Seneca: The Literary Philosopher. By Margaret Graver

The widely recognised importance of models in scientific practice suggests that they should have an equally important role in science education. The meanings attached to the word ‘model’ in the philosophical literature and the psychological literature leads to two canonical interpretations: the ‘models as representations’ view and the ‘models as epistemic artefacts’ view. The latter is argued as being the more educationally valuable of the two. The central role of analogy, thought experimentation, and argumentation, in the creation and validation of models – the act of modelling – is explored against a background of the philosophical and psychological literature on the theme. Ways in which models have been developed in educational contexts are then explored, leading to the presentation of the new version of the ‘Model of Modelling’ that is the basis of this book.

Of the modalities through which self-recognition is believed to be implemented, philosophical literature on the subject is most familiar with vision and interoception. However, they are not the only ones: chemoreception is another modality that biologists have found to be a contributor to self-recognition in numerous species, of which arthropods are notable. This article aims to help address the gap between philosophical and biological literature by presenting the octopus as an example of a creature in which peripheral chemoreceptive processes appear to be a significant component of self-recognition. Building on the findings of Nesher et al. that chemical compounds in octopus skin interfere with the behaviour of its suckers, this article proffers an account of how chemoreception may contribute to self-recognition in octopuses.

The conflation of two fundamentally distinct issues has generated serious confusion in the philosophical and biological literature concerning the units of selection. The question of how a unit of selection of defined, theoretically, is rarely distinguished from the question of how to determine the empirical accuracy of claims—either specific or general—concerning which unit(s) is undergoing selection processes. In this paper, I begin by refining a definition of the unit of selection, first presented in the philosophical literature by William Wimsatt, which is grounded in the structure of natural selection models. I then explore the implications of this structural definition for empirical evaluation of claims about units of selection. I consider criticisms of this view presented by Elliott Sober—criticisms taken by some (for example, Mayo and Gilinsky 1987) to provide definitive damage to the structuralist account. I shall show that Sober has misinterpreted the structuralist views; he knocks down a straw man in order to motivate his own causal account. Furthermore, I shall argue, Sober's causal account is dependent on the structuralist account that he rejects. I conclude by indicating how the refined structural definition can clarify which sorts of empirical evidence could be brought to bear on a controversial case involving units of selection.

This research explores the use and resurgence of Sanskrit in modern culture with an emphasis on its functions in the fields of education, literature, and the arts. Over the ages, the spoken form of Sanskrit, an ancient Indo-European language famed for its religious, philosophical, and literary literature, gradually declined. However, in recent years, there have been persistent attempts by academics and enthusiasts to restore Sanskrit's importance in a number of fields. This study investigates the use of Sanskrit in contemporary education, including its use in colleges and universities, as well as the difficulties and possibilities associated with teaching and studying this ancient language. The research also looks at the impact of Sanskrit on modern literature and the arts, including classical dance, music, and theatre. Additionally, it explores the language's function in religious and philosophical discourse, illuminating its importance in the preservation and dissemination of spiritual and philosophical literature. The article examines Sanskrit's distinctive linguistic traits and its contributions to contemporary linguistic research, especially its importance in the reconstruction of Proto-Indo-European and comparative linguistics. The study also emphasises the role of technology in text preservation and dissemination, as well as the digital resources accessible for studying Sanskrit and exploring its literary riches. It emphasises the necessity for ongoing efforts to conserve and develop this ancient language as an important cultural and intellectual asset in the modern world by reflecting on the difficulties and chances for Sanskrit in the future.

