“Sea of Peace, Cooperation, and Friendship” Is Nowhere in Sight: Japan–China Relations: The Senkaku Islands Issue and Maritime Boundary Delimitation in the East China Sea

This chapter, in the wake of a diplomatic row caused by the collision of a Chinese fishing vessel with Japan Coast Guard ships, attempts to examine the sources and unravel the different aspects of longstanding East China Sea maritime disputes. The issues of ownership over the Senkaku Islands and the legal status of the Okinawa Trough lie at the core of maritime disputes between China and Japan in the East China Sea. The disputes primarily concern the extent of their respective exclusive economic zones (EEZs) and continental shelves, with the application of different maritime boundary delimitation principles to their own advantage, and granting different legal effects to the disputed islands. Apparently the Principled Consensus between China and Japan is a significant achievement toward efforts of making the East China Sea 'a sea of peace, cooperation and friendship', given ensued conflicts over the exploration and exploitation of energy resources. Keywords: Chinese fishing vessel; East China Sea maritime disputes; EEZs; energy resources; Japan; maritime boundary delimitation principles; Senkaku islands

executive summary: This essay examines China's paramilitary and military activities in the East China Sea, draws implications for the security of Japan and the broader region, and assesses crisis scenarios in the troubled waters around the Senkaku Islands and Taiwan. main argumentAssessments of China's paramilitary and military activities in the East China Sea indicate that Beijing is less likely to seek to physically seize the Senkaku Islands in the near future. The China Coast Guard's daily presence in the vicinity of the islands and occasional intrusions into Japan's territorial waters ably demonstrate Beijing's opposition to Japanese control of the Senkaku Islands. Such displays of opposition appeal to the Chinese people. However, should Taiwan eventually be reunified with mainland through either peaceful or coercive means, the Senkaku Islands would remain a "lost territory." Furthermore, reunification would shift the military balance in the East China Sea dramatically in favor China. In such a scenario, armed conflict over the Senkaku Islands would become more likely. policy implications • Tokyo and Washington should begin bilateral planning for Taiwan contingency scenarios based on the 2015 U.S.-Japan defense guidelines. Without sufficient joint planning, the two allies will be at a disadvantage to respond to such a scenario. • Given China's massive theater missile capabilities, Tokyo and Washington need to fill the missile gap in the Pacific by co-developing intermediate-range missiles and deploying these in Japanese territory. • There is a need to further integrate Japanese and U.S. forces. The former is a resident force, while the latter is an expeditionary force, and Beijing could exploit this gap by a fait accompli in Taiwan or the Senkaku Islands. To avoid this scenario, Tokyo and Washington should establish a Standing Bilateral Joint Task Force in Japan's southwestern region with multi-domain operational capabilities.

executive summary: This essay examines Japan's crisis-management system and security-related coordination with the U.S. in the case of an East China Sea or Senkaku Islands gray-zone scenario and offers a recommendation for possible improvement. main argumentProvocative actions involving the Senkaku Islands could generate a quickly evolving and complex crisis that would require close and agile coordination between Japan and the U.S. Numerous and various government entities would become involved and events may occur dynamically, which in turn could challenge the effectiveness of the existing peacetime coordination mechanism between Japan's Self-Defense Forces and the U.S. military. This essay proposes the establishment of a Standing Bilateral Joint Task Force as a possible way to strengthen U.S.-Japan defense-related coordination and improve both sides' capabilities to respond and contribute to whole-of-government crisis management. policy implications • Opinions on China's real intentions for the East China Sea and Senkaku Islands range from possible invasion and occupation of the islands to a decades-long stand-off and waiting game. A related and key issue is how an East China Sea crisis might affect or involve Taiwan. • In a Senkaku Islands crisis, it is important to determine whether there would be certain trigger events to cause Japan and the U.S. to initiate crisis-management coordination, and whether such events could be determined in advance. • Given U.S. commitments in its security treaty with Japan, both governments and militaries should clearly define what governmental and political processes might be pursued to activate Article 5 in response to a defense scenario involving Japanese islands in the East China Sea.

