Abstract
Ascribing mental states to non-human agents has been shown to increase their likeability and lead to better joint-task performance in human-robot interaction (HRI). However, it is currently unclear what physical features non-human agents need to possess in order to trigger mind attribution and whether different aspects of having a mind (e.g., feeling pain, being able to move) need different levels of human-likeness before they are readily ascribed to non-human agents. The current study addresses this issue by modeling how increasing the degree of human-like appearance (on a spectrum from mechanistic to humanoid to human) changes the likelihood by which mind is attributed towards non-human agents. We also test whether different internal states (e.g., being hungry, being alive) need different degrees of humanness before they are ascribed to non-human agents. The results suggest that the relationship between physical appearance and the degree to which mind is attributed to non-human agents is best described as a two-linear model with no change in mind attribution on the spectrum from mechanistic to humanoid robot, but a significant increase in mind attribution as soon as human features are included in the image. There seems to be a qualitative difference in the perception of mindful versus mindless agents given that increasing human-like appearance alone does not increase mind attribution until a certain threshold is reached, that is: agents need to be classified as having a mind first before the addition of more human-like features significantly increases the degree to which mind is attributed to that agent.
Highlights
Constructing artificial agents that can engage in intuitive social interactions with their human partners is an engineering endeavor, but one that requires a deeper understanding of how humans process and engage in interactions with non-human agents
The current study addressed this issue, by i) introducing a theoretical framework of the different variables that affect mind attribution to artificial agents looking at both observer and agent characteristics, ii) by identifying the minimal level of humanlike appearance required for a mechanical being to be perceived as a mindful agent and by iii) testing whether different levels of humanlike appearance are required for different internal states to be attributed to an artificial agent
We have demonstrated that physical appearance plays a significant role in eliciting perceptions of intentionality across a wide variety of social and cognitive dimensions
Summary
Constructing artificial agents that can engage in intuitive social interactions with their human partners is an engineering endeavor, but one that requires a deeper understanding of how humans process and engage in interactions with non-human agents. Seeing Minds in Others that when we interact with other people, we need to understand whom we are interacting with and what this person is going to do [1]. Based on this knowledge, we make inferences about the person’s internal states (e.g., intentions, beliefs, feelings) in order to explain, understand and predict their behavior—a process that is commonly referred to as mentalizing [2]. Identifying the different factors that contribute to an increased likelihood of mentalizing in interactions with non-human agents provides insight into how human observers may approach interacting with a social robot, which in turn can lead to design recommendations that may facilitate a more naturalistic interaction experience
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.