Self-Healing Attack-Resilient PMU Network for Power System Operation

Abstract

In this paper, we propose a self-healing phasor measurement unit (PMU) network that exploits the features of dynamic and programmable configuration in a software-defined networking infrastructure to achieve resiliency against cyber-attacks. After a cyber-attack, the configuration of network switches is changed to isolate the compromised PMUs/phasor data concentrators to prevent further propagation of the attack; meanwhile, the disconnected yet uncompromised PMUs will be reconnected to the network to “self-heal” and thus restore the observability of the power system. Specifically, we formulate an integer linear programming model to minimize the overhead of the self-healing process (e.g., the recovery latency), while considering the constraints of power system observability, hardware resources, and network topology. We also propose a heuristic algorithm to decrease the computational complexity. Case studies of a PMU network based on the IEEE 30-bus and 118-bus systems are used to validate the effectiveness of the self-healing mechanism.