Scalar implicature rates vary within and across adjectival scales

In this work, we explore the relationship between three different inferencestriggered by gradable adjectives. In particular, we look at scalar implicature andtwo competing inferences occuring under negation - scale reversal (indirect scalarimplicature) and a type of manner implicature called negative strengthening. In aseries of experiments, we test a variety of adjectival scales and explore correlationsbetween different inferences. Our results show that some scales are more likelyto generate scalar implicature while others lean more towards generating negativestrengthening. The extent to which scalar implicature and scale reversal correlate forthe same scales, in turn, is lower than expected. We discuss our findings with respectto the mechanisms underlying the three types of inferences and factors accountingfor differences across scales, with a focus on semantic distance, boundedness, thetype of standard of comparison and adjectival extremeness.

Ad-hoc and scalar implicatures in children with autism spectrum disorder

Journal of Semantics Advance Access published December 4, 2014 Journal of Semantics, 0, 2014: 1–29 doi:10.1093/jos/ffu015 LARA HOCHSTEIN University of California, San Diego ALAN BALE Concordia University DANNY FOX The Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Massachusetts Institute of Technology DAVID BARNER University of California, San Diego Abstract Unlike adults, children as old as 9 years of age often fail to infer that a sentence like, ‘Some of the children slept’ implies the falsity of its stronger alternative, ‘All of the children slept’—an inference referred to as a ‘scalar implicature’. Several explanations have been proposed to account for children’s failures with scalar implicature, including domain-general processing limitations, pragmatic deficits or an inability to access the relevant alternatives in a lexical scale (e.g. all as an alternative to some). Our study focused on the role of Gricean epistemic reasoning in children’s failures by testing their ability to compute ‘ignorance implicatures’, which require reasoning about speaker knowledge and informativeness but which differ from scalar implicature with respect to the alternative statements that are involved. We administered two matched tasks to 4- and 5-year-old children: one that assessed their ability to compute ignorance implicatures, and another that assessed their ability to compute scalar implicatures. Five-year-olds successfully computed ignorance implicatures despite failing to compute scalar implicatures, while 4-year-olds failed at both types of inference. These results suggest that 5-year-olds are able to reason about speaker knowledge and informative- ness, and thus that it is difficult to explain their deficit with scalar implicature via these factors. We speculate about other possible sources of their difficulties, including pro- cessing limits and children’s access to the specific scalar alternatives required by scalar implicature. s The Author 2014. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com Downloaded from http://jos.oxfordjournals.org/ at University of California, San Diego on December 5, 2014 Ignorance and Inference: Do Problems with Gricean Epistemic Reasoning Explain Children’s Difficulty with Scalar Implicature?

Modified and unmodified gradable adjectives give rise to two distinct and opposing varieties of pragmatic enrichment: scalar implicature and understatement. While earlier work in pragmatics took these to be complementary inferences derived from opposing conversational principles, more recent work in the formal tradition has placed the focus firmly on scalar implicature and related phenomena, with no attempt to also account for understatement. In this paper I argue that there are good reasons to pursue a unified treatment of the two, and outline one possible way of doing so, framed within the commitment approach to assertion, where I take the commitments that come with asserting a proposition to encompass not only liability for its truth but also acceptance of the social consequences of expressing it. I further discuss how this approach can shed light on recent experimental findings regarding the role of lexical semantics in the pragmatic inferences available to gradable adjectives, as well as a puzzle that these findings pose.

Scalar implicaure is often offered as the exemplar of generalized conversational implicature. However, despite the wealth of literature devoted to both the phenomenon in general and to specific examples, little attention has been paid to the various factors that may influence the generation and interpretation of scalar implicatures. This study employs the “Literal Lucy” methodology developed in Larson et al. (in press) to further investigate these factors in a controlled experimental setting. The results of our empirical investigation suggest that the type of scale employed affects whether or not speakers judge a particular scalar implicature to be part of the truth-conditional meaning of an utterance. Moreover, we found that features of the conversational context in which the implicature is situated also play an important role. Specifically, we have found that the number of scalar values evoked in the discourse context plays a significant role in the interpretation of scalar implicatures generated from gradable adjective scales but not other scale types. With respect to the effects of scale type, we have found that gradable adjectives were less frequently incorporated into truth-conditional meaning than cardinals, quantificational items, and ranked orderings. Additionally, ranked orderings were incorporated less than cardinals. Thus, the results from the current study show that the interpretation of scalar implicature is sensitive to both the associated scale type and discourse context.

