Abstract

Outsourcing of the chip product chain makes hardware vulnerable to be attacked. For example, an attacker who has access to hardware fabrication process can alter the genuine hardware with the insertion of concealed hardware elements [hardware Trojan (HT)]. Therefore, microelectronic circuit HT detection becomes a key step of chip production. A self-reference-based power-analysis microelectronic circuit HT detection methodology is proposed in this paper. The detection method is implemented in 90-nm CMOS process. Based on simulation results, our proposed technique can detect HTs with areas that are 0.013% of the host-circuitry. ISCAS benchmarks are used to evaluate efficiency of the developed method.

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