Self-Deception in Mengzi 5A2

Moral Development and Reality explores the nature of morality, moral development, social behavior, and human connection. By comparing, contrasting, and going beyond the prominent theories mainly of Lawrence Kohlberg, Martin Hoffman, and Jonathan Haidt, the author addresses fundamental questions: What is morality, and how broad is the moral domain? Can we speak of moral development (Kohlberg, Hoffman), or is morality entirely relative to diverse cultures (Haidt)? What are the sources of moral motivation? What factors account for prosocial behavior? What are the typical social perspective-taking limitations of antisocial youths, and how can those limitations be remedied? Does moral development, including moments of moral inspiration, reflect a deeper reality? Exploring these questions elucidates the full range of moral development, from superficial perception to a deeper understanding and feeling. Included are foundations of morality and moral motivation; biology, social intuitions, and culture; social perspective-taking and development; the stage construct and developmental delay; moral exemplars and moral identity; cognitive distortions, social skills deficiencies, and cognitive behavioral interventions or moral education; and, finally, near-death experiences and the underpinnings of the social and moral world.

Based on a reading of chapter 38 of the Daodejing , this article examines the relationship between the virtues and moral motivation. Laozi puts forward a view which might be termed a "paradox of virtue"—the phenomenon that a conscious pursuit of virtue can lead to a diminishing of virtue. It aims to show that Laozi's criticisms on the focus on the virtues and characters of agents, and his overall view on morality, pose challenges to a way of moral thinking that is common in modern moral philosophy, including virtue ethics.

According to internalism about moral judgements there is an interesting conceptual connection between an agent's making a moral judgement and that agent's motivation. The externalist denies this and claims that any interesting connection between moral judgements and motivation is contingent.1 The resolution of this dispute has important consequences. For whereas the internalist can construe moral judgements either as noncognitive states like desire or as cognitive states like belief, the externalist is committed to construe moral judgements as cognitive states like belief.2 A vindication of externalism would therefore lend support to those who believe in the possibility of some kind of moral reality. In his book The Moral Problem and in a recent issue of this journal, Michael Smith claims to refute any theory which construes the relationship between moral judgements and motivation as contingent and rationally optional. He claims that no such theory is able to account for the platitude that a good and strong-willed person is reliably motivated in accordance with her moral judgements.3 More specifically, the claim is that although the externalist may provide a reliable link between the moral judgements and motivations of some individual, the only link at his disposal is a basic moral motive to do what is right, where this is read de dicto. But, so Smith argues, we can read off from the platitudes that are definitional of moral discourse that this self-consciously moral motive makes for moral fetishism and not for moral goodness.4 Good people care about what is right, where this is read de re, not de dicto. He calls this a reductio of externalism.

This paper examines Plato’s moral exemplarism, arguing that admiration plays a central role in his moral philosophy. It does so by linking Plato’s portrayal of Socrates as an object of moral admiration with his account of the psychology of moral imitation—particularly as developed in the depiction of Socrates across the dialogues and in the psychological framework of the Republic. The study responds to the growing interest in exemplarist moral theory by addressing the relative neglect of Plato’s contribution to this tradition. A parallel objective of this paper is to foster dialogue between Plato’s account of moral exemplarism and Linda Zagzebski’s Exemplarist Moral Theory, highlighting points of convergence in their approaches to admiration and moral motivation. The first part of the paper underscores the ambivalence of admiration in Plato’s dialogues, analyzing Apology, Crito, Phaedo, Laches, and Symposium to show how Plato constructs Socrates as a moral exemplar while simultaneously revealing admiration’s limitations as a consistent driver of moral transformation. The second part focuses on the Republic, where Plato provides a systematic psychological framework for admiration, particularly through the analysis of the spirited part of the soul (thymos) and its role in moral education. This analysis helps resolve the tensions present in Plato’s earlier treatment of admiration by arguing that rational reflection can internally refine and enhance admiration, enabling it to fulfill its distinctive role in the development of moral virtue. By integrating emotional and rational elements in moral formation, Plato’s account offers a historically grounded perspective on contemporary debates regarding the role of admiration in morality.

