Scrutinising scrutiny: reliance on social audits to discharge statutory human rights due diligence obligations

With the importance of non-State actors ever increasing, the traditional State-centric approach of international law is being put to the test. In particular, significant accountability lacunae have emerged in the field of human rights protection. To address these challenges, this book makes a case for extraterritorial due diligence obligations of States in international human rights law. It traces back how due diligence obligations evolved on the international plane and develops a general analytical framework making the broad and vague notion of due diligence more approachable. The framework is applied to different fields of international law which provides guidance on how due diligence obligations can be better conceptualized. Drawing inspiration from these developments, the book analyses how extraterritorial human rights due diligence obligations could operate in practice and foster global human rights protection.

It is argued in this article that due diligence, grounded on positive duties under international human rights law, is a standard against which to measure the performance of UN peacekeeping forces. Its adoption by the UN will improve accountability, but in a controlled and principled way. A requirement that the UN act diligently to prevent human rights violations would not impose over-onerous obligations. For responsibility to be incurred an organisation must have clearly failed to take measures that were within its power to take. It is argued that the UN not only should be bound by norms of due diligence but is in fact bound by positive obligations derived from customary international human rights law. The development of some due diligence-type measures by the UN to prevent sexual abuse by peacekeepers and to protect civilians within areas of peacekeeper deployment, and the adoption of an explicit due diligence policy to delineate its relationship with non-UN security actors, are positive signs. However, the article demonstrates that the UN needs to further internalise and develop its due diligence obligations if it is to limit human rights violations committed under its watch. Furthermore, it needs to create accountability mechanisms to ensure that it develops the rather limited measures taken thus far, including provision for victims to be able to hold the organisation to account for failure to protect them from human rights violations. Only by accepting its responsibility and liability to such victims will be the UN be driven to improve its due diligence when mandating, preparing, training, deploying and directing peacekeeping operations.

The defence industry plays a critical role in maintaining international peace and security, yet its activities inherently have human rights implications. This article examines the industry’s responsibility to respect human rights in conformity with the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. It explores challenges, practices, and opportunities of human rights due diligence within the arms sector—including the end-use monitoring component. It seeks to inform policymakers, industry, scholars and activists working towards a rights-respecting arms trade regime. The article will explore human rights due diligence’s foundations in international human rights law and corporate social responsibility frameworks, as well as emerging shifts and standards in the legal landscape at the national, regional, and international levels. Drawing on the American Bar Association Center for Human Rights evidence-based research, this piece will also explore the industry’s response to its due diligence obligations and how these narratives cannot shield the industry from legal, financial and reputational risks.

This chapter examines to what extent macro structures, such as economic globalisation, play a role in the implementation of due diligence. It addresses the question: do economic players, such as multinational companies, hold legal duties under international human rights law, and if so which measures do they have to fulfil? And do they have their own due diligence obligations. The chapter begins with a short overview of where women are in the global economy and the implications of globalisation for women and for states responsibilities with regard to womens human rights. It traces the development of international codes on corporate social responsibility. The chapter also examines the role played by civil society in research, campaigning and advocacy on the power and responsibilities of economic players and concludes that a new politics and greater engagement by feminists in democratic processes are needed to build accountable governance. Keywords: due diligence; economic players; global economy; international human rights law; womens human rights

This chapter focuses on the application, acceptance, and implementation of human rights due diligence obligations in UN peacekeeping operations. It points to growing, but uneven, evidence of the development of standards and measures by the UN that would fit the meaning and purpose of due diligence, although there are very few instances of due diligence being used as a term within the UN. The chapter argues that due diligence obligations are applicable either through customary human rights law, or the internal law of the UN, or both due to the fact that the UN’s principles of peacekeeping are themselves based on general principles of international law. The chapter stresses that the UN should have due diligence obligations especially as there is a gap between the commissioning of peacekeeping operations by the UN and the day-to-day control of peacekeepers by the UN.

