Secretary of State Rubio Denies and Revokes Visas for Palestinian Delegation Invited to Attend UN General Assembly Meetings

This third edition is a comprehensive manual of the rules of procedure and conduct of business at the UN General Assembly, at international conferences and at assemblies of inter-governmental organisations such as the World Health Organization. It examines the legal basis of these rules, the history of their development and the attempts at their codification. At the heart of the book is an examination of the practical applications of rules of procedure. Procedural rulings, updated to October 2016, are quoted from the records of UN General Assembly meetings, from assemblies of international organisations and from treaty-making conferences. This book is of interest to those involved in international law, international relations and international organisations. It also serves as an indispensable practical guide for delegates to the UN General Assembly and to international inter-governmental conferences. The first edition of this book was awarded the American Society of International Law 'Special Award'.

The architects of the Court had to agree upon the appropriate method to establish a court that would be universally accepted, effective and independent. The draft Statute of the Court, prepared and adopted by the International Law Commission in 1994, indicates that three proposals were contemplated initially: (a) through a UN Security Council or General Assembly resolution; (b) by amending the UN Charter, which would have made the international criminal court an integral part of the UN and hence create binding obligations for all its members; and (c) through a multilateral treaty.

The use of force� /no matter how benevolent, enlightened, or impartial in intent� /has dramatic consequences. It shapes the struggle for power and helps to determine the outcome of political contests, which is why it is inherently controversial. It is why international debates about Libya� /the first road test of the Responsibility to Protect’s (R2P) coercive element (also known as Pillar Three)� /were understandably contentious. Pillar Three is defined as ‘‘the responsibility of Member States to respond collectively in a timely and decisive manner when a State is manifestly failing to provide ... / protection.’’ 1 While peaceful means of response are primarily preferred, should that prove inadequate to ensure protection, the international community should use more robust action: ‘‘no strategy for fulfilling the responsibility to protect would be complete without the possibility of collective enforcement measures, including through sanctions or coercive military action in extreme cases.’’ 2

The activities of the UN General Assembly in the context of the contemporary Russian-Ukrainian war are studied. Unlike the UN Security Council, the General Assembly's work was not hindered by the restrictions of the veto power, which the Russian Federation, as a permanent member of the Security Council, consistently abuse. This distinction significantly influenced the outcomes of the General Assembly, which swiftly addressed the war triggered by Russian aggression against Ukraine from its early stages in 2014. The course of adoption and the key content of UN General Assembly resolutions related to Russian aggression against Ukraine in 2014–2023 are traced: resolution 68/262 «Territorial integrity of Ukraine» dated March 28, 2014; resolutions «Situation of human rights in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol (Ukraine)» 2016–2022; resolutions «The problem of militarization of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol (Ukraine), as well as parts of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov» 2018–2021; resolutions of the Eleventh Extraordinary Special Session of the UN General Assembly dedicated to the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 (ES-11/1 – ES-11/6). The analysis UN General Assembly resolutions lack binding legal force, being advisory and recommendatory in nature, they nonetheless reflect substantial global support for Ukraine, particularly among Western countries. The UN General Assembly under the conditions of the Russian-Ukrainian war, became for the Ukrainian leadership one of the platforms from which, by preparing and initiating the consideration of resolutions, it was possible to convey to the world public Ukrainian approaches to the Russian aggression, to call for its firm condemnation and, in coordination with other states of the world, to seek ways to settle the Russian-Ukrainian war and achieve a just peace in accordance with the UN Charter, the norms of international law and the national interests of Ukraine. Key words: General Assembly, United Nations, resolutions, Russian-Ukrainian war, full-scale invasion, Ukraine, Russian Federation.

This article traces the Turkish voting preferences in the UN General Assembly during the AK Party era between 2002 and 2020. It seeks to understand as to whether there is a congruence between Turkey’s critical view of international society as epitomized by Tayyip Erdoğan’s motto, 'The World is Bigger Than Five', and the way Turkish representatives voted during the same period in the UN General Assembly on questions such as nuclear disarmament, self-determination, search for a new international order, and human rights. Based on primary materials, this paper concludes that there exists an undisputable contradiction between Turkey’s anti-establishment posture and behavioural attitude towards the outside world since 2002 on the one hand and it’s voting orientation in the UN General Assembly on the other. The latter is largely the outcome of the ‘Europeanization’ of Turkish foreign policy based on Turkey’s candidacy for EU membership and its NATO commitments. Hence, during the period under investigation, Turkey was broadly allied to the European position in the context of its voting pattern in the UN General Assembly which was conspicuous with its aloofness towards calls for substantial changes intended to bring about a more just and peaceful international order.

