Seeing Immigration in Color: Skin Tone, Political Ideology, and Stereotype Activation in the United States

The United States is often regarded as a country of immigrants given its long history of immigration. While American Indians are the original inhabitants of this country, whites (individuals with primarily Western European and Anglo Saxon roots) have held most of the social, political, and economic influence in this country since the birth of this nation. A minority group in the United States (in terms of population size and power in general) is Latinos. This racial, ethnic group makes up the largest minority group in the United States and are individuals with direct or indirect ties to Latin America (Latinos is used here as a gender-inclusive term). While Latinos immigrate from various parts of Mexico, Central America, and South America, the largest percentage of Latinos are of Mexican descent. Actually, the largest percentage of immigrants in the United States were born in Mexico. The Latino population in the United States is multifarious. Not only do Latinos differ by national origin but they also differ by nativity, citizenship status, and skin tone, among a variety of characteristics. The term “Latino” is a pan-ethnic term used to describe the Latino population yet not all Latinos identify pan-ethnically. Further, Latinos do not identify by the same race. Since the US Census considers Latino origin an ethnicity, it provides Latinos the opportunity to identify by race. According to the 2010 US Census, the majority of Latinos identify as white (53 percent); some classify themselves as some other race (37 percent); and very few (3 percent) identify as black. Latinos’ increasing presence and emerging social, political, and economic clout has been noticed by many individuals, particularly whites. Some whites have responded positively to Latinos’ presence and influence, yet others have not. This article addresses race relations between whites and Latinos with a focus on what extant research reveals to us regarding whites’ perceptions of immigration with a focus on Latino immigration, Latinos’ views toward whites, and the determinants of white-Latino racial attitudes and relations. The bibliography below begins with a discussion of studies that have established the foundation for our understanding of white-Latino relations. This discussion is followed by a presentation of extant research (primarily from the political science discipline) focused on three major themes. The first theme is perceptions of immigrants and immigration with a focus on the determinants on these attitudes. The second theme of the following studies center on Latinos’ social, economic, cultural, and political incorporation into the United States and whites’ perceptions of their behavior. Lastly, the third major theme focuses on white-Latino racial attitudes, the precursors of coalition formation, and the factors that structure inter-race relations. This article culminates with a discussion of critical data sources that individuals can consult for further research on white-Latino relations.

The number of non-English speaking and bilingual immigrants continues to grow in the U.S. Previous research suggests that about one third of White Americans feel threatened upon hearing a language other than English. The current research examines how exposure to a foreign language affects White Americans’ perceptions of immigrants and group-based threats. In Study 1, White Americans were randomly assigned to read one of four fictional transcripts of a conversation of an immigrant family at a restaurant, where the type of language being spoken was manipulated to be either Korean, Spanish, German, or English. In Study 2, White Americans read the same fictional transcript—minus the Spanish; however, there was an addition of two subtitles conditions in which the subtitles were provided next to the Korean and German texts. The two studies suggest that exposure to a foreign language—regardless of whether they are consistent with Anglocentric constructions of American identity—lead White Americans to form less positive impressions of the immigrant targets and their conversation, experience an uptick in group-based threats, and display greater anti-immigrant attitudes. Moreover, there is evidence that the (in)ability to understand the conversation (i.e., epistemic threat) influences participants’ perceptions of immigrants and group-based threats.

This research investigates the relationship between education, racial identity, political ideology, and socioeconomic factors in shaping American immigrants' attitudes toward immigration policies and perceptions of law enforcement. Analyzing data from the 2020 American National Election Studies (ANES) survey through multiple linear regression models, the study reveals significant influences of perceived police brutality and racial bias on public trust in law enforcement, with political ideology being a notable determinant in forming opinions on both immigration and policing. The findings emphasize the adverse impact of aggressive policing and racial profiling on immigrants' trust in law enforcement, highlighting the linkage between education and race in modulating perceptions of immigration policies. The results illustrate several ways socio demographic factors influence views on these pivotal issues and underscore the critical need for policy approaches that are mindful of the diversity of experiences and attitudes within immigrant communities. By unraveling the layered influences on immigrants' perceptions of immigration and policing, this research contributes valuable insights towards developing more informed, inclusive, and empathetic policy frameworks, reflecting the complex nature of immigration and law enforcement issues in a multifaceted societal context.

