Searching for the Starting Points of Scientific Inquiry: Durkheim's Rules of Sociological Method and Schopenhauer's Philosophy*

Abstract

Durkheim's methodological classic is frequently read from Kantian, positivistic, or other Enlightenment contexts despite the fact that Durkheim criticizes these doctrines. Durkheim also tends to be read as a deductive analyst. Using Schopenhauer's philosophy as an alternative starting point in reading the Rules, it is demonstrated that Schopenhauer and Durkheim agree that perceptual, inductive knowledge of “things” is superior to conceptual, deductive knowledge; that causal explanations are merely phenomenal; and that the one, well‐designed experiment is sufficient for the establishment of scientific laws. Durkheim's distinction between the normal and the pathological is also addressed in this context. The implications of Durkheim's focus on induction are discussed with regard to its similarity to the works of Claude Bernard, Florian Znaniecki, and Max Weber, as well as current epistemological crises in sociology.