Sacred Deserts: Reading Fuzuli's Leyli and Majnun With Deleuze and Theology

This contribution wants to provide a broad overview of sexuality in the New Testament. It provides broad thematic stripes, picturing the early Christians as sexual beings with a new identity in Christ. Sexuality is a given in the New Testament, but due to their new identity, Christians’ sexuality displays particular features: it expresses its freedom responsibly; is driven by divine love; surrenders sacrificially to the other as Christ did; treats its partner as an equal and not as an object of self satisfaction; distinguishes itself from different cultural practices with an identity of its own; acknowledges the fact that it is part of an incomplete world; respects the identity of the other and despises all kinds of sexual malpractices; believes in forgiveness; and finds its climax ultimately and always in the presence of God.

The concept of pantheism is among the most profound and influential intellectual theories in Islamic mysticism, particularly within Sufism. The idea of pantheism, which reached its pinnacle in the works of the Andalusian Mystic Ibn Arab (1164–1240 CE), the purpose of pantheism: it posits that God manifests within all aspects of existence, and humanity reflects this divine essence. Within this framework, spiritual unity with God is achieved through the annihilation of the self in the divine presence (fana). This study investigates the influence of Ibn Arabi’s pantheism on the Kurdish poet Ahmadi Khani/ Ehmedê Xanî (1651–1707) and explores how this Sufi philosophy is interwoven into his poetry, particularly in his seminal works. To date, no research has specifically examined Khani's engagement with this mystical concept. The findings reveal that Ahmadi Khani embraced Ibn Arabi’s ideas, integrating them into his poetry through a thematic journey from worldly love to divine love. This progression mirrors the Sufi path, wherein metaphorical love (ishq majazi) serves as a bridge to the ultimate truth of divine love (ishq haqiqi). Khani portrays God as the central and absolute existence, with all other beings reflecting this divine light. His poetic vision depicts God as the source of all existence, illuminating creation, which derives its essence and gifts from this divine radiance.

<p>Forced branding, tattooing, and bodily inscriptions were linked to a complex intersection of meanings and uses in nineteenth-century Iran. Drawing on insights from studies of bodily inscriptions in other world historical contexts, this paper discusses branding as a marker of ownership, both of human slaves and of animals; Islamic attitudes toward bodily inscription and its symbolic significance in the afterlife; and associations between branding and human or divine love in Persian poetry. From this semiotic foundation, it turns to judicial uses of branding in nineteenth-century Iran: as torture for the extraction of incriminating admissions, and as punishment intended to shame (symbolically casting the criminal from society, stigmatizing their crime) and identify (tracking convicted criminals). Throughout the paper, branding’s legal place is understood in relation to silence and speaking, writing and reading, pain, humiliation, and the inversion of branding’s meaning by its victims, in Iran and a number of other societies. </p>

<p>Forced branding, tattooing, and bodily inscriptions were linked to a complex intersection of meanings and uses in nineteenth-century Iran. Drawing on insights from studies of bodily inscriptions in other world historical contexts, this paper discusses branding as a marker of ownership, both of human slaves and of animals; Islamic attitudes toward bodily inscription and its symbolic significance in the afterlife; and associations between branding and human or divine love in Persian poetry. From this semiotic foundation, it turns to judicial uses of branding in nineteenth-century Iran: as torture for the extraction of incriminating admissions, and as punishment intended to shame (symbolically casting the criminal from society, stigmatizing their crime) and identify (tracking convicted criminals). Throughout the paper, branding’s legal place is understood in relation to silence and speaking, writing and reading, pain, humiliation, and the inversion of branding’s meaning by its victims, in Iran and a number of other societies. </p>

Forced branding, tattooing, and bodily inscriptions were linked to a complex intersection of meanings and uses in nineteenth-century Iran. Drawing on insights from studies of bodily inscriptions in other world historical contexts, this paper discusses branding as a marker of ownership, both of human slaves and of animals; Islamic attitudes toward bodily inscription and its symbolic significance in the afterlife; and associations between branding and human or divine love in Persian poetry. From this semiotic foundation, it turns to judicial uses of branding in nineteenth-century Iran: as torture for the extraction of incriminating admissions, and as punishment intended to shame (symbolically casting the criminal from society, stigmatizing their crime) and identify (tracking convicted criminals). Throughout the paper, branding’s legal place is understood in relation to silence and speaking, writing and reading, pain, humiliation, and the inversion of branding’s meaning by its victims, in Iran and a number of other societies.