Drawing on an original, nationally representative sample of Asian, Black, Latino, and White adults in the United States, this article examines how race and political ideology shaped individuals’ perception of bias victimization threats during COVID-19. Overall, racialized minorities perceived a greater threat of bias victimization than their White counterparts. However, these perceptions varied by political ideology. First, Asian, Black, and Latino liberals, as well as Asian and Black moderates, perceived higher levels of bias victimization threat to themselves and their family and friends. Second, Asian and Black liberals perceived an increased change in the threat of bias victimization since the start of the pandemic. Third, White liberals perceived less threat of bias victimization for themselves in comparison to White conservatives. We propose that examining the intersecting effects of race and political ideology is important to understand perceptions of bias victimization during the pandemic.

This paper aims to attempt to understand attitudes towards immigrants and immigration as a perception of the impact of immigrants and immigration on Croatian society and their changes. It is based on the dynamic version of group conflict theory, which suggests that short-term but intense social changes have a greater effect on shifts in attitudes towards immigrants and immigration than long-term competition over resources (Meuleman, Davidov and Billiet, 2009). Therefore, following a theoretical introduction and a selective review of previous research findings within the European context, as well as an overview of social circumstances related to migration in Croatia, the paper analyses data obtained from the European Social Survey (ESS). These data pertain to attitudes towards immigrants and immigration in Croatia and within a broader European context, before and after the 2015–2016 “migration crisis”, as well as before and after the significant increase in the number of immigrants (foreign workers) in Croatia. Due to the sudden and significant increase in the number of immigrants, it was expected that the increased influx during the “migration crisis”, accompanied by media and political encouragement of moral panic, would lead to a shift in attitudes towards immigrants and immigration. While the “migration crisis” did result in a more negative perception of the role of immigrants in society across European countries, it did not lead to a long-term decline in support for immigration. Relatively soon, attitudes towards immigration generally returned to pre-crisis levels or even became somewhat more positive. However, this level varies across different countries and regions of Europe. Research has shown that attitudes towards immigration and immigrants tend to be more positive in countries with a long immigration tradition than in those that have not historically been immigration destinations or are only just becoming so. Additionally, attitudes are more positive in Western and especially Northern Europe compared to Southern and Eastern Europe, as well as in Western democracies compared to post-socialist countries. It is considered that these and similar findings cannot be fully explained solely by group conflict theory or contact theory. Moreover, the prominence of immigration as a social issue is increasingly linked to the rise of populism and the politicisation of migration in public discourse. All of this suggests that attitudes towards immigration and immigrants can only be interpreted by linking contextual and individual factors. Therefore, the expressed attitudes of Croatian citizens towards immigrants and immigration are connected to the characteristics of the socio-historical context within which the analysed research was conducted. With its accession to the European Union in 2013, Croatia was expected to increase its potential to transition from a traditionally emigrant country to an immigrant one. Facilitated mobility and improved employment opportunities abroad, as seen in other Central, Eastern, and Southeastern European countries after joining the EU, have accelerated the emigration of Croatian citizens to EU countries. At the same time, the demand for foreign workers in Croatia has gradually increased. During the “migration crisis” and the intense migratory pressure on its borders, Croatia, positioned on the external side of the Schengen borders, primarily served as a transit country for most migrants, who neither wished nor intended to stay. A notable increase in the number of immigrants has occurred due to the growing demand for foreign workers, particularly after the reopening of borders following the COVID-19 pandemic. To analyse the differences in attitudes towards immigrants and immigration in Croatia before and after the “migration crisis” within a broader European context, assess whether these attitudes are shifting with the rising number of foreign workers in Croatia, and identify key individual predictors of these attitudes, this study utilizes data from the European Social Survey, specifically its 5th (2010/2011), 9th (2018/2019), 10th (2020/2021), and 11th (2023/2024) rounds. An analysis of attitudes towards immigrants and immigration before (ESS5- 2010/2011) and after (ESS9-2018/2019) the 2015–2016 “migration crisis” shows that, as seen in most European