Second Homes and the (Re)production of Cornish Nationalism

This paper examines the effect of the benefits of corporate control to managers on the relationship between managerial ownership and the stock returns of acquiring firms in corporate control transactions. At low levels of managerial ownership, agency costs of equity (such as perquisite consumption) reduce the returns earned by acquirers. As the managerial stake in the acquiring firm increases, the interests of managers are more closely aligned with those of shareholders, reducing the acquisition premium. At sufficiently high levels of managerial ownership, managers value a reduction in the risk of their nondiversified financial portfolio. However, managers enjoy nonassignable private benefits of control at high levels of ownership which they are not willing to lose by selling their stake in the financial markets. These benefits of control are increasing in the managerial ownership stake and can lead to managers 'overpaying' even when they own a substantial fraction of the firm. Examining mergers that occurred during 1985 to 1991, we find evidence of such a nonmonotonic relationship between the stock returns earned by acquirers and their managerial ownership level. Further, we find that acquiring firms with high levels of managerial ownership tend to diversify more than acquiring firms with low levels of managerial ownership.

Terminations of overfunded pension plans may strengthen a financially‐weak firm. When manager's interests are aligned with shareholder's, either through high levels of stock ownership, or through labor and takeover market discipline at low levels of ownership, termination strengthens the firm and the stock price should react positively. In contrast, managers at middle levels of ownership hold enough stock to be entrenched, but not enough to be aligned with shareholder interests. Terminations may then be for reasons other than strengthening a financially‐weak firm and may not generate a positive stock price reaction. We find that the financial incentives for terminations differ significantly between terminators and nonterminators at high and low levels of managerial ownership, but not at intermediate levels. Our stock return analysis indicates that terminations by high and low ownership firms are consistent with shareholder welfare. Concern has been expressed that terminations of defined benefit pension plans transfer wealth from plan participants to plan sponsors. Plan terminations can have a value‐maximizing motive when the reversions are used as a source of financing, thereby helping firms avoid bankruptcy and liquidation. The empirical evidence (e.g., Alderson and VanDerhei (1992), VanDerhei (1987), and Hsieh, Ferris, and Chen (1990)) showing favorable stock price reactions to terminations by financially‐weak firms are consistent with the value‐maximizing justification for plan terminations. Prior studies (e.g., Agrawal and Mandelker (1987), Kim and Sorensen (1986), Sicherman and Pettway (1987), Hill and Snell (1989), Benston (1985), Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988), Carter and Stover (1991) and Hermalin and Weisbach (1991)) have also documented that management's ownership interest in the firm has an important effect on the incentive to maximize firm value. This paper examines the effect of managerial ownership on financial termination. Specifically, we address whether or not financial motivation to terminate plans exists at all levels of managerial ownership. Our results suggest that the terminating firms, when compared to the nonterminating firms, are financially weak at high and low levels of managerial ownership. In contrast, there is no significant difference in financial weakness between the terminators and the nonterminators at the middle ownership levels. Also, stockholders reactions to terminations are higher at high and low levels of managerial ownership.

This paper examines whether institutional investors exhibit preferences for near‐term earnings over long‐run value and whether such preferences have implications for firms' stock prices. First, I find that the level of ownership by institutions with short investment horizons (e.g., “transient” institutions) and by institutions held to stringent fiduciary standards (e.g., banks) is positively (negatively) associated with the amount of firm value in expected nearterm (long‐term) earnings. This evidence raises the question of whether such institutions myopically price firms, overweighting short‐term earnings potential and underweighting long‐term earnings potential. Evidence of such myopic pricing would establish a link through which institutional investors could pressure managers into a short‐term focus. The results provide no evidence that high levels of ownership by banks translate into myopic mispricing. However, high levels of transient ownership are associated with an over‐ (under‐) weighting of near‐term (long‐term) expected earnings, and a trading strategy based on this finding generates significant abnormal returns. This finding supports the concerns that many corporate managers have about the adverse effects of an ownership base dominated by short‐term‐focused institutional investors.