This chapter examines Kant’s account of the nature of nonhuman and human animals in the Critique of the Power of Judgement. It discusses how Kant thought that a complete account of the forms of explanation commit one to belief in God. It concludes, firstly, that Kant’s account implies an unhealthy anthropocentrism and an Enlightenment prejudice in the form of the overestimation of reason, and secondly, that the Kantian model of God lacks one of the main characteristics of the Christian conception of God: the universal divine love, a power that unifies and embraces all beings, including nonhuman and human animals and their orders.

Divine love, rooted in religious and spiritual traditions, remains relevant today as it represents unconditional, selfless love and fosters empathy, compassion, and understanding among individuals. Embracing the principles of divine love can promote unity, tolerance, and interdependence, fostering global harmony and peace. This study uses a philosophical framework to examine the complex concept of divine love, specifically looking at the historical development and subtle meanings of love-related terms in Islamic Sufi literature. Special attention is given to Sufi poetry, specifically the works of the renowned mystic Shaykh Ahmad Yasawi and his 12th-century collection, Devon-i Hikmat or Hikmats, which are highly respected in Turkish culture. The research explores the stages of love and offers philosophical interpretations to understand the complex implications and profound nature of this concept. This study enhances our understanding of Sufi literature’s perspective on divine love by emphasizing its enduring significance as a universal and timeless facet of human experience that transcends temporal and cultural boundaries. Consequently, it fosters a profound understanding and appreciation for the enduring themes and cultural heritage found in Turkic Sufi poetry. The research highlights the lasting significance of divine love and the cultivation of deep respect for the timeless themes and rich cultural heritage found in Turkic Sufi poetry.

<i>The Johannine Renaissance in Early Modern English Literature and Theology</i>. Paul Cefalu. Oxford University Press, 2017. Pp. viii+352.

Modern communication medium allows one to easily share stories, establish contact with family members, to thank and apologize. Aware of the benefits of this communication medium each family member should utilize communications media wisely and more humanely. In the midst of this communication medium advancement of Christ's faithful should regard the family as a school of faith and a special communication experience divine grace. Each family who live karinia Divine love is called to give concrete testimony of the love of it. Every Christian family is a concrete sign of the presence and implementation of the tasks of the Church that lives. When carrying out this missionary task, God is always present in the family to bless, sanctify and strengthen family members. The presence of God is happening in real time when families gather to pray, worship and hear God's word together.

This book compares two mystical works central to the Christian Discalced Carmelite and the Hindu Bhakti traditions: the sixteenth-century Spanish Cántico espiritual (Spiritual Canticle), by John of the Cross, and the Sanskrit Rāsa Līlā, originated in the oral tradition. These texts are examined alongside theological commentaries: for the Cántico, the Comentarios written by John of the Cross on his own poem; for Rāsa Līlā, the foundational commentary by Srīdhara Swāmi along with commentaries by the sixteenth-century theologian Jīva Goswāmī, from the Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇava school, and other Gauḍīya theologians. The phrase “savoring God” in the title conveys the Spanish gustar a Dios (to savor God) and the Sanskrit madhura bhakti rasa (the sweet savor of divine love). While “savoring” does not mean exactly the same thing for these theologians, they use the term to define a theopoetics at work in their respective traditions. The book’s methodology transposes their notions of “savoring” to advance a comparative theopoetics grounded in the interaction of poetry and theology. The first chapter explains in detail how theopoetics is regarded considering each text and how they are compared. The comparison is then laid out across Chapters 2, 3, and 4, each of which examines one of the three central moments of the theopoetic experience of savoring that is represented in the Cántico and Rāsa Līlā: the absence and presence of God, the relationship between embodiment and savoring, and the fulfillment of the encounter between the divine and the lovers.

