Russia’s Use of UN Mechanisms To Implement And Legitimize Aggression: Legal, Political and Disinformation Aspects

This article examines European Union (EU) military operations from the perspective of the United Nations (UN) Security Council and UN collective security. The EU has supported UN peacekeeping missions through its own military operations within the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), based on the authorisation of these operations by the UN Security Council. However, the EU’s military operation on the Mediterranean Sea, Operation Sophia, was established in 2015 without such prior UN Security Council authorisation. Although the UN Security Council authorised the operation subsequently, it was received in a less positive light than previous operations and was criticised not only for the way in which it was established, but also for its performance. The article argues that this break with prior practice does not indicate a new direction being taken by the EU as it has retreated from this approach and established a new military operation in the Mediterranean (Operation Irini), again firmly in line with a mandate issued by the UN Security Council in 2020. The assessment of EU military operations can be complex as there might be other EU agencies involved in the process such as Frontex, and their role in future operations, in particular in the field of migration, should be monitored. Yet this internal complexity does not alter their evaluation under international law. As soon as EU military operations are conducted on the territory of a third State, the EU needs to secure either a UN Security Council authorisation or State consent. Looking at this process from the perspective of the UN Security Council sheds light on the complexity of EU military operations and their position within UN collective security.

In the early 1990s the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) began looking beyond traditional war-fighting operations and engaging in so-called military operations other than war (MOOTW), which include United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations. Before the late 1980s, China repeatedly objected to UN peacekeeping activities as violations of, or interference in, the affairs of sovereign states. However, it reversed its policy in November 1988 when it joined the UN Special Peacekeeping Committee. Since its first peacekeeping operation in 1990, China’s involvement in such operations has expanded steadily. Among the United Nations Security Council permanent member states, China has most often contributed the largest number of peacekeeping personnel (monthly contribution being 2,583 persons on average in 2017). As of September 2018 it ranks eleventh among the nations that contribute military and police forces to UN missions and first among the permanent members of the UN Security Council. In 2016, China’s financial contribution to UN peacekeeping operations surpassed that of Japan—formerly the second largest contributor—to now rank as the second largest contributor. At a UN peacekeeping summit in September 2015, Xi Jinping declared that China would further support UN peacekeeping by establishing a permanent peacekeeping police force, creating an eight-thousand-strong standby force and contributing US$1 billion in military assistance to the African Union. China’s peacekeeping contribution has evolved in terms of quality as well. The majority of Chinese peacekeepers dispatched from the People’s Liberation Army are so-called force enablers such as engineers and medical and transportation companies; however, when they go to areas in which force-protection is necessary, and the protection of civilians is included in UN mandates, China dispatches “security units,” “guard detachments,” or infantry forces equipped with light arms and armored vehicles. China’s peacekeeping activity has attracted the attention of not only China scholars but also those who study international peacekeeping: this is because the abovementioned expanding activities specifically, and the rise of China more generally, may have considerable impact on the future of international peacekeeping. The key debate in China’s peacekeeping literature resonates with a wider international relations debate on the implication of China’s rise for the international order—is China a “status quo” power that helps strengthen the existing international peacekeeping order, or a “revisionist” power that challenges it? In other words, to what extent does China’s behavior accord with or begin to shape the evolving international norms of UN peacekeeping, which have been established by dominant Western states over a long period? Relatedly, China’s expanding contribution to UN peacekeeping also raises a question about what approach China might have to one of its diplomatic principles—that of non-intervention/non-interference. Although UN peacekeeping operations can go ahead only when host states give consent to such operations, contemporary peacekeeping takes place where there is no peace to keep. Thus, troop contributing countries will have to take up arms and engage in fighting when necessary. Further, the UN is “assisting,” or sometimes close to creating, the fundamental components of sovereign states—a judiciary system, police and military forces, and sociopolitical institutions, among others. China’s proactive participation in this type of operation may meddle with its principle of non-intervention/non-interference. Many policy-relevant studies, such as those by the International Crisis Group and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), provide policy recommendations to Chinese and Western governments suggesting ways in which China’s peacekeeping contribution can be beneficial to the current peacekeeping order. Given that the study of China’s peacekeeping began, in the main, in the 2000s, the majority of publications can be found in journals, with the exception of a number of autobiographies written by Chinese peacekeepers, which have been published as books in the Chinese language.