Critics often argue that institutional investors have an excessive focus on short-term firm performance that leads corporate managers to make decisions to boost short-term earnings at the expense of long-run value. This paper examines whether institutional investors exhibit preferences for near-term earnings over long-run value and whether such preferences have implications for firms' stock prices. Using the Ohlson [1995] model, I separate firm value into three components-book value, expected near-term earnings, and expected long-term (terminal) value-and test whether institutions prefer firms for which more of firm value is expected to be realized as near-term earnings rather than as long-term earnings. The results indicate that the level of ownership by institutions with short investment horizons (transient institutions) and by institutions held to stringent fiduciary standards (banks) is positively (negatively) associated with the amount of value in near-term (long-term) earnings. This evidence indicates that institutions with the strongest incentives to favor firms with a high proportion of value in near-term earnings exhibit such preferences. This evidence that banks and transient institutions prefer near-term earnings over long-run value raises the question of whether such institutions myopically price firms, overweighting short-term earnings potential and underweighting long-term earnings potential. Evidence of such myopic pricing would establish a link through which institutional investors could pressure managers into a short-term focus. The results provide no evidence that high levels of ownership by banks translate into myopic mispricing. However, high levels of transient ownership are associated with an over- (under-) weighting of near-term (long-term) expected earnings and a trading strategy based on this finding generates significant abnormal returns. This finding supports the concerns that many corporate managers have about the adverse effects of an ownership base dominated by short-term-focused institutional investors.

Family control and dilution in mergers

The rise of homeownership in the elderly population from 1940 to 1980 is investigated within the framework of compositional analysis. Recent cohorts have arrived at old age at higher levels of ownership than was previously the case. Using data on all individuals, significant compositional effects on homeownership were found. Changes in the process of homeownership retention have led to higher levels of home ownership among the elderly, but these are comparatively small and became relatively less influential in the latter half of the period investigated. Changes in income distribution and living arrangements accounted for virtually all the increase in homeownership. Developments in living arrangements among the elderly are linked to the increase in homeownership.

Ownership structure, founder leadership, and performance in Norwegian SMEs: implications for financing entrepreneurial opportunities

Following an exploratory factor analysis, factor scores may be computed and used in subsequent analyses. Factor scores are composite variables which provide information about an individual’s placement on the factor(s). This article discusses popular methods to create factor scores under two different classes: refined and non-refined. Strengths and considerations of the various methods, and for using factor scores in general, are discussed. Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) has been used as an analytical tool in educational research. The methods may be used with novel or exploratory research scenarios as a precursor to latent variable modeling or confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) (Schumaker & Lomax, 2004). However, in many research situations, EFA is used as the focal methodology. Practitioners may use EFA for a variety of purposes such as reducing a large number of items from a questionnaire or survey instrument to a smaller number of components, uncovering latent dimensions underlying a data set, or examining which items have the strongest association with a given factor. Once a researcher has used EFA and has identified the number of factors or components underlying a data set, he/she may wish to use the information about the factors in subsequent analyses (Gorsuch, 1983). For example, researchers may want to identify an individual’s placement or ranking on the factor(s), use the information with hypothesis tests to determine how factor scores differ between groups, or to incorporate factor information as part of a regression or predictive analysis. To use EFA information in follow-up studies, the researcher must create scores to represent each individual’s placement on the factor(s) identified from the EFA. These

Confirmatory factor analysis of the Cornell scale for depression in dementia among patient with dementia of various degrees

BackgroundWith the advent of the digital age, online social interaction has become an important form of interpersonal communication. This increasing popularity of online interaction has led to a growing debate about its impact on community cohesion. However, the effects and mechanisms by which online social interaction affects community cohesion are not well understood. This study aims to investigate the correlations between online social interaction and community cohesion in the Chinese context.MethodsThis cross-sectional study examines urban community residents (n = 1037) across China’s eastern, central, and western regions, with proportional sampling to ensure geographic representation. Data were collected via random questionnaires. Using structural equation modeling (SEM), we empirically assess (1) the impact of online social interaction on community cohesion, (2) the underlying mechanisms, and (3) heterogeneity effects across demographic and regional subgroups.ResultsThe direct influence of online social interaction on community cohesion was significantly positive (β = 0.694, P = 0.000), and the indirect effect of social interaction on community cohesion through offline social interaction was also significantly positive(β = 0.243, P = 0.000). The effects of online social interaction on community cohesion show significant heterogeneity across demographic groups and geographic regions, being more pronounced among middle-aged residents (β = 0.901, P = 0.000), male residents (β = 0.727, P = 0.000), and married residents (β = 0.779, P = 0.000) relative to their respective counterparts. The effect magnitude in the eastern region (β = 0.784, P = 0.000) substantially exceeds that in both central and western regions.ConclusionThe findings indicate that online social interaction is an important factor affecting the formation of urban residents’ community cohesion, and offline social interaction plays a mediating role. In addition, The association between online social interaction and community cohesion demonstrates significant heterogeneity across demographic and regional subgroups.