Regional human rights courts like the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR), and the African Court of Human and People's Rights (ACtHPR) have become popular sites of mobilization for victims and activists who seek justice when justice fails at home. Besides being platforms for individual remedy, human rights courts increasingly shape social norms and state policy within countries, making them attractive avenues for rights advocates to develop new norms or to push domestic authorities to reform legislation. The judges of these courts can decide, for example, whether same-sex couples have a right to be married, if prisoners have the right to vote or receive HIV/AIDS treatment, or when a state can deport illegal immigrants to a country where they will likely be tortured. As these courts pass their judgments, they often find themselves in conflict with states that are violating human rights of marginalized groups on a large scale and are unwilling to implement international rulings. Although international human rights courts have become increasingly popular venues among victims and activists who seek justice when justice fails at home, we are only beginning to understand how activists play roles in shaping the development of regional human rights courts' case law—the body of judgments that shapes how judges will make their decisions in the future. We now have plenty of international relations and international legal research on the interactions between states and international courts: how judges in these courts wrestle between deferring to the interests of member state governments whose actions are on trial and sticking closely to the conventions' fundamental yet evolving principles (Alter et al., 2019; Helfer & Voeten, 2014). As some states begin to resist international courts' authority, scholars have begun to examine the dynamics of this backlash (Hillebrecht, 2022; Madsen et al., 2018; Sandholtz et al., 2018). Recent studies have also demonstrated that human rights advocates—whether NGOs or individual lawyers—have a significant impact on shaping the jurisprudence of international courts and the impact judgments have in concrete locations (Kahraman, 2018; Sundstrom, 2014; van der Vet, 2012; Kurban, 2020; Conant, 2018; Harms, 2021; Cichowski, 2016; Hodson, 2011; Haddad, 2018). Meanwhile, these advocates themselves have been subject to repression and stigmatization by governments as part of the backlash phenomenon. Without an adequate understanding of the factors shaping activists' engagement with international courts, we risk undervaluing their strategic impact on the expansion of case law, the human rights protection of marginalized groups who cannot find remedies at home, and the domestic implementation of these judgments in an age of state backlash. In this section, we summarize the three papers contained in this symposium and their original contributions to these themes. Over the last decade, dozens of countries have erected legal barriers or started vilifying campaigns to stymie the work of NGOs (Buyse, 2018; Chaudhry, 2022). One tactic in this toolkit is the enactment of burdensome regulation on NGOs that receive funds from foreign donors as they allegedly promote foreign agendas (Christensen & Weinstein, 2013; Dupuy et al., 2021). States that frequently abuse human rights are especially prone to target NGOs that engage in strategic litigation (Hillebrecht, 2019). Most NGOs depend on foreign funding, and NGOs that litigate international cases fall disproportionately in this category, but do funders affect the selection of cases? In “Foreign Agents or Agents of Justice? Private Foundations, NGO Backlash, and International Human Rights Litigation,” Heidi Haddad and Lisa Sundstrom examine the extent to which Western donors, particularly private foundations, have encouraged NGOs in Europe to litigate at the ECtHR as a human rights advocacy strategy. They examine overall patterns of donor funding and NGO litigation records, and look in more detail at the case of Russian NGOs' foreign funding and litigation records. The analysis is extremely timely, as the Russian government's criminalization of independent civil society actors, especially in the human rights field, and their accusation that foreign funding turns NGOs into “foreign agents” have been crucial elements of the Russian regime's autocratization. This claim has also provided fuel for Russia's disenchantment with the ECtHR in recent years, contributing to the assessment of many observers that Russia's full-scale attack on Ukraine was the last straw in an inevitable collision course leading to its exit from the Council of Europe. Haddad and Sundstrom debunk the idea that foreign donors are pushing NGOs toward strategies of human rights litigation. Instead, they argue, there is more evidence that NGOs themselves promoted the mechanism of international litigation as a strategy that donors later adopted. This article is a poignant reminder of the advocacy tools that Russian human rights activists and citizens have lost as a result of their government's departure from the Council of Europe, including ECtHR jurisdiction. Yet it also provides insight into the likely roles of foreign donors in other country cases where NGOs are using international court litigation as a human rights advocacy strategy, which is often a target of the ire of national governments, as explored in the next article in the symposium. When states attack human rights NGOs within their borders and/or international human rights courts themselves, how does this affect the willingness of those NGOs to take cases to international courts, and the ways in which they do so? De Silva and Plagis ask this question in their article about state backlash against NGOs in the case of Tanzania and the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights. A fascinating empirical question they pose is: does state backlash against NGOs increase NGO litigation at international courts (to contest state repression at those courts and use international mechanisms when domestic ones are not available), roughly in line with Keck and Sikkink's famous “boomerang pattern” (Keck & Sikkink, 1998), or decrease it due to heightened fear and restricted NGO capabilities that state repression creates? Employing a process-tracing analysis of NGOs' involvement in three cases before the African Court at different stages of the Tanzanian government's backlash against the Court, De Silva and Plagis find that “two-level backlash” by states can result in both phenomena, either promoting or deterring NGO legal mobilization at international human rights courts, depending on certain conditions. The three selected cases concerning the death penalty, the rights of persons with albinism, and the rights of pregnant schoolgirls and mothers, which took place at different time periods, demonstrate a number of patterns of state backlash interacting with NGO strategies. The authors find that domestic-level state backlash deterred domestic NGOs from partnering with international NGOs in