Author(s): Zaremba, Kathryn Davidson | Abstract: A difficult learning problem for both children and artificial language learning systems is knowing what is intended to be conveyed based on what is literally said. For example, adults usually take Some teas contain caffeine to also convey that Not all teas contain caffeine, an inference known as a scalar implicature. The present work investigates the role of language-specific knowledge in such inferences through three studies on scalar implicatures in American Sign Language (ASL). The first study illustrates a new experimental paradigm and compares prototypical scalar implicatures in ASL and English. The second study includes the first investigation of general use coordinators in ASL that can be interpreted as either conjunction (and) or disjunction (or). This provides a test case for the role of language-specific lexical contrast in scalar implicatures, with results showing that lexically non-contrastive scales (i.e., lexical scales whose items differ in meaning but not in form) trigger less scalar implicatures than prototypical lexically contrastive scales, which are based on contrasting lexical items. In the third study, both lexically contrastive and non-contrastive scales are interpreted by deaf native signers and also deaf signers who learned ASL at later ages. Result show that later ASL learners calculated less implicatures than early learning signers, but only on the lexically contrastive scale. Together, these studies support a view that despite their context dependence, scalar implicatures are most likely to be triggered by lexical items which contrast with each other in form to create a context-independent scale, and that there may even be advantages to learning scales early in life. The dissertation concludes with suggestions for incorporating lexical contrast into theories of implicature and for further study of the semantic/ pragmatic interface in sign languages

Scalar implicatures, the phenomena where a sentence like “The pianist played some Mozart sonatas” is interpreted, as “The pianist did not play all Mozart sonatas” have been given two different analyses. Neo-Griceans (NG) claim that this interpretation is based on lexical scales (e.g., <some, all>), where the stronger term (e.g., all) implies the weaker term (e.g., some), but the weaker term (e.g., some) implicates the negation of the stronger term (i.e., some = not all). Post-Griceans (PG) deny that this is the case and offer a context-based inferential account for scalar implicatures. While scalar implicatures have been extensively investigated, with results apparently in favor of PG accounts, the psychological reality of lexical scales has not been put to the test. This is what we have done in the present experiment, with a lexical decision task using lexical scales in a masked priming paradigm. While PG accounts do not attribute any role for lexical scales in the computation of scalar implicatures, NG accounts suggest that lexical scales are the core mechanism behind the computation of scalar implicatures, and predict that weaker terms in a scale should prime stronger terms more than the reverse because stronger words are necessary to the interpretation of weaker words, while stronger words can be interpreted independently of weaker words. Our results provided evidence in favor of the psychological existence of scales, leading to the first clear experimental support for the NG account.

The simplest form in which gradable adjectives are used—positive constructions, like John is tall—carry an additional semantic component, evaluativity, that is not part of the adjective’s lexicalized meaning. Evaluative constructions require that an entity instantiate a gradable predicate to a significantly high degree. This property holds of John is tall, but it fails to hold of some other adjectival constructions, like John is taller than Bill or John is 6 ft tall. The source of evaluativity has posed a challenge for semantic accounts of adjectives and adjectival constructions, which are tasked with explaining why the most basic use of gradable adjectives doesn’t reflect its core meaning. This book’s author's (2008) EVAL account capitalizes on notions of antonymy and markedness to account for the distribution of evaluativity across adjectival constructions, including the equative, which can be evaluative. This book sets these notions in a neo-Gricean framework of conversational implicature (Horn 1984; Levinson 2000). It presents an account of evaluativity across adjectival constructions as arising in some cases as a Quantity implicature (similar to the meaning attributed to tautologies like War is war) and in other cases as a Manner implicature (similar to the non-truth-conditional content of litotes like not uncommon). It attributes notable differences in where (i.e. matrix/subordinate clauses) and how (i.e. at-issue/not-at-issue content) evaluativity is encoded to the type of implicature and the question under discussion.

This paper presents experimental results showing that four-year-old Mandarin- speaking children draw free choice inferences from disjunctive statements, though they are not able to compute inferences of exclusivity for disjunctive statements or other scalar implicatures. The findings connect to those of Chemla &amp;amp; Bott (under review) who report differences in how adults process free choice inferences versus scalar implicatures and, prima facie, the findings pose a challenge to treatments that attempt to unify inferences of both kinds. Instead, the findings appear to favour accounts that invoke different analyses for each kind of inference, such as Zimmerman 2000a, Geurts 2005, and Barker 2010. The results, however, also support the recent approach in the experimental literature which attributes children’s failures to compute scalar implicatures to a difficulty with alternatives: children may lack the lexical knowledge of alternatives, or these implicatures impose such a high processing cost that children are unable to handle the alternatives necessary to compute them (Gualmini, Crain, Meroni, Chierchia &amp;amp; Guasti 2001 Chierchia, Crain, Guasti &amp;amp; Thornton 2001 Reinhart 2006; Barner, Brooks &amp;amp; Bale 2011; Singh, Wexler, Astle, Kamawar &amp;amp; Fox 2012). If accessing alternatives is the source of children’s difficulty, then they would be expected to perform better if the requisite alternatives are made explicit, as sub-strings of the asserted sentences. This is exactly what we found. Children were able to compute free choice inferences based on alternatives that were made explicit in the assertion, but children were unable to compute ‘regular’ scalar implicatures arising from alternatives lacking this property. We discuss the implications of these findings for the debate about the relationship between free choice inferences and scalar implicatures and children’s knowledge of alternatives.