countries, attitudes in Croatia became more positive after the “crisis”, indicating relative stability in these views. It was found that, on average, Croatian citizens held more positive attitudes towards immigrants and immigration after the “migration crisis” compared to citizens of most post-socialist EU member states, although these attitudes were still less positive than those in most Western, and especially Northern European countries, including traditionally immigrationreceiving countries. According to the measurement of perceived immigration threat on a scale from 0 (negative) to 10 (positive), Croatian respondents exhibited a statistically significant improvement in their attitudes after the “migration crisis” (MESS5 = 4.71; MESS9 = 4.93 /t = -2.660; df = 3345.197; p = 0.008/). However, despite this improvement, their attitudes remained more negative than the European average (MESS5 = 4.70; MESS9 = 5.13). The dynamics of expressed attitudes towards immigrants and immigration in Croatia, within the context of the “migration crisis”, mirror those observed in most other European countries, including those that faced a significant increase in the number of immigrants. However, unlike these countries, Croatia was only marginally impacted by the “crisis”, and no surge in negative attitudes towards immigrants and immigration followed. However, a shift in these attitudes, specifically, a rise in more negative views towards immigrants and immigration, occurs with the arrival of a growing number of foreign workers and their increased visibility in Croatian society. An analysis of attitudes towards immigrants and immigration in Croatia, surveyed before (ESS10-2020/2021) and after (ESS11-2023/2024) the significant increase in the number of immigrants (foreign workers), reveals a statistically significant shift towards more negative attitudes following the rise in the immigrant population, according to the measurement of perceived immigration threat (MESS10 = 5.09; MESS11 = 4.82 /t = 3.112; df = 3085.646; p = 0.002/). It is important to note that the overall shift occurred largely due to respondents perceiving immigrants as a cultural threat to a statistically significantly greater extent after the notable increase in their numbers (t = 5.436; df = 3041.246; p < 0.001), while the perception of an economic threat did not change statistically significantly. Additionally, regarding opposition to immigration based on the origin of immigrants, the analysis shows that, after the significant increase in the number of immigrants, there was a somewhat statistically significant shift towards more negative attitudes, specifically towards the immigration of people “of a different race or ethnic origin” compared to the majority of the Croatian population (t = -2.218; df = 3080; p = 0.027). The results of this analysis confirm the assumptions of the dynamic version of group conflict theory, which posits that attitudes towards immigration and immigrants change in response to short-term, or perhaps more accurately within the Croatian context, unusual but significant shifts in the presence and visibility of immigrants in society, with their numbers being an important factor. Following the increased influx of immigrants without Croatian citizenship, who come from various European countries, other continents, and increasingly from certain Asian countries, respondents demonstrate a statistically significant higher perception of immigrants as a cultural threat. Additionally, there is a somewhat statistically significant shift towards a more negative view of the immigration of people “of a different race and ethnic origin,” suggesting a rise in xenophobic attitudes. Based on data from the 11th round of the ESS, regression analysis identified some key predictors of attitudes towards immigrants and immigration in Croatia. The findings concluded that respondents who are older, less educated, from rural areas, selfidentify as more religious, of lower socio-economic status, politically right-leaning and more inclined towards nationalism are more likely to express negative attitudes towards immigrants and immigration. Since political orientation is highlighted as a predictor of both the perception of immigration threat and opposition to immigration in the applied regression model, it can be said that this variable contributes most to explaining attitudes towards immigrants and immigration. Such a perception of the impact of immigration on society, along with the view of immigration as a societal problem and the negative perception of immigrants, suggests a rise in rightwing populism and the politicisation of migration within public discourse. These findings, along with the results of previous studies, highlight a certain structural xenophobia within Croatian society and indicate the need for a carefully designed immigration policy. In addition to laying the foundation for the integration of immigrants into Croatian society, such a policy could, as research shows, encourage more positive attitudes towards immigrants. Its implementation is not only a challenge related to the necessary condition of securing essential workers but also to retaining them in the country. This, in turn, presents the challenge of immigrant integration, which must be understood as a two-way process between immigrants and the native population.

