Abstract

A Dual Perspective to the Robust Screening Problem Robust screening problem is concerned with the problem of a seller seeking a selling mechanism that maximizes the worst-case revenue obtained from a buyer whose valuation distribution lies in a certain ambiguity set. In the paper “Screening with Limited Information: A Dual Perspective”, Z. Chen, Z. Hu, and R. Wang show that strong duality holds between the problem of finding the optimal robust mechanism and a minimax pricing problem, where the adversary first chooses a worst-case distribution and then the seller decides the best posted price mechanism. The duality result connects prior literature that separately studies the primal (robust screening) and problems related to the dual and offers a unified geometric intuition in solving the problem.

Full Text
Paper version not known

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call

Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.