Japan’s Coast Guard and Maritime Self-Defense Force in the East China Sea:Can a Black-and-White System Adapt to a Gray-Zone Reality? Céline Pajon (bio) KEYWORDS JAPAN, MARITIME SECURITY, COAST GUARD, EAST CHINA SEA [End Page 111] EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This essay examines the need for growing coordination between the Japan Coast Guard (JCG) and the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) to better cope with gray-zone situations. MAIN ARGUMENT Coping with gray-zone situations is particularly challenging for Japan because its security posture is based on a binary system that complicates coordination between civilian and military agencies. In Japan, gray-zone situations generally refer to the challenges raised by China’s maritime activities around the disputed Senkaku Islands, creating situations that are neither peacetime nor wartime contingencies. Dealing with such situations requires careful and close management of law-enforcement contingencies that might escalate into military conflicts. Japan’s unique security system has so far prevented the adoption of a legal framework to regulate the coordination between the civilian JCG, which is primarily responsible for securing national waters, and the military JMSDF, which intervenes if a situation worsens. Despite some progress, legal and technical issues still prevent optimal cooperation between the two agencies, thus undermining Japan’s ability to respond to current challenges in the East China Sea. POLICY IMPLICATIONS • Because Japan has a binary security system that strictly divides civilian and military corps and activities, the country will struggle to adapt its institutions to China’s “salami slicing” strategy. • Ensuring a well-integrated response to gray-zone situations would ideally require a legal framework defining more precisely these situations and articulating the respective roles of the JMSDF and JCG. If such a framework is not possible, other steps should be taken, such as expanding technical interoperability between the JMSDF and JCG; developing a common, integrated maritime domain awareness; and increasing training and exercises on more realistic scenarios. • To improve its current security posture, Japan must implement a “whole of government” approach that ensures optimal coordination between civilian and military agencies rather than revising Article 9 of the constitution. [End Page 112] On August 6, 2016, an armada of 230 Chinese fishing boats, accompanied by 7 China Coast Guard (CCG) vessels, was spotted near Japanese waters around the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea.1 This could have been the starting point of a nightmare scenario for Japan in which the disputed islands are taken by armed Chinese fishermen backed by big CCG ships and eventually military vessels, leaving no chance for the Japan Coast Guard (JCG) to adequately reply. The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) would then need to step in, with the risk of the situation escalating into a military conflict. Coping with “gray zone” situations, such as the above scenario, has been Japan’s core security challenge in recent years. Defined in the National Defense Program Guidelines of December 2013 as “neither pure peacetime nor contingencies over territory, sovereignty and maritime economic interests,” gray-zone situations mainly refer to the challenges raised by China’s “reactive assertiveness” around the disputed Senkaku Islands (known as the Diaoyu Islands in Chinese).2 Beijing is challenging Japan’s sovereign control by regularly sending vessels from law-enforcement agencies into its territorial waters and contiguous zone.3 Civilian or paramilitary forces are therefore used to change facts on the ground while pushing the targeted country to eventually take the initiative of using force to stop these activities. These incursions, which do not amount to an armed attack, are blurring the line between crime and defense, between law enforcement and military activities. Gray-zone situations have been identified by Tokyo since 2010 and have informed the transformation of Japan’s defense posture.4 Japan is organizing a “dynamic joint defense force” and redeploying troops onto the Ryukyu Islands, located in the southwest of the archipelago, closer to the [End Page 113] Senkaku Islands.5 Importantly, official documents call for more cooperation and coordination between the JMSDF, on the one hand, and the JCG and police forces, on the other.6 Indeed, the JCG is the primary agency responsible for patrolling and safeguarding Japanese waters: it...

The Senkaku Islands are rich in oil and gas resources, which has led Japan and Cina to claim each other that the Senkaku Islands belong to them. The impact of the dispute on Japan's security stability makes the senkaku islands and Japanese territories threatened and insecure because Cina conducts military operations by arming fishermen to become "maritime militias" and Cina has also increased their air activities, conducted training for their pilots and even created and enforcing air defense zones so that Japan's security stability becomes insecure and causes the Japanese state to be wary of attacks given by Cina because Cina sends military forces to Japan's territory which makes the Japanese region less secure while it has an impact on the economy and relations between Japan and the United States. Cina is going bad. The Japanese government's passive attitude that has been applied so far has turned into a proactive one by strengthening the military and surveillance system with advanced technology. To improve its national security, Japan increased their military budget and created military bases to deal with possible invasions from Cina in certain places around the Senkaku Islands.This study uses qualitative methods with descriptive explanatory data collection techniques. Techniques for data collection were carried out using literature studies obtained from journals, articles and books. The author will analyze the data with Process Tracing which will track a conflict process that can occur and explain the data according to the framework of each country's thinking because Japan and Cina mutually claim the Senkaku island belongs to each other and are a threat to the security of the Japanese region. The author uses the concept of National Security in analyzing the dispute between the senkaku islands of Japan and Cina as well as threats to the security stability of the Japanese region. Keywords: Dispute, Japan, Cina, Senkaku Island, UNCAFE, National Security.

Dispute over the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea has been influenced by historical right, international 1aw, economic factor, and domestic political variables. Recently that has been aggravated by security strategy of China and Japan. Two countries is unsatisfied with the past history of the sediment which has been being continued in the current, having accelerated a full-fledged competition for hegemony in East Asia. The United States is involved in a dispute between these, which is the major variable. It is associated with the alliance for U. S. to intervene in the dispute and strategic objectives to deter the expansion of China’s forces ultimately. If U.S. choose a strategic certainty, it is certain that America has the risk to bump into the dangerous enemy, China. In case U.S. have a view to take a strategic ambiguity, Japan as axis alliance in East Asia will have intention to go away independently and to accelerate military capabilities. As alliance dilemma works in intervention in a dispute over Senkaku islands, it seems that it will be more flexible for U.S. to operate alliance militarily.