Much of the philosophical literature on skill takes for granted that skill and know-how are roughly equivalent. Two recent developments provide an opportunity to question this prevailing notion. The first development is Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson’s account of skill as a disposition to manifest know-how; and of know-how as entailing knowing whether, knowing which, knowing what, and other ‘know-wh’ states. Since the latter are states of propositional knowledge, skill is understood to be a disposition to manifest situation-specific propositional knowledge states. The second development is Jessie Munton’s project to understand visual perception as a type of skilled performance, drawing on Stanley and Williamson’s analysis of skill. Munton’s project is itself motivated by two other developments in the philosophical literature on perception: cognitive penetration of vision and perceptual learning. Let’s call instances of cognitive penetration that manifest implicit biases visual prejudice. I argue that instances of visual prejudice are skilled. First, I canvass philosophical and empirical literature for a set of features characteristic of skilled performances and argue that visual prejudice is skilled because it instantiates those features. Next, I argue that visual prejudice is skilled on Stanley and Williamson’s analysis because it manifests situation-specific know-wh states. But since visual prejudice does not manifest knowledge of facts, instances of visual prejudice are not instances of know-how. I conclude that visual prejudice is a counterexample to the prevailing notion that skill and know-how are roughly equivalent.

In lieu of an abstract, below is the essay's first paragraph.\n"The noted philosopher and Santayana scholar Irving Singer, author of the magisterial three-volume work The Nature of Love, died on February 1, 2015, aged 89. Singer was born in Brooklyn on December 24, 1925, and served in World War II. He graduated summa cum laude from Harvard in 1948, under the G.I. Bill. The following year he wed Josephine Fisk, an opera singer with whom he had four children. They spent a year at Oxford (1949-1950), during which time Singer read The Last Puritan and in 1950 took a trip to Italy to meet its author. This is related in detail in the delightful article 'A Pilgrimage to Santayana,' which can be found in Singer’s 2000 book George Santayana, Literary Philosopher, an essential work for anyone interested in the life and thought of Santayana. Graduating with a PhD in philosophy from Harvard in 1952, Singer taught at Harvard, Cornell, the University of Michigan, and Johns Hopkins before joining MIT in 1958, where he was to remain for over half a century, retiring from there in 2013. Over his long and distinguished career, Singer wrote numerous articles and 21 books, devoted to such diverse topics as aesthetics, creativity, film, literature, music, and moral philosophy. He combined the rigorous approach of analytic philosophy with the experimental technique of pragmatism. In addition to the Nature of Love trilogy, other titles include Modes of Creativity: Philosophical Perspectives; Mozart and Beethoven: The Concept of Love in Their Operas; Cinematic Mythmaking: Philosophy in Film; Ingmar Berman: Cinematic Philosopher; Santayana’s Aesthetics: A Critical Analysis, and the aforementioned George Santayana: Literary Philosopher. The MIT Press has honored his work by initiating 'The Irving Singer Library,' which has republished many of his books. At the time of his death, Singer was working on a manuscript entitled Creativity in the Brain. A more detailed description of Singer’s many works and awards can be found on the MIT website: http://web.mit/edu/philosophy/singer.html Singer was predeceased by his wife Josephine, who died in 2014. They had been wed for 65 years. He called her his semicollaborator, and joked that 'I write in bed, where I am comfortable, and dictate to my wife. She often disagrees with what I say, and we’ll discuss it, and sometimes I incorporate her ideas.'"

<p>A dominant claim in the philosophical literature on trust is that we should stop thinking in terms of group trustworthiness or appropriate trust in groups. In this paper, we push back against this claim by arguing that philosophical work on trust would benefit from being brought into closer contact with empirical work on the nature of trust. We consider data on reactive attitudes and moral responsibility to adjudicate on different positions in the philosophical literature on trust. An implication of our argument is that the distinction between different kinds of groups—mere groups versus institutional groups—deserves more attention than is currently recognized in the philosophical literature on trust.</p> <p>In the first section of the paper, we draw some basic philosophical distinctions concerning the nature and kinds of trust. In section two, we present the positions taken by Hawley (<a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-the-american-philosophical-association/article/empirical-and-philosophical-reflections-on-trust/C87EB491FD2BD0CE9C2B64F9871A5A60#ref15" target="_blank">2017</a>), who argues against trust in groups, and Faulkner (<a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-the-american-philosophical-association/article/empirical-and-philosophical-reflections-on-trust/C87EB491FD2BD0CE9C2B64F9871A5A60#ref9" target="_blank">2018</a>), who argues in favor of trust in groups. In section three, we introduce some empirical data and suggest that, albeit tentatively, this looks to undermine Hawley's position and is compatible with Faulkner's approach. We thus suggest, on the basis of the evidence that we have available, that we have reasons to prefer the position taken by Faulkner (<a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-the-american-philosophical-association/article/empirical-and-philosophical-reflections-on-trust/C87EB491FD2BD0CE9C2B64F9871A5A60#ref9" target="_blank">2018</a>) over that taken by Hawley (<a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-the-american-philosophical-association/article/empirical-and-philosophical-reflections-on-trust/C87EB491FD2BD0CE9C2B64F9871A5A60#ref15" target="_blank">2017</a>). We end by discussing some implications for distinctions between different kinds of groups relevant for future philosophical work on trust.</p>