Discussions and practices for biodiversity and the environment are associated predominantly with duty ethics, which spell out the do’s and don’ts of good behavior. Virtue ethics offer an alternative that is much more inspirational, provided we do not reduce it to a mere enumeration of environmental virtues. Moreover, a virtue ethic is truly humanistic, in that it builds on inborn human capacities rather than on external sources of morality. Grounded in the classic Greek account of virtue ethics and in interaction with medieval and modern visions, this paper articulates a virtue ethic for the Earth. Accessible to a broad audience, we address the foundational concepts of nature-inclusive telos, eudaimonia, virtues and friendship, and connect these with social-scientific research findings. This elucidates how the virtues, sometimes supported by moral exemplars, work in lives that include nature in their flourishing. A virtue ethic for the Earth, we think, can be helpful for policy making but most of all act as a platform for people to become more inspired, courageous and effective friends of nature and the planet as a whole.

The article examines the methodological limitations of the application of (contemporary) virtue ethics in the field of artificial intelligence. The first limitation lies in the theoretical vagueness of “virtue ethics”, since it is only instrumentally interpreted in case of applied ethics’ issues by many researchers: for instance, they often refer only to the principle of golden mean that helps to understand the nature of virtues and to articulate them for AI. This approach is fundamentally wrong, since it selectively considers the main ideas of (con­temporary) virtue ethics and uses only those that approve it. The second limitation is that in Aristotelianism and neo-Aristotelianism AI cannot be considered as a moral agent sensu stricto. In this regard, AI is a system that can only imitate the behaviour of a moral agent who is the bearer of a certain set of virtues. Despite the initial negative diagnosis, there are still two approaches in neo-Aristotelianism that can bring light to the possibility of AI ethics. Ex­emplarism allows us to take a different look at the role of social robots in human life: they can be seen as moral exemplars or narratives that can contribute to the moral development of their owners and change their moral portrait for the better or worse. The capability approach created by M.K. Nussbaum also focuses on the impact of AI on the quality of human life: in this context, we are highlighting what changes basic human capabilities can undergo and how the minimal level of social justice and the respect of human dignity are ensured while using AI technologies.

While much of the existing research regarding moral exemplarity has focused on living individuals, examination of the lives of historical figures can also prove invaluable in understanding moral motivation. Consequently, this paper sought to apply Frimer and Walker’s (2009) reconciliation model and methodology in examining themes of agency and communion in the motivation of Miep Gies. Frimer and Walker’s (2009) Self-Understanding Interview and the VEiN coding method (Frimer, Walker, & Dunlop, 2009) served as guides for examining published and audio-recorded interviews, biographical and autobiographical information, as well as video-recorded speeches given by Gies. Aspects of an integrated moral identity appeared evident in the personality of Miep Gies as indicated in statements reflecting an overlap of both agency and communion. The study was limited in its reliance on publically available documents about or by Gies. Further, reliance on these documents, as opposed to a “live” interview, limited the ability of the author to identify responses to all questions included in Frimer and Walker’s (2009) interview or fully utilize the VEiN coding method (Frimer et al., 2009). Exploration of life narratives of historical figures can provide insight into an integrated moral identity as well as examples of developmental crossroads Frimer and Walker (2009) cited as essential in their reconciliation model. Comprehension of this reconciliation process is critical to understanding what lies at the heart of moral motivation and action as well as the ability to promote such growth in the lives of others.

In this article, I discuss ethical lessons we can learn from the stories and beliefs of moral exemplars—and how these insights can complement and extend the knowledge we gain through theoretical study. First, exemplars teach us psychological lessons about the way in which virtue is developed and expressed: e.g., about role modeling and post-traumatic growth. Second, they teach us philosophical lessons about the nature of virtue itself and of particular ethical virtues: e.g., about how virtuous people deliberate and how they perceive the mean of virtue. Third, exemplars’ stories teach us personal lessons about our own lives and character: e.g., about how far we are from acting or even thinking like virtuous people—and how much better our lives would be if we were genuinely virtuous. I conclude by discussing an ethical puzzle moral exemplars have not helped me solve: apparent disunity of the virtues.

In this article we discuss what are the implications for improving the design of corporate ethics programs, if we focus on the moral motivation accounts offered by main ethical theories. Virtue ethics, deontological ethics and utilitarianism offer different criteria of judgment to face moral dilemmas: Aristotle’s virtues of character, Kant’s categoricalimperative, and Mill’s greatest happiness principle are, respectively, their criteria to answer the question “What is the right thing to do?” We look at ethical theories from a different perspective: the question we ask is “Why should I do the right thing?” In other words, we deal with the problem of moralmotivation, and we examine the different rationale the main ethical theories provide. We then point out the relation between moral motivation and the concept of rationality in the different approaches – is acting morally seen as an expression of rational behavior? Our analysis of moral motivation provides a useful framework to improve the understanding of the relationships between formal and informal elements of corporate ethics programs, emphasizing the importance of the latter, often overlooked in compliance-focused programs. We conclude by suggesting that the concept of moral imagination can provide a unifying approach to enhance the effectiveness of corporate ethics programs, by providing an intangible asset that supports the implementation of their formal components into management decision making.