Water mass properties along cross-sections of the Kuroshio in the East China Sea (ECS) are investigated in detail. We used temperature, salinity and dissolved oxygen data from 2000 and 2002, together with historical temperature and salinity data from 1987 to 2004. Water properties were divided into two groups: high and low salinities or oxygen at temperatures warmer than 15 and 12 °C, respectively. We found the existence of outer shelf water W2, as defined by clear modes in frequency distributions of salinity and oxygen within various temperature segments. The outer shelf water was different from both Kuroshio Tropical Water (KTW) and coastal water. We mapped horizontal and vertical distributions of W2, along with W1 and KTW. The outer shelf water was distributed with density σt = 22.5–25.5 over a relatively broad area, from the outer continental shelf to the continental slope, particularly in autumn. Vertical distribution of the water suggests that W2 spread from the outer shelf to just the shelf side of the Kuroshio Current velocity maximum. Seasonal variations are examined with historical data along PN section over 17 years, and suggest that the appearance of W2 is distinct in summer and autumn. By comparing temperature–salinity (T–S) diagrams from Taiwan Strait and east of Taiwan, the outer shelf water (W2) originates from South China Sea Tropical Water (SCSTW), as suggested by Chen, J Geophys Res 110:C05012 (2005). The present study of the ECS clearly shows that SCSTW is transported along the east coast of Taiwan or through the Taiwan Strait into the ECS. It then spreads over a relatively wide area from the outer shelf to just the shelf side of the Kuroshio axis, and there is some horizontal mixing between SCSTW and KTW around the shelf break.

In the 1960s, the Arctic glaciers gradually melted, while the rich mineral and fishery resources in the region triggered a new strategic layout design for the countries around the Arctic Ocean, and countries have started to fight for the rights and interests related to the outer continental shelf of the Arctic Ocean in accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. As of 2023, Russia, Canada, Norway and Denmark have applied to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) for delineation of the continental shelf, while the U.S. is also striving for the rights and interests of related resources by virtue of its geographical location. At present, in the case of the uncertainty of the delimitation of the outer continental shelf of the Arctic Ocean by the United Nations, the governance guidelines of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea for the outer continental shelf of the Arctic Ocean are relatively in line with the interests of all countries, but there are also certain practical problems, and the United States and non-Arctic countries are bound to join the competition for the relevant rights and interests, and it is difficult to avoid the relevant situation. In this regard, through improving the working mechanism of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf and formulating the Arctic Treaty, we can gradually realize the governance of the outer continental shelf in the central waters of the Arctic Ocean and maintain the healthy and benign resource circulation and utilization of the relevant sea areas.

A 1/18° nested ocean model is used to determine locations, volume transports, and temporal variations of Kuroshio onshore fluxes across the shelf break of the East China Sea (ECS). The Kuroshio onshore flux shows strong seasonality: maximum (∼3 Sv; 1 Sv ≡ 106 m3 s−1) in autumn and minimum (<0.5 Sv) in summer. Another short-term (∼17 days) variation due to Kuroshio meanders introduces large fluctuations in the onshore fluxes but its seasonal average almost vanishes. The Kuroshio onshore fluxes have two major sources, Kuroshio intrusion northeast of Taiwan and Kuroshio separation southwest of Kyushu; the former provides larger onshore flux than the latter. Therefore, in addition to the waters from the Taiwan Strait and the Kuroshio separation region southwest of Kyushu, the water due to the Kuroshio intrusion northeast of Taiwan is also a major source of the Tsushima Warm Current. A vorticity equation is used to separate the contribution of surface Ekman transport to the Kuroshio onshore fluxes in the ECS from that relating to density fields. For the total Kuroshio onshore flux across the entire shelf break, its seasonal variation is primarily controlled by the Ekman transport while the change in density field is secondary. For the Kuroshio onshore flux at a fixed location along the shelf break, its seasonal variation is primarily related to the change in density field and the Ekman transport is secondary. Furthermore, the role of the Taiwan Strait water and the Kuroshio water across the shelf break on material transport in the ECS is examined with passive tracer experiments. In summer, about half of the tracer in the Tsushima Strait originates in the Taiwan Strait, while the other half comes from the Kuroshio. From summer to winter, the ratio changes dramatically; the contribution from the Taiwan Strait decreases to 20% and that from the Kuroshio increases up to 80%. The tracer originating in the Kuroshio water dominates the bottom layer of the continental shelf in the ECS throughout the year.