When we think of United Nations (UN) peacekeepers, the first image that is conjured in our mind is of an individual sporting a blue helmet or a blue beret (fig. 1). While simple and uncomplicated, these blue accessories represent an expression and an embodiment resembling that of a warrior, sent to bring peace to conflict-torn communities. UN peacekeeping first conceptually emerged in 1948 in the wake of the Arab-Israeli war that ensued following the United Kingdom’s relinquishing of its mandate over Palestine, and the proclamation of the State of Israel. “Forged in the crucible of practical diplomacy” (Rubinstein 16), unarmed military observers were deployed to Palestine to monitor the hostilities and mediate armistice agreements between Israel and its Arab neighbours. This operation, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), significantly exemplified the diplomatic and observational capabilities of military men, in line with the UN Charter’s objectives of international peace and security, setting henceforth a basic archetype for international peacekeeping. It was only in 1956, however, that peacekeeping formally emerged when armed UN forces deployed to Egypt to supervise the withdrawal of forces occupying the Suez Canal (informally known as the ‘Second Arab-Israeli’ war). Here, the formation of UN peacekeeping represented an international pacifying mechanism comprised of multiple third-party intermediaries whereby peaceful resolution would be achieved by transcending realist instincts of violence for political attainment in favour of applying a less-destructive liberal model of persuasion, compromise, and perseverance (Howard). ‘Blue helmet’ peacekeeping operations continue to be regarded by the UN as an integral subsidiary instrument of its organisation. At present, there are 12 active peacekeeping operations led by the UN Department of Peacekeeping across the world (United Nations Peacekeeping). Fig. 1: United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) sporting blue berets (https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-troops-awarded-un-medals-for-south-sudan-peacekeeping-mission) But where did the blue helmets and berets originate from? Rubinstein details a surprisingly mundane account of the origins of the political accessory that is now a widely recognised symbol for UN peacekeepers’ uniforms. Peacekeepers’ uniforms initially emerged from the ad hoc need to distinguish UN troops from those of the armed forces in a distinctive dress during the 1947 UNTSO mission by any means and material readily available, such as armbands and helmets (Henry). The era of early peacekeeping operations also saw ‘observers’ carry UN flags and paint their vehicle white with ‘UN’ written in large black letters in order to distinguish themselves. The blue helmets specifically came to be adorned during the first peacekeeping operation in 1956 during the Suez crisis. At this time, Canada supplied a large number of non-combatant troops whose uniform was the same as the belligerent British forces, party to the conflict. An effort to thus distinguish the peacekeepers was made by spray-painting surplus World War II American plastic helmet-liners, which were available in quantity in Europe, blue (Urquhart; Rubenstein). The two official colours of the UN are ‘light blue’ and ‘white’. The unique light “UN” blue colour, in particular, was approved as the background for the UN flag in the 1947 General Assembly Resolution 167(II), alongside a white emblem depicting a map of the world surrounded by two olive branches. While the UN’s use of the colour was chosen as a “practical effect of identifying the Organization in areas of trouble and conflict, to any and all parties concerned”, the colour blue was also specifically chosen at this time as “an integral part of the visual identity of the organisation” representing “peace in opposition to red, for war” (United Nations). Blue is seen to be placed in antithesis to the colour red across several fields including popular culture, and even within politics, as a way to typically indicate conflict between two warring groups. Within popular culture, for example, many films in the science fiction, fantasy, or horror genres, use a clearly demarcated, dichotomous ‘red vs. blue’ colour scheme in their posters (fig. 2). This is also commonly seen in political campaign posters, for example during the 2021 US presidential election (fig. 3). Fig. 2: Blue and red colour schemes in film posters (left to right: Star Wars: The Force Awakens (2015), Captain Marvel (2019), and The Dead Don’t Die (2019)) Fig. 3: Biden (Democratic party) vs. Trump (Republican party) US presidential election (https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-10-15/us-election-political-parties-explained-democrats-vs-republicans/12708296) This dichotomy can be traced back to the high Middle Ages between the fourteenth and seventeenth century where the colour blue became a colour associated with “moral implications”, rivalling both the colours black and red which were extremely popular in clothing during the eras of the late Middle Ages and early Renaissance (Pastoureau 85). This ‘moral metamorphosis’ in European society was largely influenced by the views of Christian Protestant reformers concerning the social, religious, and artistic use of the colour blue (Pastoureau). A shift in the use of blue and its symbolic connotations may also be seen, for example, in early Christian art and iconography, specifically those deriving from depictions of the Virgin Mary; according