Abstract
This article analyses the opportunities and complexities of the SADC mediation in Zimbabwe’s Global Political Agreement (GPA) in facilitating and operationalising theprinciples and values of peace, security, human rights and democracy as set out in Article 4 of the SADC treaty. It attempts to interrogate the extent to which the regional grouping’s mechanisms for enforcing its principles and values have been successful. The article argues that despite SADC’s noble commitment to promoting the development of democratic institutions and practices, as well as encouraging the observance of universal human rights, peace and security, the resolution of the Zimbabwe crisis shows that, in practice, the operationalisation of SADC protocol principles and values have been a sorry saga of delays, secrecy, purported agreements and nothing concrete coming out of it. Using the Zimbabwe case study, this article further argues that SADC either lacks appropriate power and authority or is reluctant to hold member states accountable. This seems so, given that as a regional body, it has allowed itself to be utterly inadequate to the task envisioned by the organ in resolving the Zimbabwe crisis. The paper concludes that the sum of all this has had the effect of exposing SADC and it being perceived as a weak regional organisation.
Highlights
In the Gaborone communiqué of 28 June 1996, the Republics of Angola, Botswana, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe, the Kingdoms of Lesotho and Swaziland, the United Republic of Tanzania and the Democratic Republic of Congo, took a decision to establish the Southern African Development Community (SADC) protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (OPDS)
This paper argues that this theory can further be used as a lens to examine how peaceful resolutions can be reached in a region such as SADC, where “political turmoil” and mounting threats to peace and security exist
The robust and consistent communiqués that have emerged from SADC since the March 2011 Troika Summit of the SADC OPDSC in Livingstone, Zambia have to some extent demonstrated a SADC resolve to the Zimbabwe crisis
Summary
In the Gaborone communiqué of 28 June 1996, the Republics of Angola, Botswana, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe, the Kingdoms of Lesotho and Swaziland, the United Republic of Tanzania and the Democratic Republic of Congo, took a decision to establish the Southern African Development Community (SADC) protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (OPDS). The International Crisis Group cited in Raftopoulos, (2013:977) reported with concern that, the voters roll was in shambles, the security sector remained unreformed, the public media was imbalanced, the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) was underfunded and lacked time for preparation, and ZEC failed to provide an electronic voters’ roll in breach of Section 21 of the electoral Act. The Harmonised Elections went ahead on 31 July 2013 and the extent of ZANU (PF) victory shocked many observers, Robert Mugabe who was President in the inclusive government under the GPA received sixty-one percent (61%) in the presidential vote, compared to the 44% he had won in 2008 and Morgan Tsvangirai’s votes plunged from 48% he had won in 2008 to 33% in 2013.
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