litigation, but that such backlash, when it repressed domestic political and legal mobilization opportunities, actually encouraged both Tanzanian and international NGOs to turn to the African Court more frequently to seek remedies. International-level backlash in turn only deterred NGOs from international litigation when such backlash consisted of state efforts to restrict NGOs' ability to engage in litigation, and not when the international backlash was in the form of routine noncompliance with African Court rulings. Importantly, the authors find that NGO responses to state backlash were significantly shaped by their degree of legal consciousness and expertise with the rules, proceedings, and workings of the African Court. Those NGOs with less knowledge and experience were more likely to back away from engaging with the Court under the pressure of state backlash. De Silva and Plagis conclude that “NGOs' persistent human rights advocacy in the face of state backlash is a double-edged sword,” in the sense that they may not be deterred by state backlash initially, but there is a danger that their continued determination to engage in international litigation could prompt governments to engage in even more severe forms of backlash, with critical impacts on international courts and already vulnerable human rights defenders. Rights advocates have a growing menu of institutions and courts available to them. How do activists choose at which institution to lodge their cases in a world where legal remedies have diversified, or as some have argued, fragmented (Koskenniemi & Leino, 2002)? In “What Makes an International Institution Work for Labor Activists? Shaping International Law through Strategic Litigation,” Filiz Kahraman goes beyond the tendency of legal mobilization studies to only examine how activists interact with a single court or institution. Instead, Kahraman opens up how rights advocates imagine which institution is most receptive to their claims. Drawing on a comparative interview study of British and Turkish trade union activists and their legal mobilization campaigns at international courts and quasi-judicial institutions like the International Labor Organization (ILO), Kahraman examines how activists first probe and then strategically identify which court or international institution is most susceptible to their primary goals of influencing structural reforms and setting new norms. Through this probing process—or dynamic signaling game between courts and litigants—activists push a court's jurisprudence and case law into new issue areas. For instance, at the ECtHR, Turkish trade unionists challenged domestic courts' ruling that public sector workers did not have the right to establish unions, even though the ECtHR had no established case law on labor rights in 1990s. They won the case, with the ECtHR finding that Turkey violated the right of public sector workers to unionize. These cases not only had an impact within Turkey, but over the next decades, similar cases brought by British unionists would spin off the early precedent set by the Turkish legal mobilization efforts. Kahraman argues that they ultimately pushed the ECtHR to recognize the basic trade union rights as fundamental human rights. Kahraman sheds light on the often hidden strategies behind international litigation. Activists litigate not just for the immediate impact on the current case they work on, but how they envision that all the cases they work on may shape norms and domestic structural reforms further in the future. Whether an institution is perceptive of claims lies in the eye of the beholder. Kahraman finds that besides targeting institutions with high compliance rates, they also take cases to institutions with low rates of compliance, especially “if these institutions have extensive judicial authority to create new international norms.” So, it is not the de jure protection set by an international courts, but rather how activists perceive the juridical responsiveness and judicial authority of courts—or, how judges adopt either an activist approach or restraint in response to incoming cases and how willing states are to implement cases of a court, respectively—that determines why activists select certain courts or quasi-judicial institutions (like the ILO). Kahraman gives us new tools to interpret how activists perceive authority and receptiveness and respond to opportunities. Rather than static external legal remedies, courts and quasi-judicial institutions are opportunity structures that are malleable to the strategic vision of the activist or litigant. The articles in this symposium together reveal a number of key overlapping insights. At the broadest level, they demonstrate that activists' behaviors and strategies influence international courts' jurisprudence, politics within states, and the human rights outcomes of everyday citizens—and these influences have often been hidden in our existing canon of research on international courts. In addition, all of these articles show that, while activists may face challenges in their efforts, often including significant backlash from their home state governments, they also continue to retain significant agency through their creative efforts to develop legal strategies and circumvent state repression. Activists perennially innovate: sparking the ideas that inspire donors who fund them; calculating how to continue their litigation work when government actors threaten them; and taking risks in litigation to push courts to expand how they define human rights. However, along with these uplifting conclusions, there are worrying patterns that demand future research. States are increasingly pushing back against the powers of international courts to bind them to costly measures, and as this symposium has shown, national governments often point to activists as contributors to this “problem” of invasive international human rights standards. A growing body of research has tracked how human rights defenders of all kinds globally are under threat from actors like governments and corporations who disagree with their contentious actions. We need more studies that gather comprehensive data and systematically track these threats, specifically with regard to activists who engage in international human rights litigation. We suspect that such activists are likely disproportionately targeted due to the international visibility of their complaints. We also desperately need research into possible innovative responses to these threats to activists—responses from activists, funders, governments of countries that support human rights, and international courts themselves. Freek van der Vet is a University Researcher at the Erik Castrén Institute of International Law and Human Rights, Faculty of Law, University of Helsinki and the principal investigator of the Toxic Crimes Project. Lisa McIntosh Sundstrom is Professor of Political Science at the University of British Columbia. She is the director of the ActinCourts network at UBC and conducts research on legal mobilization by Russian activists.