to Pastoureau (50), this provides the “clearest illustration of the social, religious, and artistic consequences of blue's new status”. Up until the eighteenth century, the colour blue, specifically ‘sky blue’ or light blue tones resemblant of the “UN” shade of blue, had minimal symbolic or aesthetic value, particularly in European culture and certainly amongst nobility and the upper levels of society. Historically, light blue was typically associated with peasants’ clothing. This was due to the fact that peasants would often dye their clothes using the pigment of the woad herb; however, the woad would poorly penetrate cloth fibres and inevitably fade under the effects of sunlight and soap, thereby resulting in a ‘bland’ colour (Pastoureau). Although the blue hues worn by the nobility and wealthy were typically denser and more solid, a “new fashion” for light blue tones gradually took hold at the courts of the wealthy and the bourgeoisie, inevitably becoming deeply anchored in Western European counties (Pastoureau). Here, the reorganisation of the colour hierarchy and reformulation of blue certainly resembles Pastoureau’s (10) assertion that “any history of colour is, above all, a social history”. Within the humanities, colour represents a social phenomenon and construction. Colour thus provides insights into the ways society assigns meaning to it, “constructs its codes and values, establishes its uses, and determines whether it is acceptable or not” (Pastoureau, 10). In this way, although colour is a naturally occurring phenomenon, it is also a complex cultural construct. That the UN and its subsidiary bodies, including the Department of Peacekeeping, deliberately assigned light blue as its official organisational colour therefore usefully illustrates a significant social process of meaning-making and cultural sociology. The historical transition of light blue’s association from one of poverty in and around the eighteenth century to one of wealth in the nineteenth century may perhaps also be indicative of the next transitional era for light blue in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, representative of the amalgamation or unity between the two classes. Representing the ambitions not only of the organisation, but rather of the 193 member-states, of attaining worldwide peace, light blue may be seen as a colour of peace, as well as one of the people, for the people. This may be traced back, according to Pastoureau, as early as the Middle Ages where the colour blue was seen a colour of ‘peace’. Colours, however, do not solely determine social and cultural relevance in a given historical event. Rather, fabrics and clothing too offer “the richest and most diverse source of artifacts” in understanding history and culture. Artifacts such as UN peacekeepers’ blue berets and helmets necessarily incorporate economic, social, ideological, aesthetic, and symbolic aspects of both colour and material into the one complete uniform (Pastoureau). While the ‘UN blue’ is associated with peace, the beret, on the other hand, has been described as “an ally in the battlefield” (Kliest). The history of the beret is largely rooted in the armed forces – institutions typically associated with conflict and violence – and it continues to be a vital aspect of military uniforms worn by personnel from countries all around the globe. Given that the large majority of UN peacekeeping forces are made up of military personnel, peacekeeping, as both an action and an institution, thus adds a layer of complexity when discussing artifact symbolism. Here, a peacekeeper’s uniform uniquely represents the embodiment of an amalgamation of two traditionally juxtaposing concepts: peace, nurture, and diplomacy (often associated with ‘feminine’ qualities) versus conflict, strength, and discipline (often associated with ‘masculine’ qualities). A peacekeeper’s uniform thus represents the UN’s institutionalisation of “soldiers for peace” (Howard) who are, as former UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold proclaimed, “the front line of a moral force” (BBC cited in Howard). Aside from its association with the armed forces, the beret has also been used as a fashion symbol by political revolutionaries, such as members of the ‘Black Panther Party’ (BPP) founded in the 1960s during the US Civil Rights Movement, as well as Che Guevara, prominent Leftist figure in the Cuban Revolution (see fig. 4). For, Rosabelle Forzy, CE

Introduction During the Cold War, traditional United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations had to cope with cases of international conflict, which required the UN to monitor ceasefire agreements and buffer zones. This first generation of peacekeeping operations was followed by new missions with new goals when the global order evolved. With the end of the Cold War, the UN has become involved in a second generation of peacekeeping operations, related to domestic rather than international conflicts, and requiring civilian administrations and policemen, as well as soldiers, to oversee the implementation of peace plans negotiated by the parties in conflict that have agreed to resolve their disputes at the ballot box. (1) In each case, the parties involved had earlier accepted the UN presence and, therefore, UN peacekeepers only used force to defend themselves. Meanwhile, a third generation of peacekeeping operations, which did not require the consent of the parties involved, has emerged under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Th is development overlapped with