Abstract
Drawing on the SAGE minutes and other documents, I consider the wider lessons for norms of scientific advising that can be learned from the UK’s initial response to coronavirus in the period January–March 2020, when an initial strategy that planned to avoid total suppression of transmission was abruptly replaced by an aggressive suppression strategy. I introduce a distinction between “normatively light advice”, in which no specific policy option is recommended, and “normatively heavy advice” that does make an explicit recommendation. I argue that, although scientific advisers should avoid normatively heavy advice in normal times in order to facilitate democratic accountability, this norm can be permissibly overridden in situations of grave emergency. SAGE’s major mistake in early 2020 was not that of endorsing a particular strategy, nor that of being insufficiently precautionary, but that of relying too heavily on a specific set of “reasonable worst-case” planning assumptions. I formulate some proposals that assign a more circumscribed role to “worst-case” thinking in emergency planning. In an epilogue, I consider what the implications of my proposals would have been for the UK’s response to the “second wave” of late 2020.
Highlights
The COVID-19 pandemic has presented governments around the world with extraordinarily difficult decisions
The group considered the risk to the UK population to be “very low” (NERVTAG, 2020), the threat was considered serious enough to convene the UK’s most important scientific advisory body, the “Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies” (SAGE)
Retrospective modelling estimates that the cumulative number of COVID-19 infections in England was in the range 20–28,000 on 2 March (Birrell et al, 2021)
Summary
UK’s initial response to COVID-19 in the early months of 2020. My aim is to analyse the advisory and decision-making process.. One is to arrive at norms for effective scientific advising that may usefully generalize to other national contexts and to other major crises, including future pandemics. Another is to better understand how normal advising differs from advising in extremis, when the lives of a significant fraction of a country’s citizens are in immediate peril and there is no adequate preexisting plan or procedure for managing the risk. NERVTAG formally advises the Department of Health and Social Care, but throughout 2020 has collaborated closely with SAGE and has significantly overlapping membership This group met more than 40 times in 2020, and its minutes have been made publicly available.
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