Nearly all research focused on understanding perceptions of climate-related risks to coastal resources has used data collected via mail surveys, online surveys or in-depth qualitative interviews. To compliment previous research, this study focuses on objective perceptions of climate-related risks to coastal resources as measured by respondents’ gaze behavior when viewing images describing or depicting climate-related impacts to coastal resources. We utilize data collected from a survey paired with an eye tracking session to measure perceptions of climate-related risks to coastal resources. We also compare the gaze behavior of liberals and conservatives when viewing an infographic and a digital photograph illustrating climate-related impacts to coastal resources; these included impacts to: 1) abiotic resources; 2) biotic resources; 3) built infrastructure; and 4) recreation opportunities. Survey data indicate liberal participants believed climate-related risks to all four types of impacts were more serious relative to conservative participants. However, eye tracking data revealed both liberal and conservative participants spent an equivalent amount of time viewing the four types of impacts. Consequently, differences in the extent to which liberals and conservatives perceive climate-related risks to coastal resources may be attributable to differences in how the two groups evaluate each of the specific impacts. Eye tracking data also revealed liberal participants noticed impacts to biotic resources faster than conservative participants. Conversely, conservative participants noticed impacts to built infrastructure faster than liberal participants. The practical implications of these findings are noteworthy: climate change communicators should target messages based on the predominant political ideology of their audience or include both biotic and built infrastructure impacts in their messages to capture wider audiences.

Moral foundations theory (MFT) has provided an account of the moral values that underscore different cultural and political ideologies, and these moral values of harm, fairness, loyalty, authority, and purity can help to explain differences in political and cultural ideologies; however, the extent to which moral foundations relate to strong social ideologies, intergroup processes and threat perceptions is still underdeveloped. To explore this relationship, we conducted two studies. In Study 1 (N = 157), we considered how the moral foundations predicted strong social ideologies such as authoritarianism (RWA) and social dominance orientation (SDO) as well as attitudes toward immigrants. Here, we demonstrated that more endorsement of individualizing moral foundations (average of harm and fairness) was related to less negative intergroup attitudes, which was mediated by SDO, and that more endorsement of binding moral foundations (the average of loyalty, authority, and purity) was related to more negative attitudes, which was mediated by RWA. Crucially, further analyses also suggested the importance of threat perceptions as an underlying explanatory variable. Study 2 (N = 388) replicated these findings and extended them by measuring attitudes toward a different group reflecting an ethnic minority in the United States, and by testing the ordering of variables while also replicating and confirming the threat effects. These studies have important implications for using MFT to understand strong ideologies, intergroup relations, and threat perceptions.

Researchers have explored human values can effectively induce changes in attitudes and behaviors toward immigrants. This study compared the impact of different human values (self-transcendence and self-enhancement) on individuals' perceptions toward immigrants. A total of 250 participants were included in the study. Each participant was randomly assigned to one of the following conditions: control condition, priming condition on universalism, benevolence, power, or achievement. All participants completed a Scrambled Sentences Task to prime the value saliency, a Short Schwartz’s Value Survey for the manipulation check, and a questionnaire assessing their perceptions of threat toward immigrants. One-way ANOVAs were conducted between each value priming condition (achievement, benevolence, power, and universalism) and the control condition, along with planned contrasts. The results did not reveal any statistically significant differences between the conditions across the composite scale and subscales (realistic and symbolic threat). Post Hoc tests indicated that individuals who identified as White were more likely to perceive immigrants as threats compared to Blacks and Hispanics, suggesting racial and ethnic background differences in perception. Across all groups, negative correlations were found between threat perceptions and self-transcendent values, while positive correlations were found between threat perceptions and self-enhancement values. Although experimental evidence using Scrambled Sentences Tak for priming human values was not found, the study supports the correlational associations between human values and attitude toward immigrants.