As we grant artificial intelligence increasing power and independence in contexts like healthcare, policing, and driving, AI faces moral dilemmas but lacks the tools to solve them. Warnings from regulators, philosophers, and computer scientists about the dangers of unethical AI have spurred interest in automated ethics-i.e., the development of machines that can perform ethical reasoning. However, prior work in automated ethics rarely engages with philosophical literature. Philosophers have spent centuries debating moral dilemmas so automated ethics will be most nuanced, consistent, and reliable when it draws on philosophical literature. In this paper, I present an implementation of automated Kantian ethics that is faithful to the Kantian philosophical tradition. I formalize Kant’s categorical imperative in an embedding of Dyadic Deontic Logic in HOL, implement this formalization in the Isabelle/HOL theorem prover, and develop a testing framework to evaluate how well my implementation coheres with expected properties of Kantian ethic. My system is an early step towards philosophically mature ethical AI agents and it can make nuanced judgements in complex ethical dilemmas because it is grounded in philosophical literature. Because I use an interactive theorem prover, my system’s judgements are explainable.KeywordsAutomated ethicsKantIsabelleAi ethics

A dominant claim in the philosophical literature on trust is that we should stop thinking in terms of group trustworthiness or appropriate trust in groups. In this paper, we push back against this claim by arguing that philosophical work on trust would benefit from being brought into closer contact with empirical work on the nature of trust. We consider data on reactive attitudes and moral responsibility to adjudicate on different positions in the philosophical literature on trust. An implication of our argument is that the distinction between different kinds of groups—mere groups versus institutional groups—deserves more attention than is currently recognized in the philosophical literature on trust.In the first section of the paper, we draw some basic philosophical distinctions concerning the nature and kinds of trust. In section two, we present the positions taken by Hawley (2017), who argues against trust in groups, and Faulkner (2018), who argues in favor of trust in groups. In section three, we introduce some empirical data and suggest that, albeit tentatively, this looks to undermine Hawley's position and is compatible with Faulkner's approach. We thus suggest, on the basis of the evidence that we have available, that we have reasons to prefer the position taken by Faulkner (2018) over that taken by Hawley (2017). We end by discussing some implications for distinctions between different kinds of groups relevant for future philosophical work on trust.

Like the ‘thoughts and prayers’ so commonly offered by politicians in the aftermath of disaster, it is incredibly common to hear ‘autonomy and dignity’ invoked together in response to some threat to human well-being. As such, it seems natural to assume that they must bear some kind of relation to one another. But are they merely two core human interests that happen to be vulnerable to the same kinds of threat? Or are they interrelated in a deeper way? What I aim to do in this chapter is draw on the philosophical literature on both concepts to consider how they might be connected, and explore whether certain ways of connecting them are more fruitful than others. I argue that the two most prominent connections drawn in the philosophical literature – that dignity is grounded in autonomy, and that respect for dignity is synonymous with respect for autonomy – are both highly problematic. Instead, I suggest that we see autonomy and dignity as mutually supportive. Doing so has both practical and theoretical benefits: it can help us identify threats to both autonomy and dignity; and it exposes theoretical lacunae, especially within the autonomy literature.