the appearance of coalitions of the willing with a mandate from the Security Council to undertake specific enforcement actions, such as the International Force East Timor (INTERFET). It was against this background that a UN mission was undertaken in East Timor, a mission seen by some as the precursor of a fourth generation of state-building operations, (2) and by others as a classic case of decolonization. (3) The UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) was established by UN Security Council Resolution 1272 on 25 October 1999, endowed with overall responsibility for the of the territory and empowered to exercise all legislative and executive authority, including the of justice, during the period of transition from Indonesian until formal independence. At the same time, it also had many other tasks to accomplish, such as providing security, maintaining law and order, establishing an effective administration, assisting in the development of civil and social services, ensuring the co-ordination and delivery of humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation and development assistance, supporting capacity-building for self-government, and as sisting in the establishment of conditions for sustainable development. UNTAET's scope of responsibilities and the range of the mandate were without any precedent in the peacekeeping or peacemaking operations that came before (UNMIK [UN Interim Administration in Kosovo] is the only, but partial, exception). For the first time, the UN had sovereign control over a trust territory, and UNTAET was a trusteeship administration preparing a territory for independence. (4) In other words, there was a combination of UN governorship with the strategic objective of independent statehood. (5) As such, it was a state-building mission, and this was viewed by many as a test case. In fact, it was considered that UNTAET would have to invent a functioning state of East Timor. (6) Between October 1999 and May 2002, the territory became a laboratory for an experiment of governance, and UNTAET was the de facto sovereign in the territory. With so much at stake, and now that UNTAET's mandate has expired, it is apt to evaluate its performance. Some questions are particularly relevant. What were the results of the experiment? Did it accomplish the goals established by UN Security Council Resolution 1272? Were there any lessons learned from this experience? What kind of legacy did it leave in the new sovereign state of East Timor? The Establishment of UNTAET In 1999, after twenty-four years of occupation, Indonesia finally allowed a popular consultation -- Jakarta refused to call it what it really was, a referendum -- to take place in East Timor. (7) The United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) was responsible for the organization and conduct of the popular consultation, on the basis of a direct, secret, and universal ballot. …

IntroductionOn July 5, 2006, North Korea test-launched an array of missiles, which ended a self-imposed moratorium of eight years. Ten days after the missile test (on July 15, 2006), in its toughest official response to North Korean actions since 1994, the United Nations (UN) Security Council adopted Resolution 1695. This resolution condemned the missile tests, demanded North Korea cease all activities related to its ballistic mi - ssile program, and required all member states to comply with measures limiting North Korea's access to missile-tested materials or technology. On October 9, 2006, North Korea set offits first nuclear test. The UN Security Council voted unanimously on October 14 to slap North Korea with trade, travel, and other as punishment for its claimed nuclear weapons test. This resolution (1718) is much stronger than the earlier resolutions; it calls for inspection of North Korea cargoes, bars the travel to UN member states of North Koreans responsible for North Korea's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program, requires UN member states to freeze the financial assets of North Korean people or entities designated by the UN as engaged in North Korean WMD activities, and requires the establishment of an oversight committee.Under the latest resolution (2094), tougher impose penalties on North Korean banking, travel, and trade, and were passed in a 15-0 vote that reflected the country's increased international isolation. China, the North's longtime benefactor, helped the United States draftthe resolution, in what outside experts called a sign of Beijing's growing annoyance with Pyongyang's defiant behavior on the nuclear issue. The Chinese had entreated the North Koreans not to proceed with the February 12, 2013, underground nuclear test, their third. It is questionable whether these new will work. In other words, will the compel North Korean leaders to comply fully with UN demands, or will they lead the North Korean masses to rebel against their leaders? This article discusses reasons for the possible failure of these new against North Korea, the consequences of their failure to stop North Korea from developing nuclear weapons, and policy options on a nuclear North Korea.The Effectiveness of Sanctions Against Outlaw CountriesThe term sanctions means restrictions on normal commercial relations with a target country, including trade, investment, and other cross-border activities. Economic are either unilateral or multilateral. A unilateral sanction is imposed by one country, such as the U.S., against another country, such as North Korea. Multilateral require the cooperation of at least