The debate over moral bioenhancement has incrementally intensified since 2008, when Persson and Savulescu, and Douglas wrote two separate articles on the reasons why enhancing human moral capabilities and sensitivity through technological means was ethically desirable. In this article, we offer a critique of how Persson and Savulescu theorize about the possibility of moral bioenhancement, including the problem of weakness of will, which they see as a motivational challenge. First, we offer a working definition of moral bioenhancement and underscore some of the challenges in determining whether moral bioenhancement, as conceptualized by Persson and Savulescu, falls into the category of enhancement or constitutes a type of therapeutic intervention. Second, we provide a critical analysis of the way Persson and Savulescu pathologize human behavior in relation to what they see as the main threat to the survival of the human species: weak moral motivation. Next, we critique the claim that the use of genetic manipulation and drug treatment will increase moral motivation. We argue that Persson and Savulescu mischaracterize the nature of human moral psychology because moral motivation includes affective and cognitive dimensions. The type of interventions they envision focus almost exclusively on the former. In the final two sections, we outline three main criticisms of moral bioenhancement and offer a more robust account of moral psychology and moral development than what Persson and Savulescu recommend, through the lens of Aristotle’s work on virtue ethics. Ultimately, we argue that what Persson and Savulescu, and Douglas consider as moral bioenhancement is a misnomer because they do not fully account for the complexity of moral agency.

Theological ethicists rarely allow the virtues to perform the heavyweight work of guiding action. This article contests this tradition and argues that, and demonstrates how, virtue ethics provides a practicable method of normative action guidance. The article contends that there are five interrelated but distinct modes of virtue action guidance. The first three modes—dialogue, emulation, and substituted judgment—invite the agent to take counsel with moral exemplars. The interrogative and discovery modes direct agents to morally deliberate using thick accounts of the virtues.

The paper presents a new seven-step methodology for using narrative ethics and two case studies illustrating its application. A brief discussion of the importance of ethics to engineers and the need to consider outcomes and macroethics introduce the paper. This is followed by overviews of the literature on narrative ethics, the ethics of care, and virtue ethics and moral exemplars. The ethics of care and virtue ethics are included due to their relationship to narrative and the fact they are probably less known to many engineers than other types of ethical theories. The paper also considers the important issues of culture, diversity and the `other' and the need for support and collective responsibility. Understanding diversity and the `other' are very important for engineers for a number of reasons, including the need to design technologies, goods and services for people who are not engineers and who are also different from them on other characteristics, such as gender, race and disability. Although ethical behaviour is often portrayed as an individual responsibility, it is much easier to behave ethically in a context which supports and encourages ethical behaviour. Collective action is frequently more effective than individual action and can prevent victimisation.

Virtue approaches to communication ethics have experienced a resurgence over the last decades. Tied to rhetoric since the time of Aristotle, virtue ethics offers scholars in the broad field of communication an approach to ethics based on character and human flourishing as an alternative to deontology. In each major branch of communication scholarship, the turn to virtue ethics has followed a distinctive trajectory in response to concerns about the adequacy of theoretical foundations for academic and applied work in communication ethics. Recent approaches to journalism and media ethics integrate moral psychology and virtue ethics to focus on moral exemplars, drawing on the work of Philippa Foot and Rosalind Hursthouse, or explore journalism as a MacIntyrean tradition of practice. Recent work in human communication ethics draws on MacIntyre’s approach to narrative, situating communication ethics within virtue structures that protect and promote particular goods in a moment of narrative and virtue contention.