The human being is a multi-faceted entity, and within the spiritual realm, two primary centers govern: the center of reason (ʿaql) and the center of love (ʿishq). Human beings possess the faculty of thought, which, through reason, discerns truth from falsehood in the domain of theoretical and epistemic inquiry and fulfills practical functions in the domain of action. Love, however, arises from the human inclination toward ultimate perfection. According to ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī, love constitutes an existential connection between the lover and the beloved, manifesting as an attraction between the perfect cause (ʿillat kāmilah) and the perfected effect (maʿlūl mustakmil). Through ḥarakat al-jawhariyyah (substantial motion), humans ascend from the level of potential intellect (ʿaql hayūlānī) to the level of acquired intellect (ʿaql mustafād), thereby attaining the boundless joy of Divine knowledge. Ṣadr al-Dīn Qūnawī identifies two aspects of reason: first, as a faculty of logical reasoning and deduction, and second, as an instrument for apprehending intuitive truths (ḥaqāʾiq shuhūdiyyah). While the former is prone to error in logical structures or deductive reasoning, the latter is neither constrained by limitation nor subject to error. Qūnawī considers the human essence to be the qalb (heart), characterized by its intermediary (barzakhiyyah) and unitive (aḥadiyyah jamʿiyyah) nature, which allows it to apprehend all truths-universal and particular alike. The highest attainment of the intellect is ʿaql mustafād (acquired intellect). Yet, through the heart’s love, the human being transcends the realm of intellect and enters the Divine Presence (ṣuqʿ rabbūbī). When the heart receives truths from higher realms, it transforms ordinary intellect into sacred intellect (ʿaql qudsī). This sacred intellect, being an illuminated intellect (ʿaql munawwar), not only comprehends divine truths but also retains the ability to engage in logical and philosophical reasoning. ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī identifies three paths to the knowledge of God: sensory perception (ḥiss), rational intellect (ʿaql), and the innate or heartfelt path (ṭarīq qalbī wa-fiṭrī). The innate path corresponds to the human heart’s natural inclination toward the Ultimate Source (mabdaʾ al-mabādī). For ʿAllāmah, sharīʿah (divine law), grounded in illuminated and sacred intellect as well as divine revelation, aligns with human nature (fiṭrah) and facilitates human happiness through the harmonious integration of reason, love, and divine guidance. In Qūnawī’s thought, divine love (ʿishq ilāhī) refers to the primordial divine longing resulting from the unity of the divine names (asmāʾ). This love signifies a metaphysical movement and inclination inherent to the divine names themselves, independent of external causation. Qūnawī devoted significant effort to providing a rational framework for unveiling (kashf) and mystical intuition (shuhūd), asserting that the limitations of reason in comparison to intuition do not signify its absolute inefficacy. He critiques reason confined to Aristotelian rationality (ʿaql mashāʾī), emphasizing its dependence on theoretical reasoning, its susceptibility to imagination (wahm), and its limitations when devoid of intuitive insight. Consequently, before reason is elevated to sacred intellect through the heart, it may find itself in conflict with certain stages of love.

Collective Flourishing:A Response to Anantanand Rambachan Kate Newman and John J. Thatamanil marriage, religious diversity, commitment, lifelong friendship, interreligious togetherness, interreligious friendship, lokamitra While I (Kate) sat, across the continent from my Canadian home in an Episcopal church on my wedding day, with my chosen one beside me, I was engaged in a ritual that invited us to comprehend love in its divine depth. I was becoming married, engaging in sacrament, participating in divine love, hunting transformation. In order to help us appreciate the meaning of this ritual, we had called on our Hindu brother and invited him to give the wedding sermon in our [End Page 439] church, St. Mark's-in-the-Bowery, the oldest site of continuous worship in Manhattan. Anantanand Rambachan, a Hindu theologian speaking in a Christian ceremony,1 stood amid vapors of frankincense in the ninety-onedegree heat of downtown Manhattan (Lenape, Manahatta: island of many hills) and spoke of the possibility of our "collective flourishing." His was not only a call to my beloved and me; it was also a call to our collective identity as religious communities. Rambachan was speaking to several collectives. On that day, it would mean, first, the newly emergent collectivity of the married couple. Second, it would extend to the assembly of the gathered congregation. Now, on this page, the collectivity addressed here includes readers who define their identity through interest in inter-religious engagement. In this context especially, what if we were to hear Rambachan's words anew as pertaining not only to marriage but also to relationships between people across religious traditions? We find ourselves hearing his words as directed not only to one couple but, instead, to all those who seek to live in interreligious friendship. The inclusion of a Hindu theologian who offers his tradition's wisdom to a Christian couple enfleshes a possibility that we cannot help but hear in Rambachan's words. In a world wherein religious communities are inextricably wedded to each other, what if we dared to hear Rambachan's call to husband and wife as extending also to the mutual care, love, support, and friendship that religious communities are called to grant to each other? Together, communities of interreligious friends can support each other's flourishing. We can be living organisms that help one another to grow or develop in healthy and vigorous ways. Just as Rambachan has done for us by offering a sermon, we can offer one another divinely inspired words and so open the door to the new interreligious community of communities that we are becoming together. But, is this a stretch too far? Surely, Rambachan is right to ask partners in a marriage to nourish each other, but can religious traditions nourish each other? Should they? Does the very notion that a Christian has something to give to Hindus or, as in this case, a Hindu to Christians, imply a deficiency in the one who receives? We who hear Rambachan's words say [End Page 440] no, no more so than in a marriage. No thought of deficiency is implied in the notion that a wife has much to give a husband and vice versa—so, too, with our traditions and the work of interreligious giving and receiving. Our traditions are constituted by their particularities even when we share symbols in common. Although we share the same symbol—in our wedding sermon, the symbol of fire came into play—the uses and meanings of the symbol are distinctive. This is one reason for our confidence that we have much with which to nourish each other. Christians, by and large, do not walk around fires. Hindus do. Nonetheless, fire is a precious symbol in Christian traditions also. Rambachan taught us that Hindus celebrate God's presence in and as the fire. He evoked fire from the Hindu marriage tradition where it is likened to Sacred Love. This prompts me to recollect the symbol of fire within Christian tradition and hope to consider how fire marks our relationship with the sacred and calls to mind encounter with the light of divine presence. In the New Testament, fire consumes, baptizes, and transforms; tongues of flame danced on...

