Abstract
In this paper I will argue that Plato is committed to self-predication in dialogues generally agreed to be earlier than the Parmenides. By this I mean not merely that Plato is committed to statements of the form (1) F-ness is F (S-statements) where F-ness is a Form. That Plato was committed to such statements is beyond dispute.' Rather I am claiming that (1) must be interpreted to mean (2) F-ness is characterized by F, or possesses F. While my thesis may well be accepted by a majority of scholars, there are a number of holdouts who have proposed alternative interpretations of (1). The main contenders are the following: (3) F-ness is identical with F2 (4) F-ness makes whatever participates in it F3 (5) N [ (x)(Fx-. Fx) ]4 (6) F-ness is what it is to be F' (7) F-ness is what is F (or F itself or the nature of F).6 I believe there is clear evidence in the dialogues which supports (2) as the correct interpretation of (1), but the present paper will be limited to trying
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