In the Sino-Japanese relations, there are many complex issues which, as always in neighborly relations, have deep historical context. Political competition and expansive economic and military policies cause that China questions the existing territorial state on the East China Sea and South China Sea. The subject of the claims of China (both Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China) are located under the Japanese administration – the Senkaku Islands. The two countries also have a contradictory position concerning the delimitation of the exclusive economic zone between China and Japan (Ryukyu) on the East China Sea and the status of Okino-Tori Shima being the subject to Japanese sovereignty. Each of these three disputes as a consequence, above all, concerns the delimitation of large areas of the exclusive economic zone between the two countries.

Japan’s view of the territorial disputes in the South China Sea is intricately linked to its own dispute with China over the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea. Amid deteriorating Sino-Japanese relations and strains over the bilateral territorial row in the past few years, Tokyo’s political elites have become increasingly concerned about Beijing’s growing confidence and assertiveness in its foreign policy. From their perspective, China is pursuing a strategy of creeping expansionism in the maritime domain by challenging the territorial status quo of islands in the South and East China Seas. In its national security planning, Japan is thus seeking to discourage Chinese assertiveness in the East Asian region. As the paper shows, the US-Japan alliance continues to play a key role in Japanese strategic thinking, but it is no longer viewed as sufficient in ensuring security and stability for Japan in the region, particularly vis-a-vis China. The paper demonstrates two areas in which Tokyo is making greater efforts to supplement the alliance’s deterrence function: Firstly, it is enhancing its military ability to discourage and respond to Chinese provocations around the Senkaku Islands, although efforts are constrained by budgetary limits. Secondly, Japan is diversifying its security relations with regional countries, thereby seeking to demonstrate to China that it is not indifferent to Beijing’s provocations in the South China Sea. The paper draws on a content analysis of Japan’s newest security strategy documents (the National Security Strategy and the National Defense Program Guidelines, both issued in December 2013) as well as recent (Japanese language) papers and commentary by Japanese security experts.

This presentation gives an assessment of the actual judicial control concerning the delimitation of the continental shelf. Before interpreting the role of International Courts and Arbitral Tribunals, the author gives a brief overview over the different categories of delimitation, the coastal state's rights over its continental shelf and outlines historic precedents of international disputes. Today, the Convention provides an comprehensive dispute settlement system. This system will be illuminated and reviewed by the presentation with special reference to the judicial control over the Commission's recommendations.

This article is a prospective analysis of whether the established principles for delimitation of the continental shelf within 200 NM will apply for delimitation of outer continental margins. On the basis of the established normative jurisprudence of delimitations within 200 NM it can namely not be ruled out that the established equitable criteria and methods for delimitation, for finding an equitable solution, were solely set to prevail in delimitations within 200 NM.Title commands delimitation and the title for the zone beyond 200 NM differ from the title within 200 NM. Wherein the distance criterion is the title for the zone within 200 NM, geological and geomorphologic criteria are the basis of the title for the legal continental shelf that extends 200 NM. Accordingly, the established normative principles in delimitation of continental shelves beyond 200 NM are susceptible to differ from the established prevailing principles within 200 NM and may have an important impact on delimitations in the continental outer margins.In conclusion it is held that the established equitable criteria and methods in order to find an equitable solution in delimitations within 200 NM are likely not to apply mutatis mutandis for delimitations beyond 200 NM

States have long vied to control the resources found in the Oceans rendering the same as the hotspots for disputes and confrontations among countries. The unilateral delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and the continental shelf by some countries aggravated the situation giving rise to an international legal regime to govern the huge resources of the Oceans which will ensure the equitable rights of all countries. The practices of the states as to the resolution of disputes regarding delimitation of the continental shelf caused the emergence of the equitable principle and the principle of equidistance as customary norms of international law. However, in some cases, for example the maritime disputes, equitable principle fails to be applied in the logical sense. In this outset, it has been strived for scrutinizing the application of the principle of equity in maritime issues and disputes as well as determining if the equitable principle always results in an equitable outcome.

There are two aspects to the controversy over the Okinawa Trough between the States bordering the East China Sea. The scientific aspect concerns whether the Okinawa Trough disrupts the unity of the continental shelf in the East China Sea, and the legal aspect concerns whether geophysical factors should be considered in the delimitation between opposite States where the distance between their coasts is less than 400 nautical miles. The role of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in the determination of the scientific nature of the Okinawa Trough is limited by the non-prejudice clause in Article 76 of the Convention on the Law of the Sea. If the Okinawa Trough is proved to constitute a fundamental discontinuity between the natural prolongation of China and Korea on the one hand, and that of Japan on other hand, the median line between the opposite coasts concerned should not be applied in the continental shelf delimitation, for it cannot achieve an equitable solution.