Various debates in bioethics have been focused on whether non-persons, such as marginal humans or non-human animals, deserve respectful treatment. It has been argued that, where we cannot agree on whether these individuals have moral status, we might agree that they have symbolic value and ascribe to them moral value in virtue of their symbolic significance. In the paper I resist the suggestion that symbolic value is relevant to ethical disputes in which the respect for individuals with no intrinsic moral value is in conflict with the interests of individuals with intrinsic moral value. I then turn to moral status and discuss the suitability of personhood as a criterion. There some desiderata for a criterion for moral status: it should be applicable on the basis of our current scientific knowledge; it should have a solid ethical justification; and it should be in line with some of our moral intuitions and social practices. Although it highlights an important connection between the possession of some psychological properties and eligibility for moral status, the criterion of personhood does not meet the desiderata above. I suggest that all intentional systems should be credited with moral status in virtue of having preferences and interests that are relevant to their well-being.

Background. The article deals with the analysis of cognitive features of the concept HEART in the English language based on the monolingual English lexicographical sources. The heart is often used as a symbol of emotion, love, passion, courage or spirituality. In the English-speaking world, as in many other cultures, the heart is considered an important element that reflects the inner feelings and moral qualities of a person. Moreover, in many cultures and contexts, the heart has a deep symbolic meaning. One of the most vivid symbolic meanings of the lexical unit heart is love. In addition, the heart also symbolizes the emotional center of a person, since in many cultures the heart is considered to be the center of life energy and morality of a person; the heart is associated with endurance, fortitude and vitality, or with divine love, sorrow and mercy. All these examples illustrate the deep symbolic significance of the heart in the culture and language, depicting it as a key symbol of spirituality, the center of human emotions and vital energy. Despite the fact that there is a number of researches dedicated to investigation of the nature of concept and conceptualization this topic is still of paramount importance. Purpose. The purpose of the article is to reveal the cognitive peculiarities of the concept HEART based on the material of lexicographic sources. To achieve the goal, six English lexicographic sources have been chosen: Oxford Learner's Dictionaries, Cambridge Dictionary, Free Dictionary, Collins English Dictionary, Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English, Merriam-Webster Dictionary. Methods. To reach research objectives the following methods have been chosen: the descriptive method, the constructive method, the comparative analysis, the cognitive analysis. Results. As a result of the investigation of six lexicographic sources of the English language, it has been found out that the concept HEART verbalized by the lexical unit counts 11 conceptual meanings. Conclusions and perspectives. The topic of Cognitive peculiarities of the concept Heart based on English lexicographic sources touches on a number of linguistic, cognitive, and cultural dimensions. The concept of HEART is often explored through the lens of conceptual metaphor theory, a key framework in cognitive linguistics. This theory suggests that abstract concepts are understood through metaphors grounded in physical and experiential realities. Cultural features can be analyzed by comparing how the concept HEART is linguistically and metaphorically expressed in other languages versus English could provide insight into universal versus culture-specific cognitive patterns. Lexicographic analysis from dictionaries (Oxford Learner's Dictionaries, Cambridge Dictionary or Collins English Dictionary) and thesauri can shed light on the semantic networks surrounding heart. Newer corpus-based lexicography tools will allow the study of frequency, collocations, and shifts in the concept’s usage across various registers (literary, colloquial, medical). To add, a discourse-based approach to study concept HEART might investigate how its use reflects societal values or ideologies, such as its role in romantic discourse, motivational speech, or even religious contexts.

Abraham Kuyper’s Lectures on Calvinism make available in printed form his 1898 Stone Lectures delivered at Princeton Theological Seminary, locating ‘Calvinism’ amongst other major philosophies and religions. Given the erroneous manner in which each of these other world-views—Paganism, Islamism, Romanism and Modernism—depict the fundamental relationship between God and the world, they cannot help but fall far short in their understandings of the other two basic relationships: between human and human, and between humankind and the rest of created reality. Calvinism alone, then, with its conception of human life as lived directly (in an unmediated manner) in the presence of God, can preserve the all-important conviction that all of human life, including the relationships of human beings to the non-human creation, be carried out in obedience to the Creator who desires the flourishing of the whole creation.