This study aimed to investigate the association between political ideology and awareness of HPV and HPV vaccine among US adults. Study data were derived from Health Information National Trends Survey 5 Cycle 4, a 2020 cross-sectional survey of US adults. Multivariable logistic regressions were conducted to examine the association between political ideology with HPV and HPV vaccine awareness. A total of 3418 adults participated in the study, with the majority being non-Hispanic White individuals and women. The results showed that 66.1% and 62.3% of the participants were aware of HPV and HPV vaccine, respectively. A total of 36.9%, 29.7% and 33.4% of the population reported moderate, liberal and conservative political ideologies respectively. Awareness levels were highest among liberals, with 77.1% and 72.7% reporting awareness of HPV and HPV vaccine respectively. Multivariable logistic regression analysis revealed that liberal participants were more likely to be aware of HPV (aOR, 1.94; 95% CI, 1.25–3.00), and HPV vaccines (aOR, 1.94; 95% CI, 1.37–2.74) compared to moderates. Also, liberals had higher odds of HPV (aOR, 2.41; 95% CI, 1.65–3.51), and HPV vaccine awareness (aOR, 1.91; 95% CI, 1.29–2.83) compared to conservatives. However, there was no significant difference in awareness between moderates and conservatives. Study findings point to an association between individuals’ political ideology and HPV awareness. Further research is needed to understand the intricacies on how political ideology impacts HPV awareness. Overall, results highlight the need to incorporate individuals’ political ideologies in interventions geared toward increasing the awareness and uptake of HPV vaccination.

As part of a national survey on social workers’ attitudes toward immigrants and immigration (N=4,499), we collected information on respondents’ perceptions of immigrants as threats and respondents’ views on structural inequality as it pertains to immigrants’ opportunities for success. Contrary to the Council on Social Work Education’s Educational Policy and Accreditation Standards stating the need for social workers to understand the existence and functioning of structural forces of inequality, nearly a third of our respondents denied that immigrants are disadvantaged compared to U.S.-born citizens, and more than a third denied that disadvantage is related to race, ethnicity, or national origin. Those who denied disadvantage were more likely than those who did not to see immigrants as threats. We provide interpretations for these findings and offer some recommendations for social work research and education geared toward deepening practitioners’ knowledge of the structural barriers faced by immigrants.

The discourse on immigration and immigrants is central to contemporary political and public discussions. Analyzing online conversations about immigrants provides valuable insights into public opinion, complemented by data from questionnaires on how attitudes are formed. The research includes two studies examining the expressive and informational use of social media. Study 1 conducted a computational text analysis of comments on Singaporean Facebook pages and forums, focusing on how social media is used to discuss immigrants. Study 2 utilized survey data to examine the use of social media at the individual level, testing the relationships between cognitive ability, perceptions of threat, negative emotions towards immigrants, and social media usage within the Integrated Threat Theory framework. Study 1 found that discussions about immigrants on social media often involved negative emotions and concerns about economic impact, such as competition for jobs and crime. Complementing these findings about perceived economic threats, Study 2 showed that individuals with higher social media usage and greater perceptions of threat were more likely to have negative emotions towards immigrants. These relationships were mediated by perceptions of threat and were stronger in individuals with lower cognitive abilities. The findings from both studies demonstrate the role of social media in shaping public attitudes towards immigrants, highlighting how perceived threats influence these attitudes. This research suggests the importance of considering how digital platforms contribute to public opinion on immigration, with implications for understanding the dynamics of attitude formation in the digital age.