Due diligence is a frequently employed notion in international law, yet much is still to be explored about this concept. This article aims to contribute to an understanding of due diligence obligations in international law, which is useful as it can form the basis for a further clarification of corresponding legal rights of subjects of international law. With this purpose in mind, this article initiates the construction of a working model of due diligence in international law by exploring this notion from two perspectives: an accountability perspective and a regulatory perspective. Subsequently, this article will use this model to compare the operation of due diligence obligations in two branches of international law: international environmental law and international human rights law. In doing so, it will become clear that due diligence contains two core elements: ‘reasonableness’ and ‘good faith’. Moreover, it will become apparent that the operation of due diligence obligations in these two branches has implications for systemic issues in international law. Further research on the operation of due diligence obligations in other branches of international law is therefore recommended.

Individual States are required to reduce their emissions in order to meet the collective goal of keeping global warming to an increase of no more 2 °C but ideally strive to limit temperature rises to 1.5 °C. States have expressed ambitions for reducing greenhouse gas emissions although largely have yet to translate them into policies. Inadequate climate mitigation policies may fall foul of the obligation to reduce GHG emissions, which is a due diligence obligation. Making any successful determination would depend on the status of the jurisprudence on the formation of a customary obligation on the prevention of the risk of transboundary harm in climate change-related human rights. Progressive norms in human rights jurisprudence inform the content of the due diligence obligation and positive duties thereunder. The implication is that responsibility for inadequate climate mitigation policies, as supported by the recent jurisprudence on the failure of due diligence duties in context of environment-based human rights, may be invoked. It is noted that arguments have been advanced that the obligation to prevent climate change harm presents challenges in establishing the elements necessary for responsibility, particularly in respect to defining the internationally wrongful act and causation. However, developments in international human rights jurisprudence supports positive due diligence obligations in preventing climate risks, raising the theoretical possibilities of an international decision following Urgenda. This article observes the possibility of such a trend within States’ customary obligation to prevent transboundary harm with respect to States’ inadequate climate mitigation policies.