This chapter examines the division of competence between the UN Security Council and the UN General Assembly concerning matters of international peace and security but placed within the context of the prohibition on the use of force. Although the Security Council can authorize the use of force by states, what is not clear is whether the General Assembly can recommend that states take military action. The chapter considers the conundrum faced by the United Nations with respect to an imminent and catastrophic use of force or act of egregious violence, when the UN Security Council is deadlocked because of the lack of agreement between the permanent members. It discusses the debate over the legality of the (in)famous Uniting for Peace Resolution of 1950 within the context of the emerging principle of a Responsibility to Protect (R2P) as well as within existing principles of international law.

Transforming or tinkering: the world remains unprepared for the next pandemic threat

A new wave of interest in the complete elimination of nuclear-weapons is washing over international security institutions. Although the goal of a nuclear weapons-free world is as old as the nuclear...

The subject of the study is the development assistance of the United States and China to Sub-Saharan states and its impact on the voting of recipient countries in the UN General Assembly.The object of the study is the relations of the United States and China with Sub-Saharan Africa. The author examines in detail such aspects of the topic as development assistance, as well as voting in the UN General Assembly. Particular attention is paid to the impact of development assistance from donor States represented by the United States and China on the voting in the UNGA of recipient states on key issues of interest to China and the United States. The main conclusions of this study are the following: the more African countries receive more aid from the United States, the more they tend to vote for the same opinion as the United States in the UN General Assembly. On the other hand, China's assistance did not have a significant impact on the similarity of foreign policy between China and the recipient African States. The novelty of the study lies in the regression analysis. In addition to the amount of aid to African countries in the United States and China, the work includes variables that may influence the UN General Assembly vote on African recipient States in the statistical model as control variables based on existing research.

This article analyses the role of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) as a security actor. With the creation of the ‘International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011’ (IIIM), through UNGA Resolution 71/ 2481 in 2016, the General Assembly creatively used its powers to strengthen international criminal justice. Although investigative or fact-finding missions itself are nothing new to the UN system, Resolution 71/ 248 is qualitatively different to any other mission before it. The IIIM was established without Syrian consent, which is a historic first for the General Assembly. It is also the first time that such a body is tasked with investigations that fulfil prosecution standards, that serves as an evidence repository as well as a connecting hub between different justice actors. The UN General Assembly filled a void where the UN Security Council found itself in a stalemate over Syria. The IIIM has since served as a blueprint for a new generation of investigative mechanisms that emerged in the UN system. Looking beyond the appraisal of the IIIM, the article argues that the UN General Assembly practice in maintaining peace and security has significantly evolved over time. The early UN General Assembly practice through Uniting for Peace allowed it to assert its proactive role in parallel to the Security Council, yet it failed in its claim of authority to recommend forceful, collective measures. The practice subsequently evolved towards the diverse use of non-forceful measures, of which the IIIM provides a recent example. Creative boundary pushing in the UNGA through non-forcible measures will hopefully contribute to peace and security beyond war.

In 1947, the United Kingdom and the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) concluded that Palestine’s Arabs and Jews, who had been subject to a British-administered League of Nations mandate since 1922, were sufficiently advanced to govern themselves. A “Plan of Partition with Economic Union” was subsequently adopted by the UN General Assembly in Resolution 181 (II) “for the future Government of Palestine” (Resolution 181 (II)) that made provision for the establishment of two states in the territory along with a special international regime for the City of Jerusalem. The plan was never implemented in the way it was foreseen, due to the outbreak of war, although the UN Secretariat, the Soviet Union, and the Jewish Agency, considered it a binding act of international law. This was also a view that was reiterated by other states when Israel applied for membership of the UN, and during the debate in the UN General Assembly to establish a special international regime for Jerusalem in 1949. Additionally, there is jurisprudence in the International Court of Justice concerning the South West Africa/Namibia cases, and judgments in Israeli and Italian courts that can be cited in support of this view. Statements made by UK officials in 1947 referred to Resolution 181 (II) as a decision of a court of international opinion. The views of the US Government and France were equivocal, although both issued statements that could be interpreted to mean that they viewed Resolution 181 (II) as normative, given the subsidiary powers conferred on the General Assembly by Article 22 of the UN Charter. The Arab states, on the other hand, opposed the resolution during the debates in 1947 on the basis that it was contrary to the Palestinian Arab people’s right of self-determination to establish a single unitary state over the whole territory. However, Israel and the Arab states (Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria) accepted Resolution 181 (II) as a basis for negotiation in the Lausanne Protocol of 12 May 1949, indicating that it was acceptable, in principle, as a basis for negotiating the territorial issue, before negotiations began in the UN Trusteeship Council and the UN General Assembly on establishing a special international regime for Jerusalem. Although Resolution 181 (II) was never implemented in the way it was foreseen, a UN Mediator was established with wide powers to continue the work of the Palestine Commission. These powers were subsequently transferred to the UN Conciliation Commission for Palestine (UNCCP), before a plurality of states in the UN General Assembly recognized the Palestinian people as a principal party in the establishment of a just and lasting peace (GA Res 3236, 22 November 1974, para 4), who could participate in its work, in furtherance of their right to self-determination, through the representation of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)—initially as an observer (GA Res 3237, 22 November 1974), then as an observer state (GA Res 67/19, 29 November 2012). Accordingly, it could be argued that the Palestinian people retained title to the territories allotted to the Arab state in Resolution 181 (II). This is a view that has since been endorsed by the international community multiple times in Security Council and General Assembly resolutions in support of a “two-state solution.” The opposition the Arab states expressed toward Resolution 181 (II) in 1947 was opposition to the establishment of a Jewish state. These states were not opposed to the creation of an Arab state. The dispute, therefore, was not over statehood per se, or title, but over the shape that the state would take and the location of its boundary with the Jewish State. Given the specificity of the topic, most analyses of Resolution 181 (II) have taken the form of articles in international law journals or chapters in books. In addition, there are historical accounts that consider partition from a broader historical vantage point. By far, most of the material comes in the form of primary sources in UN speeches, government reports, and legal memorandums.

