Abstract
The bargaining model has emerged as a progressive, analytic, and persuasive explanation of war; yet, it has some limitations and weaknesses that need improvement. In this study, the potential strength and weaknesses of the bargaining model of war, as well as its applications are discussed. More specifically, this paper reviews the emergence, causal mechanisms, and modifications of the bargaining model of war by concentrating on its up-to-date applications to war. This paper argues that bargaining model gives us a conspicuous explanation concerning the war, even though the theory suffers from some deficits; particularly on the logic of its mechanism, the problem of disagreement, uncertainty, “take it or leave it” protocol, rationality and risk aversion of the actor. The bargaining model of war is still progressing; nonetheless, these problems allow us to have a persuasive but limited and even partially misleading explanation of war. Benefiting from the psychological and domestic explanations of war, the explanatory power of the theory might be enhanced.
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