Extraterritorial cooperation—including by providing funds, equipment, training, and technical support—has become central to policies aimed at preventing access of refugees and “irregular” migrants to particular countries and regions. But cooperating countries and international organizations have due diligence obligations under human rights law to take all reasonable steps to ensure that the cooperation they provide does not result in human rights violations, even when the violations are perpetrated extraterritorially by third parties. Consequently, they can become liable for the failure to exercise due diligence to prevent human rights violations from occurring in the receiving states. Also, they may incur responsibility for the resulting acts where they knowingly aided or assisted the receiving state to commit human rights violations with the support provided.International organizations and some states have begun to adopt human rights due diligence policies to assess and mitigate the risks of such cooperation. Using the examples of European Union and United Kingdom support to Libya, this Article analyzes the due diligence policies they have applied to extraterritorial cooperation in the area of border control and the detention of refugees and other migrants. It finds that the policies as implemented have provided only superficial scrutiny and argues that they should be made more robust and transparent. Ultimately, this will help mitigate the human rights risks associated with extraterritorial assistance, and ideally help ensure that assistance contributes to the strengthening of human rights protections in recipient countries.

Jurisprudence emanating from the High Court of Australia over the past three decades manifests increased willingness on the part of litigants, advocates and judges to voice or consider arguments in terms of 'human rights'. Alongside this, the 1980s and 1990s have witnessed a proliferation in the scholarly analysis of Australian law in terms of human rights. In this context, this article raises the following question: Should moves towards assimilation of human rights into Australian law over the period 1976-2003 be regarded as a 'journey of enlightenment', as a member of the Australian High Court has suggested? Taking issue with the expectation that Australian law is likely to be made more progressive through its greater internalisation of international human rights law, this article scrutinises those cases in which international human rights law has featured in the jurisprudence of the High Court of Australia. It studies the impact of appeals to 'the international' in these settings and, in view of this study, puts forward the following thesis: Efforts to promote the adoption of human rights language and instruments in Australian law tend to do as much, or even more, to reassure Australian law and lawyers that progress is being made than they do to effect meaningful legal, social or political change. Indeed, in specific cases, human rights' invocation in the High Court of Australia may be shown to have had demobilising or otherwise disadvantageous effects for those pursuing a human rights claim before that Court. Moreover, these tendencies are engendered by the prevailing jurisprudential style of Australian case law and scholarship: specifically, its particular combination of late modernism and legal pragmatism.

