravchuk and Kuchma back a united Orthodox Church there is little understanding as to how to attain this objective. The granting of autocephaly by Constantinople to a united Ukrainian Orthodox Church, as in Estonia in 1995, would lead to dangerous rifts between Kyiv/Moscow and Moscow/ Constantinople. Orthodoxy in Ukraine on the Eve of Independence The Russian Orthodox Church went into decline and suffered many defections during the late 1980s, in particular in western Ukraine. Nevertheless, it still remained the largest church in Ukraine when Ukraine became an independent state and has continued to hold this dominant position. Two thirds of the parishes of the Russian Orthodox Church in the Brezhnev era were located in Ukraine. Of these, half were in western Ukraine.2 During the last two remaining years of the former Soviet Union the Russian Orthodox Church had been forced to allow some semblance of 'autonomy' to counter the growth of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAPTs). The 'autonomous' branch of the Russian Orthodox Church was renamed the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UPTs) in October 1990 and continued to be led by Metropolitan Filaret. Only the head of the autonomous UPTs, elected by the Ukrainian Sobor of the clergy and laity, needed confirmation by the Moscow Patriarchate. All other activities became the sole responsibility of the UPTs. The title of the head of the UPTs was changed to 'His Beautitude', 'an address reserved for heads of autocephalous churches'.3 The majority of former Catholic parishes which opted to remain Orthodox in Galicia initially joined the UAPTs during 1989-91 when it was vigorously portrayed

ABSTRACTThe Holy and Great Council of the Orthodox Church (2016) was supposed to be, above all, a demonstration of Orthodox unity. However, four autocephalous Orthodox churches were absent and others were split internally over their stances towards the Council. Ethnophyletism (ecclesiastical nationalism) and disagreements between the Orthodox churches over universal primacy have often been emphasised as the factors which eventually prevented the display of full pan-Orthodox conciliarity. By analysing official documents of the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) and the statements of Serbian hierarchs, I assess the role of ethnophyletism and primacy in the SOC’s positioning regarding the Council. I conclude that ethnophyletism and a lack of consensus over primacy were overshadowed by the cleavage between progressive and conservative tendencies within the SOC as well as beyond autocephalous frontiers. The study may thus contribute to a better understanding of the current challenges to pan-Orthodox conciliarity in general.

This study tackles the place and role of the Orthodox Church in Serbian society, state, and political life after October 5, 2000. Owing to its present “symphony” with the state, the church now offers a new ideological framework and value-system for state institutions such as the armed forces and public education. This new role of the church is particularly emphasized in the current legislation. One could probably refer to the “etatization” of the Serbian Church, with some negative consequences for non-traditional religious communities. The relations with the Macedonian and Montenegrin Orthodox churches have also been discussed in this context. In post-Milošević Serbia, religious rights and freedoms have been considerably extended, but there is still a great deal of arbitrariness, even completely partial interpretations of the church-state relations. In the concluding section, this article deals with the church's traditionalist perception of society as narod (the people), with some recommendations as for the possible cooperation between the church and civil society in Serbia.

The Orthodox Church exists and lives within history and passes through it without changing its identity. This is a very important aspect of Orthodoxy which one should always have in mind when dealing with questions that regard the orthodox part of Christianity. This means that the Church always remains the same in its canonical organisation and theological teachings. However, the Church exists inside human society and interacts with it. In the light of the ever-changing interests of contemporary man, the riddle that stands before us is as follows. What does the ostensibly static and passive Orthodox Church have to offer modern society and in what form? What could be the role of the Orthodox Church in contemporary integrations? What is the place of the Church in the modern capitalistic system? These questions remain very difficult and challenging, especially when they are addressed to the Serbian Orthodox Church, which exists in the part of Europe where peace and stability still seem to be goals impossible to achieve. It is my experience that the western readership is not quite familiar with the historical and cultural background of the Balkans area, which, unfortunately, has become more known for military operations and difficult political processes. It therefore gives me even greater pleasure to contribute this article. Before considering the contemporary issues with which the Serbian Orthodox Church is concerned, I find it neccessery to offer a brief historical introduction to its development.