Traditionally the study of computer ethics involves taking students who are not philosophically trained, exposing them to action-guiding theories, presenting them with the codes of ethics of several companies and professional organizations and asking them to make ethical decisions in scenario-based cases. This approach is deliberately action-based and focuses on doing. "What would you do?" is the traditional question we ask our students. While this pedagogical methodology forces them to examine situations and argue from a particular point of view, it does little to influence their character. They see the utilitarian or deontologist as someone other than themselves. There seems to be very little internalization of these action-based theories.Virtue Ethics offers character-forming theory that has been more successful with my students than the action-based theories of computer ethics texts. Why? Virtue Ethics is directed toward character development. The focus is on being rather than doing. It presents a good heuristic or approach to the problem of moral agency. Virtue ethics offers a way of teaching self-reflection through narratives that focus on core values, heroes and moral exemplars. It is grounded in practical wisdom. It is experiential, learning to care about the self, others, the community, living the good life, flourishing and striving for moral excellence. It offers a model for the development of character and personal ethics which will lead to professional ethics. Yet, the strict Virtue Ethics espoused by Aristotle has its limitations. This paper will explore the need for a more integrative approach to contemporary moral theory, one that may be found by revisiting the virtues through the works of Aristotle and Kant. It will offer insight into translating theory into practice for students of computer science and information technology.

Reviewed by: Moral Exemplars in the Analects: The Good Person is That by Amy Olberding Michael Ing Moral Exemplars in the Analects: The Good Person is That. By Amy Olberding. New York: Routledge, 2012. Pp. x + 232. Hardcover $125.00, ISBN 9780415897051. In Moral Exemplars in the Analects, Amy Olberding offers a self-reflexive and thought-provoking interpretation of the Analects. Scholars of China will find her book valuable in that it provides a holistic reading of the Analects that preserves the tensions in the text. Ethicists will find it valuable in that it furthers discussion on the role of emulating paradigmatic figures in moral development. Olberding characterizes her project as an attempt to "discern a governing logic that renders the Analects' compelling moral sensibility intelligible as moral theory" (p. 1). The difficulty of interpreting the Analects, Olberding explains, is that the text does not offer an explicit moral theory. Instead it reads more like a "moral manual" —a "compendium of practical and direct moral advice" (p. 3). The difference between a moral manual and a moral theory is that a moral theory explains why the instructions a manual offers might be successful. In more detail, Olberding draws from the work of her colleague, Linda Zagzebski, who defines moral theory as "an abstract structure that aims to simplify, systematize, and justify our moral beliefs and practices" (p. 6). This leaves the task of articulating a moral theory of the Analects largely to the interpreter. Olberding proceeds on this basis to provide a careful account of a moral theory that on the one hand is sensitive to the concerns of a modern ethicist, and on the other remains faithful to the Analects as a culturally situated text. She begins this process by noting a primary concern in the text with emulating exemplars. Borrowing an analogy of learning from the Analects where Confucius gives a student one metaphorical corner of a square, expecting him to return with the other three, Olberding explains, "the people the text describes . . . constitute the 'one corner' from which we can infer [the other three]" (p. 10). Employing this analogy, Olberding offers an account of exemplarism as the remaining corners of the Analects' moral theory. Exemplarism, in short, is a theory about how emulating paradigmatic figures leads people to be moral. It explains, systematizes, and justifies the pre-theoretical ability that people have to identify good models of morality (p. 24). While this involves thinking about particular acts and individuals in more general, and often abstract, concepts (such as virtue), Olberding stresses the fact that exemplars are not merely illustrations of abstract concepts; rather they "source" the concepts—meaning [End Page 439] that they serve as a means for creating abstract concepts but also continue to remain personally significant for the moral actor and theory (pp. 42 and 102-103). In other words moral exemplars "are not merely important, but [are] indispensable and necessary " to the Analects' ethical vision (p. 11). It should also be noted that several aspects of Olberding's theory of exemplarism come from Zagzebski, who develops a theory of exemplarism in the context of Christian virtue ethics. Zagzebski appears frequently in Olberding's book. Exemplarism, in Olberding's view, is effective in interpreting the Analects for at least three reasons: (1) it can be inferred from the Analects itself; (2) it provides the most coherent account of the text's explicit claims and its silences (where "silences" refers to gaps or omissions in concepts important for a moral theory such that secure conclusions about them cannot be drawn—in the Analects these include human nature, a model for human flourishing, and a clear sense of ren 仁) (pp. 43-44); and (3) it brings the Analects into contemporary discussions of moral theory. The first half of Moral Exemplars sets out to explain how the Analects can be read as an exemplarist text. Chapter 2 recounts an "origins myth" for the Analects. In this origin myth "biography" and "philosophy" converge in the figure of Confucius (p. 19). Philosophically, Confucius points to examples of moral individuals and seeks to explain why they are good. Biographically, the authors of the Analects situate Confucius in the forefront of these...