Using data from Hong Kong, a market that has family‐concentrated ownership structure, we examine the relation between managerial ownership, the board of directors and firm performance. We first conduct analysis on the managerial ownership and firm performance to derive the turning points where either ‘convergence of interest’ or ‘entrenchment’ effect of managerial ownership is dominant. Based on these estimated turning points, we find that at low and high level of ownership, effective board mitigates the entrenchment effect associated with managerial ownership; at medium level of ownership, board effectiveness is less demanded. These findings suggest that managerial ownership and board monitoring are substitutes in mitigating the agency problem between managers and shareholders. We also find that effective board curbs the excessive compensation by entrenched managers to themselves at low level of managerial ownership.

This study analysed the variety of pro-development roles of second-home owners in their host municipalities in Finland. The roles had not been identified previously, despite the policy expectations concerning the economic and social advantages of second-home owners for rural development. Moreover, this article examined how factors such as place attachment explained the roles. The data was collected from the postal survey (N = 2500). The roles and the place attachment constructs were defined by exploratory factor analysis (EFA), while the roles were explained by multivariate regression analysis (MRA). Five roles were identified: Potential Developer, Aware Consumer, Ordinary Member of association, Responsible Member of association, and Developer outside associations. The key components of second-home owners’ place attachment were identified as Community belonging, Rootedness, Place dependence, Family history at the second home, Rural leisure roots, Second-home community belonging and Economic embeddedness. Most roles were shaped to some extent by Community belonging, thus emphasising the co-operative nature of local development processes. The importance of Rootedness as well as of personal agency was proven. In addition, some features of the local context encouraged second-home owners to assume these roles.

This study examines the influence of managerial ownership on firm agency costs among listed firms in Bangladesh. This is an institutional setting that features a mixture of agency costs. This institutional setting has a concentration of ownership by managers, but the firms are not solely owned by managers. The extant literature suggests that the sacrifice of wealth by the principal and potential costs associated with monitoring the agents is known as the agency cost. This study uses three measures of agency cost: the ‘expense ratio’, the ‘Q-free cash flow interaction’, and the ‘asset utilisation ratio’. The finding of the study is that managerial ownership reduces the firm agency cost only under the ‘asset utilisation ratio’ measure of agency cost; this is robust with regard to a number of robustness tests. Furthermore, the non-linearity tests suggest that the convergence of interest is evident with very high and low levels of managerial ownership. The entrenchment effect by the owners is evident at moderate levels of managerial ownership. Although there has been great scepticism among management researchers on the validity of agency theory, overall, the findings of this study do not reject the validity of agency theory. Given that the entrenchment by managers is evident at certain levels of ownership and that the agency problem may still exist between insiders and outsiders, legislative guidelines for controlling share ownership may be required.

Why do governments pursue regulatory reforms fostering entrepreneurship? In this paper, we examine the link between government ownership of banks, political regime transparency, and regulatory barriers to the entry of new industrial firms. We propose a signalling theory for the deregulation of entry. We argue that high levels of government ownership of banks and political system opacity erode the reputation of national economies in the eyes of international investors. To improve international perceptions of their business and investment climate, governments reduce regulatory barriers to new business entry. Deregulation of new firm entry signals an improved investment climate to foreign investors, and thereby substitutes for political system transparency. This signal is credible, valued by international investors, and easier to implement than alternative signals. Evidence drawn from an analysis of 93 developed and developing countries supports our propositions. Countries with high levels of state ownership of banks exhibit higher regulatory barriers to firm entry. However, this relationship attenuates and even reverses in extremely opaque political systems. Consistent with our argument that international perceptions are the key mechanisms underlying this conditional relationship, we also show that the moderating effect of political system opacity weakens among countries with high levels of government ownership of banks and FDI inflows. Our findings have important implications for the literature on state ownership of banks, the political economy of reform, and for our understanding of strategic signalling in international relations.

The aim of this study was to develop “Teachers’ Views on Mixed and Single-gender Education Scale”. The study group consisted of 718 teachers in 18 different schools who volunteered to participate in the study in Küçükçekmece District of İstanbul. Both Exploratory and Confirmatory Factor Analysis were carried out for the validity of the scale. With Exploratory Factor Analysis, it was found that the scale consisted of two factors (positive views on single-gender education and positive views on mixed-gender education) and 18 items and the scale explained 63% of the total variance. When the fit index values of the scale were examined, it was found that the model had a good fit [RMSEA=,05, SRMR=,05, CFI=0.98, GFI=0.93, AGFI=,91, NFI=,95 and IFI=0.98]. In order to calculate the discriminative values of the scale items, mean scores of upper and lower groups were examined with t-test and it was found that all of the items were discriminative. Cronbach Alpha values calculated for the scale reliability were found to vary between, 81 and ,89.