Orthodox churches in central, eastern, and Southeastern Europe have been intimately connected with the region’s dominant post-communist ideology (nationalism), and have actively engaged in national politics.1 The key to this politicoreligious character is the structural organization of Orthodox churches, which render it possible that a “national” church with specific national characteristics can develop with relative autonomy. With no centralized structure within Orthodoxy, churches become a symbol of the national being, and, thereby, rather politicized. In the Balkans, or Southeast Europe, Orthodox churches have, in some instances, supported the politics of intolerance and hate on occasion, explicitly aligned themselves to nationalist political parties or governments that have sought to create ethnically homogenous states.2 However, Orthodox churches have often been burdened by internal splits and competition from “breakaway” factions. Perhaps, one of the most striking examples is the case of the Orthodox Church conflict in Montenegro. There, the Serbian Orthodox Church (Srpska pravoslavna crkva—SPC)3 have been one of the key instruments used to maintain the Serb identity of the Montenegrins, firmly supporting the narrative that Montenegro is the “second Serb state” and the “Serbian Sparta.”KeywordsReligious CommunityHate SpeechNorth Atlantic Treaty OrganizationCatholic PriestDerogatory TermThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

In the first part of the paper, the author talks about the unilateral declaration of the Macedonian Orthodox Church as autocephalous at the third Macedonian Church-People's Assembly on July 18, 1967, and the church St. Kliment in Ohrid vand the denial of the autocephaly of the MPC by its mother, the Serbian Orthodox Church. In the second part of the paper, the author talks about the donation of autocephaly by the Holy Council of Bishops of the Serbian Orthodox Church to the Macedonian Orthodox Church - Ohrid Archdiocese. The decision on autocephaly of the MPC-OA was ceremoniously and administratively confirmed at the Holy Liturgy in the Cathedral Church in Belgrade on June 5, 2022, by the awarding of the Tomos on AutocephalyMacedonian Orthodox Church - Ohrid Archdiocese from the hands of His Holiness. Serbian Patriarch Porfirije (Perić) to the head of the MPC-OA Archbishop Stefan (Veljanovsko) of Ohrid and Macedonia. The author of the paper argues the point of view that the recognition of the autocephaly of the Macedonian Orthodox Church - Ohrid Archdiocese is historically and canonically valid and that it is significant both for Orthodoxy in the Balkans and beyond, as well as for the collective national Macedonian identity and the further affirmation of North Macedonia as a sovereign state with international legal subjectivity.

The issue of primacy divides Roman Catholic (RCC) and Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) in theological field. Painful historical heritage from Second World War is also the great obstacle. Yugoslav atheistic state supported development of inter-church relations in acceptable proportion that would increase national relations in Yugoslav federation. Its fear was related to possible 'common front' against ideological system. Regional inter-church relations were initiated by Vatican and Pope Paul II, while SOC accepted it particularly in the social field. Both agreed on common responsibility for the evangelization an atheistic society. The variety of institutional forms of cooperation was also agreed, Common Commission for dialogue of SOC Council and Yugoslav Bishop Conference, and Theological Faculties Conferences in Post World War II Vatican period. In post-conflict Balkan Societies, RCC and SOC agreed to continue common activities for post-conflict rehabilitation and evangelizational purposes.

The dissolution of Yugoslavia in the nineties brought a series of armed conflicts, civil wars and outright war to the Balkan Peninsula. The Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) was entangled in these conflicts. The SOC’s involvement in these wars has sparked an academic discussion about the role of religion, especially that of the SOC, in these conflicts. This discussion has so far mainly been social scientific in its scope and preoccupied with nationalist movements and political elites, and has therefore not sought to investigate the SOC’s own reflection on the war. Secondly the discussion of the SOC’s role has been on some level detached from the broader discussion of Christianity’s relation to war and violence. This article will provide an in-depth study of a selection of Serbian Orthodox reflections on war and its relationship to Christian, and in particular Eastern Orthodox, tradition, bringing forth ways in which parts of the SOC views war and violence.