The United Nations as one of the most important international organizations has an important role in securing human rights. The UN General Assembly as the principal organ of this organization, regarding the duties and powers considered for it, can also improve humanitarian law among state members. The role of the UN General Assembly has been investigated through an analytical-descriptive method in this article. An important and special role has been given to the UN in the new international order. One of the organs of this organization is the General Assembly which has found more importance in expressing the thoughts and values of the Third World countries since the Third World countries can express their views against the developed industrialized- countries through this organ. Assigning missions such as mediation and good office to the Secretary General of United Nations in the times of crisis, as it has been discussed in this article, indicates that UN General Assembly has taken advantage of all available mechanisms to create humanitarian law and prevent international conflicts in international relations. The position of the General Assembly against violence and extremism becomes more apparent when we know that almost all human rights institutions are considered as subsets of the General Assembly and that their job is to monitor human rights violations done by governments. This issue is important for this reason that the violation of human rights regulations in long run will lead to devastating violence in the international arena as well as among governments; an issue that will eventually lead to terrorist measures and behaviors.

The FAA plays a pivotal role in maintaining security within the National Airspace System (NAS). This paper discusses employment of temporary flight restrictions, use of air interdiction assets and establishment of an Aviation Security Operations Center as air domain security measures during the September 2007 United Nations General Assembly meeting. Also discussed are some of the Tracks of Interest that were detected during the event and some of the impacts that airspace security measures had on the NAS and its users.

This thought piece explores the historical episodes regarding human rights issues and their relationship with the Olympics and other mega and major sporting events. We show how sporting events have long been used for opportunities for the world to see human rights abuses. We then discuss the mixture of money, media companies, and sporting events and how these forces are increasing the visibility of municipalities and states that host these events. We ask the question: Other than money, why do these sporting events continue to be awarded to Middle East counties that have long records of human rights abuses? Like many academic works we try and find the link between ideas and action. We conclude with a call to action and examine the IOC–UN partnership that began in 2009 and allowed the IOC to be directly involved in the UN agenda and also granted them the ability to attend the UN General Assembly meetings.

In the article the author discloses the role of the UN General Assembly in the sphere of implementation of the UN Global coun -ter-terrorism strategy as a document of the «soft» international law. The author examines the particularities of the elaboration, adoptionand reviewing of the Strategy and synthesizes the major provisions of this document and the resolutions of the General Assembly containingits reviews in the context of the adaptation, development and putting into practice of the Strategy. On this basis the author concludeson the essential input of the UN General Assembly into the process of the implementation of the Strategy.The author points out that the UN Global counter-terrorism strategy is a unique anti-terrorist international law document whichprovides comprehensive approach and universal legal regulation based on the «soft» obligations of the UN Member States. In theauthor’s view, the adoption of the Strategy in 2006 was a revolutionary step considering that at that stage only some separate aspectsof combating and preventing terrorism have been regulated in the resolutions of the UN General Assembly and the UN Security Counciland in the universal anti-terrorist treaties, and the Strategy has become the first document at the universal level which established a systemof multifaceted and interrelated measures of the global countering of terrorism and fixed the important main principles in this area.The author argues that the Strategy presents a dynamic, living instrument, the reviewing and updating of which, since 2008, havebeen assuring its adaptation to the new realities and needs in the sphere of the global countering of terrorism and the codification anddevelopment of the «soft» international law in this sphere. It is concluded that the UN General Assembly plays a key role in reviewingand keeping up to date of the four groups of measures contained in the Strategy aimed at combating and preventing terrorism, and inproviding the coordination and mobilization of the efforts of a wide range of subjects in its implementation, such as States, UN system,international organizations, civil society, private sector.The author also points out at a number of problematic aspects of legal and institutional nature which require particular attentionfrom the point of view of increasing the efficiency of the implementation of the Strategy.