This paper presents experimental results showing that four-year-old Mandarin- speaking children draw free choice inferences from disjunctive statements, though they are not able to compute inferences of exclusivity for disjunctive statements or other scalar implicatures. The findings connect to those of Chemla &amp; Bott (under review) who report differences in how adults process free choice inferences versus scalar implicatures and, prima facie, the findings pose a challenge to treatments that attempt to unify inferences of both kinds. Instead, the findings appear to favour accounts that invoke different analyses for each kind of inference, such as Zimmerman 2000a, Geurts 2005, and Barker 2010. The results, however, also support the recent approach in the experimental literature which attributes children’s failures to compute scalar implicatures to a difficulty with alternatives: children may lack the lexical knowledge of alternatives, or these implicatures impose such a high processing cost that children are unable to handle the alternatives necessary to compute them (Gualmini, Crain, Meroni, Chierchia &amp; Guasti 2001 Chierchia, Crain, Guasti &amp; Thornton 2001 Reinhart 2006; Barner, Brooks &amp; Bale 2011; Singh, Wexler, Astle, Kamawar &amp; Fox 2012). If accessing alternatives is the source of children’s difficulty, then they would be expected to perform better if the requisite alternatives are made explicit, as sub-strings of the asserted sentences. This is exactly what we found. Children were able to compute free choice inferences based on alternatives that were made explicit in the assertion, but children were unable to compute ‘regular’ scalar implicatures arising from alternatives lacking this property. We discuss the implications of these findings for the debate about the relationship between free choice inferences and scalar implicatures and children’s knowledge of alternatives.

Recent experimental literature has investigated across-scale variation in scalar implicature calculation: lexical scales significantly differ from each other in how likely they are to be strengthened (e.g., old → not ancient vs. smart → not brilliant). But in existing studies of this scalar diversity, not enough attention has been paid to potential variation introduced by the carrier sentences that scales occur in. In this paper, we carry out the first systematic investigation of the role of sentential context on scalar diversity. Focusing on scales formed by two grad- able adjectives, we manipulate the comparison class, specifically whether a noun is likely to have the property described by the scalar adjective (e.g., brilliant employee vs. brilliant scientist). Our results show within-scale variation: a significant effect of comparison class on the likelihood of scalar implicature calculation. We explain this result in terms of the adjectival threshold distance between the weaker (smart) and stronger (brilliant) adjective, conditioned on the comparison class (employee vs. scientist). Our findings also highlight the methodological importance of controlling carrier sentences.

The structural approach to alternatives (Katzir in Linguist Philos 30(6):669–690, 2007; Fox and Katzir in Nat Lang Semant 19(1):87–107, 2011; Katzir in Semantics, pragmatics and the case of scalar implicatures, Palgrave Macmillan, London, pp 40–71, 2014) is the most developed attempt in the literature at solving the symmetry problem of scalar implicatures. Problematic data with indirect and particularised scalar implicatures have however been raised (Romoli in Snippets 27:14–15, 2013; Trinh and Haida in Nat Lang Semant 25(4):249–270, 2015). To address these problems, Trinh and Haida (2015) proposed to augment the theory with the Atomicity Constraint. Here we show that this constraint falls short of explaining minimal variants of the original problems, and moreover that it runs into trouble with the inferences of sentences involving gradable adjectives like full and empty. We furthermore discuss how the structural approach suffers at times from the problem of ‘too many lexical alternatives’ pointed out by Swanson (Linguist Philos 33(1):31–36, 2010), and at other times from the opposite problem of ‘too few lexical alternatives’. These three problems epitomise the challenge of constructing just enough alternatives under the structural approach to solve the symmetry problem in full generality. Finally, we also sketch another recent attempt at solving the symmetry problem, Bergen et al. (Semant Pragmat 9(20), 2016), which is based on relative informativity and complexity. We argue that Bergen et al. do not provide a general solution to the symmetry problem either, by pointing to some of the open problematic cases that remain for this approach as well. We conclude that while important progress has been made in the theory of alternatives for scalar implicatures in the last few years, a full solution to the symmetry problem has not yet been attained.

Despite the rich theoretical and experimental work on scalar implicature, many of the studies on this topic were limited to some vs. all, neglecting the cross-categorial pervasiveness of the phenomena. The few experimental studies involving a more diverse group of scalar implicatures have found variation among expressions in the likelihood they give rise to scalar implicature, thereby challenging the assumption that scalar implicature (and generalized conversational implicature) is a uniform phenomenon (Doran, Baker, McNabb, Larson &amp; Ward 2009; Doran, Ward, Larson, McNabb &amp; Baker 2012; Van Tiel, Van Miltenburg, Zevakhina &amp; Geurts 2014). This paper presents a first, systematic investigation of the degree to which a large group of quantifiers give rise to the implicature ‘not all’ using an utterance compatibility task with a modified Likert scale. Two accounts for the variation among quantifiers are proposed: (i) Shared semantic properties among three coherent groups of quantifiers account for the degree they give rise to upper- bound implicature; or (ii) the likelihood of an implicature is a function of the scalar distance between the various quantifiers and ‘all’. The predictions these two accounts make are discussed, charting the way to a future investigation of the heterogeneity of scalar implicature.

Some scales require cognitive effort: A systematic review on the role of working memory in scalar implicature derivation

Testing theories of plural meanings