Selectivity of Bargaining and the Effect of Retirement on Labour Division in Italian Couples

Abstract

Using Italian data on the Use of Time, in this study we analysed the influence of the bargaining process between partners on the allocation of intra-household labour after the retirement of the male partner. Adopting an appropriate procedure to identify the effect of women's bargaining power, we found that men’s propensity to retire increased if women had strong bargaining power in labour division. This implies an overstatement of the effect of a man’s retirement on the housework of a woman with higher bargaining power and, conversely, an understatement of the effect of the man’s retirement on the housework time of a woman with lower bargaining power. To correct this selectivity effect, we estimated the effect of a man's retirement on the paid and domestic work of both partners by comparing couples in which the woman had high bargaining power and couples in which the woman had low bargaining power.