<p>A dominant claim in the philosophical literature on trust is that we should stop thinking in terms of group trustworthiness or appropriate trust in groups. In this paper, we push back against this claim by arguing that philosophical work on trust would benefit from being brought into closer contact with empirical work on the nature of trust. We consider data on reactive attitudes and moral responsibility to adjudicate on different positions in the philosophical literature on trust. An implication of our argument is that the distinction between different kinds of groups—mere groups versus institutional groups—deserves more attention than is currently recognized in the philosophical literature on trust.</p> <p>In the first section of the paper, we draw some basic philosophical distinctions concerning the nature and kinds of trust. In section two, we present the positions taken by Hawley (<a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-the-american-philosophical-association/article/empirical-and-philosophical-reflections-on-trust/C87EB491FD2BD0CE9C2B64F9871A5A60#ref15" target="_blank">2017</a>), who argues against trust in groups, and Faulkner (<a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-the-american-philosophical-association/article/empirical-and-philosophical-reflections-on-trust/C87EB491FD2BD0CE9C2B64F9871A5A60#ref9" target="_blank">2018</a>), who argues in favor of trust in groups. In section three, we introduce some empirical data and suggest that, albeit tentatively, this looks to undermine Hawley's position and is compatible with Faulkner's approach. We thus suggest, on the basis of the evidence that we have available, that we have reasons to prefer the position taken by Faulkner (<a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-the-american-philosophical-association/article/empirical-and-philosophical-reflections-on-trust/C87EB491FD2BD0CE9C2B64F9871A5A60#ref9" target="_blank">2018</a>) over that taken by Hawley (<a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-the-american-philosophical-association/article/empirical-and-philosophical-reflections-on-trust/C87EB491FD2BD0CE9C2B64F9871A5A60#ref15" target="_blank">2017</a>). We end by discussing some implications for distinctions between different kinds of groups relevant for future philosophical work on trust.</p>

In this article, the notion of materialities is rearticulated as an important field for the future of mobilities research. We focus on the intersection between situational mobilities research and design/architecture. The vocabulary and material imaginary developed within the latter are an important source of inspiration for the future mobilities research interested in the pragmatic question: What makes this particular mobile situation possible? The argument is based on a critique of an abstract and universal notion of materiality or the material. Rather, it is argued, we should partly look at ‘other’ materialities (surfaces, voids, volumes, etc.). Moreover, we should also develop an ‘other’ way of looking at materialities. In other words, the article argues for a need for a view of ‘other’ materialities. The sensitivity to materials, spaces and sensations hereof developed within architecture and design intersects with research into situational mobilities design in two dimensions. Firstly, there are direct links to the ways in which designers and architects perceive, gestate and articulate their ideas about things, spaces and materialities. Secondly, the article draws on the recent thinking within the ‘new materiality’ literature in philosophy as well as in cultural theory. Important lessons are drawn in from across different positions such as non-representational theory, the non-human turn, Object-Oriented-Ontology to mention a few. It is argued that to create the necessary materially sensitive imaginary, mobilities research should be looking to architecture and design, as well as it may profit from engaging with these new materially sensitive thinkers. The article ends with some concrete themes for future research inspired by these intersections and identifies ‘material pragmatism’ as an underpinning set of assumptions for research into mobilities design.

How physicians and scientists can respond responsibly and effectively to religiously based opposition to human embryonic stem cell research

This account of evil takes the Book of Job as its guide. The Book of Job considers physical pain, social bereavement, the origin of evil, theodicy, justice, divine violence, and reward. Such problems are explored by consulting ancient and modern accounts from the fields of theology and philosophy, broadly conceived. Some of the literature on evil - especially the philosophical literature - is inclined toward the abstract treatment of such problems. Bringing along the suffering Job will serve as a reminder of the concrete, lived experience in which the problem of evil has its roots.

ABSTRACTDiscussions of trustworthiness are not ubiquitous in the philosophical literature (compare remarks by Jones 2012, 61). Nonetheless, there are some attempted analyses and there is excellent work ongoing. The goal of this paper is to focus on trustworthiness's even less discussed opposite: untrustworthiness. So far as I can tell, the concept has gone largely undiscussed in the philosophical literature. This is unfortunate. For, just as Hawley (2014) points out that a theory of trust must be rendered compatible with a theory of distrust, so (I claim) a theory of trustworthiness must be rendered compatible with a theory of untrustworthiness. A further wrinkle to be introduced along the way is the need for a further distinction: cases where we must talk, not of trustworthiness or untrustworthiness, but of neither.