Background Public concerns about immigrants' use of welfare programs have long influenced U.S. immigration and social policy. During the Trump administration, claims that immigrants exploit the American welfare system became central to the political agenda, amplifying perceptions that immigrants are economic burdens. These perceptions, whether grounded in reality or not, can shape public support for both immigration and the welfare state. Aims Few studies have systematically examined how closely Americans' perceptions of immigrants' welfare usage align with actual usage patterns, and how individual and contextual factors moderate this relationship. In this study we explore these connections. Materials and Methods We use original national survey data merged with state‐level data on immigrant welfare usage to investigate the extent to which Americans' beliefs reflect the realities of local immigrant welfare usage. Results We show a significant–albeit modest–association between the objective rate of immigrant participation in welfare programs and individuals' subjective perceptions. However, this effect is not uniform: it is strongest among individuals who are more engaged in politics, though moderating effects of political ideology and education are mixed. Discussion and Conclusion These findings contribute to our understanding of the conditions under which factual context influences perceptions and belief formation in a polarized political environment. They also contribute to the growing literature on immigrants' fiscal impact, as well as the literature on immigration attitudes.

This paper examines how the perceived threat of immigration affects the links between national identification, endorsement of assimilation or multiculturalism, and prejudice against immigrants in France. One hundred thirty-five French undergraduates completed a questionnaire measuring these factors. Path analysis showed that higher national identification increased perception of immigrants as a threat, which in turn predicted increased endorsement of assimilation for immigrants. The link between endorsement of assimilation and prejudice was not significant. In contrast, lower national identification decreased perception of immigrants as a threat and, in turn, increased endorsement of multiculturalism and reduced levels of prejudice. An alternative model specifying perception of threat as an outcome of preferences for multiculturalism or assimilation did not fit the data well. Results suggest that perceived threat from immigration is the key factor that guides the preferences of the majority group for acculturation ideologies and, through these preferences, shapes intergroup attitudes.

Political ideology is an increasingly powerful force in support of public policy. Historically, nuclear energy has found more support among political conservatives. This study updates the literature on political ideology and support for nuclear energy by examining how political ideology is associated with perceptions of nuclear energy and trust of nuclear information sources. After excluding participants with incomplete data, and participants within 50 miles of a nuclear reactor, the analytical sample size for the analysis examining political ideology and perceptions of nuclear energy was 4153. The analytical sample includes a total of 1035 participants within a 50‐mile radius of INL, 710 participants from within Idaho who lived further than 50 miles from INL, 1899 participants from other states (more than 50 miles from a nuclear reactor), and 509 Non‐Idaho participants living within 50 miles of a nuclear reactor. Logistic regression was used to determine how political ideology was associated with perceptions of nuclear energy and trust in different sources regarding radioactive waste, after controlling for demographics and location. While liberal participants near INL were less favorable towards nuclear energy, and more trusting in impact scientists to tell the truth about radioactive waste than their conservative counterparts, this was not consistent across the US. Our findings reveal the complexity of political ideology and the perceptions of nuclear issues and how proximity influences perceptions. The perceptions of political moderates were particularly important in providing a more complex understanding of political ideology and nuclear energy issues.

In the summer of 2022, the U.S. Supreme Court overturned the historic Roe v. Wade ruling, prompting various states to put forth ballot measures regarding state-level abortion rights. While earlier studies have established associations between demographics, such as religious beliefs and political ideologies, and attitudes toward abortion, the current research delves into the role of psychological traits such as empathy, locus of control, and need for cognition. A sample of 294 U.S. adults was obtained via Amazon Mechanical Turk, and participants were asked to provide their attitudes on seven abortion scenarios. They also responded to scales measuring empathy toward the pregnant woman and the unborn, locus of control, and need for cognition. Principal Component Analysis divided abortion attitudes into two categories: traumatic abortions (e.g., pregnancies due to rape) and elective abortions (e.g., the woman does not want the child anymore). After controlling for religious belief and political ideology, the study found psychological factors accounted for substantial variation in abortion attitudes. Notably, empathy toward the pregnant woman correlated positively with abortion support across both categories, while empathy toward the unborn revealed an inverse relationship. An internal locus of control was positively linked to support for both types of abortions. Conversely, external locus of control and need for cognition only positively correlated with attitudes toward elective abortion, showing no association with traumatic abortion attitudes. Collectively, these findings underscore the significant and unique role psychological factors play in shaping public attitudes toward abortion. Implications for research and practice were discussed.