Abstract. The globalization of economic relations of the XXI century led to the realization that human resources are the driving force in the development of the stability of the state. A great number of internally displaced persons that appeared was a challenge for Ukraine because the establishment and protection of human rights and freedoms are the main responsibility of the state. This is why the need to form a system of social cost audit on the internally displaced persons due to the armed conflict in the east of Ukraine is a priority in order to optimize the ways of establishing social consensus by taking concerted actions to develop human resources. The strategic focus of the social audit is to become a crucial factor for implementing the main principles of social partnership in regulating social and labour relations and carrying out the strategy of the financial encouragement of internally displaced persons due to the armed conflict in the east of Ukraine. The problems and needs of internally displaced persons were discussed by many researchers. The issue of improving the system of the social audit was described in the works of A. Liubenko, V. Rysin, V. Pikhotskyi, M. Bukovynska, O. Hnatiuk, O. Ponomarenko, S. Sachenko, F. Fukuiama, etc. As the analysis of the studies conducted by scientists implies, the urgent matter emerging in the current realities was not outlined in their works. Little attention was given to improving the efficient analysis system of social risks of either enterprise or state by implementing the social audit. The study aims at examining the consistent patterns of allocation of funds of pilot projects total cost between the number of registered internally displaced persons and their families in Ukraine using the social audit as the foundation for carrying out the strategy of the financial encouragement of internally displaced persons while they are socializing in new areas. The study analyzed the funds allocated for the implementation of pilot projects aiming at the protection of human rights and legitimate interests violated by the armed conflict in the east of Ukraine and/or temporary occupation of the part of Ukraine. The study of the consistent patterns of allocation of funds of pilot projects total cost between the number of registered internally displaced persons and their families in Ukraine was carried out. It was revealed that increasing the number of registered persons does not influence the allocation of funds between them. It emphasizes the importance of examining the factors of these phenomena, which can be provided by the social audit of allocation of funds on a national scale. The need to carry out the social audit using participatory principle is stressed. Keywords: social audit, internally displaced persons, costs, communities, analysis, participatory principle, plan of the social audit. JEL Classification H55, H56, H57 Formulas: 0; fig.: 4; tabl.: 5; bibl.: 19.

Do No Harm and Do More Good Too: Connecting Business and Human Rights with Political CSR to Identify Business Opportunities for Contributing to the SDGs

Towards a Business and Human Rights Treaty

Central Asian States’ Compliance with International Refugee and Human Rights Law Both China and Central Asian states are parties to the major international human rights instruments that demand protection of the human rights of ethnic and religious minorities as well as protection of refugees from persecution based on their ethnicity and religious and political views. This chapter explores how Central Asian states have been balancing their international human rights obligations towards Chinese Uyghur asylum seekers and their regional obligations under the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) to fight against terrorism, extremism and separatism. The author finds that Central Asian states have continuously treated Chinese asylum seekers as a political matter and have given preference to their regional commitments towards China over their international human rights obligations, which has resulted in the absence of any real protection for Chinese asylum seekers in the region. This chapter argues that while Central Asian states may see compliance with human rights obligations to be politically inconvenient, only due compliance with international refugee and human rights law in good faith will benefit these states in the long run. In particular, a strictly legal approach to Chinese asylum seekers will help Central Asian states assert their sovereign equality and independence within the SCO and balance out China’s growing influence on their domestic policy.

As is well known, different countries may have a different attitude toward the formal rank of international human rights law in domestic legal order. In those countries that qualify the ratified international human rights law merely as statute, the formal rank of international human rights law is often used as an argument against the binding force of international human rights law on domestic constitutional law. Through a comparative analysis between Germany and Taiwan, though, this paper shows that, despite similar determinations on the formal rank of international (human rights) law, the German and the Taiwanese Constitutional Courts have developed quite different views on the normative significance of international human rights law to their domestic constitutional orders. The different constitutional practices in Germany and Taiwan thus not only reflect Taiwan’s unique international status, but also indicate that the formal rank of international human rights law does not have much to do with its normative binding force on domestic constitutional law. Those who use formal rank as an argument against the binding force of international human rights law on constitutional law presuppose the absolute dichotomy of international and domestic law and thereby overlook the potential compatibility between international human rights law and constitutional law. From a human rights perspective, I argue that international human rights law should not be regarded as an “external” law, but rather as a framework order which delegates domestic constitutional orders to concretize international human rights law according to their own needs or interests so as to fulfill their international task of human rights protection on national level. Viewed this way, the determination on the formal rank of international human rights law in domestic legal order matters only because it has to do with the determination of a certain constitutional order on the way in which it concretizes international human rights law.