Abstract
AbstractIn this paper, we investigate whether the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)’s review of voluntary non‐GAAP disclosures in 10‐K reports varies with firm ownership structure. Relying on the voluntary disclosure literature, we argue that managers voluntarily disclose financial and non‐financial information in order to resolve information asymmetries arising from firm ownership structure. We find, using a sample of firms over the period 2006–2018, that family ownership reduces the likelihood of receiving a comment letter related to non‐GAAP disclosures. We also show that family firms take a longer period and exchange a larger number of correspondence letters with the SEC before the latter closes the case. These findings contribute to the family firm literature and expand the literature investigating the SEC review of voluntary non‐GAAP disclosures.
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