two nations. The clearest examples of multilateral are those imposed by the Security Council of the United Nations.Multinational were relatively rare before 1990. The UN Security Council, obviously incapacitated due to Cold War-related veto powers, imposed only twice (Rhodesia in 1966 and South Africa in 1977) in the 45 years of its existence prior to the August 1990 embargo of Iraq.1 Since 1990, however, the UN Security Council has increasingly imposed economic to prevent, manage, or resolve violent conflict. When a UN sanction is imposed, all UN member nations are required to comply with the order and to enforce the sanction against the outlaw country.2The active utilization of as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy dates back to the aftermath of World War I, when U.S. President Woodrow Wilson suggested that the adoption of was a method that could keep the world free of war. However, empirical studies on the effectiveness of economic by Pape3 and others found that historically, have a poor track record. The rare success of cases such as South Africa is associated with unique factors that are unlikely to be found elsewhere. …

United Nations (UN) organs have the primary responsibility in the collective security system. The UN Security Council is a body with broad responsibilities for the maintenance of international peace and security. Accordingly, this body makes recommendations and decisions with the aim of establishing international peace and security. It also enacts measures that do not involve, but also those that involve the use of armed force. In relation to the Security Council, the UN General Assembly has a subsidiary role in the maintenance of international peace and security. The Republic of Austria was a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council from 1990 to 1992. It was important for Austria that the UN system of collective security functions properly, having in mind the fact that the territory of the former Yugoslavia is in its immediate vicinity, as well as the fact that the basic principles of international law were violated, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In this regard, the officials of the Republic of Austria at the United Nations initiated, participated in the preparation and voting of several UN Security Council resolutions with the aim of implementing certain collective security measures in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The most important acts related to the implementation of the set of collective security measures adopted by the United Nations organs with the strong involvement of the Republic of Austria are: UN Security Council Resolutions 749 and 752 (activities of the Republic of Austria in stopping the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina at an early stage), UN Security Council Resolutions 757 (economic sanctions against FR Yugoslavia), UN Security Council Resolution 761 (sending UNPROFOR to Sarajevo Airport), UN Security Council Resolution 764 (proposal to impose coercive measures), Council Resolutions 770 and 771 UN Security Council (delivery of humanitarian aid to Bosnia and Herzegovina and its right to self-defense), UN Security Council Resolution 779 (right to return the refugees), UN Security Council Resolution 781 (establishment of a no-fly zone), Security Council Resolution 787 UN (proposal for the establishment of protected zones), UN General Assembly Resolutions 48/88 and 49/10 (request for lifting the arms embargo on Bosnia and Herzegovina and Herzegovina).

Indonesia is frequently mentioned as an emerging player in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping, but its role has been understudied compared to other emerging powers. Drawing on interviews with foreign and defence ministry officials, and independent analysts in Jakarta, as well as statements by Indonesian representatives in the UN and other forums, this article makes three arguments. First, although Indonesia has a long history of involvement in UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs), there has been a major change in policy in the last decade, with much greater importance attached to peacekeeping. Jakarta has set itself the goal of becoming a top ten troop contributing country with 4,000 personnel deployed by 2019. Second, although Indonesia retains a strong preference for traditional “blue helmet” missions mandated by the UN Security Council (UNSC), and based on principles of host country consent, impartiality and non-use of force, its views on peacekeeping are evolving. While Indonesia has concerns about aspects of the “new” peacekeeping agenda, such as Protection of Civilians and robust peace enforcement missions, in practice it has proved to be more pragmatic than some of its rhetoric might suggest. Third, although emerging powers are frequently portrayed as conservative, Indonesia has been an advocate for a more ambitious approach to peacekeeping in Southeast Asia. It was the first to argue for an ASEAN peacekeeping force and has supported the use of regional troops to monitor peace agreements. In sum, the Indonesian case supports some of the claims made about emerging powers and peace operations but challenges others, underlining the diversity of this group of states.

Zooming in on the serving European Union (EU) Member States and exploring the legal parameters defining regional actorness both directly and indirectly, this article analyzes the EU's representation at the United Nations (UN) Security Council. Looking at the theory and practice behind Articles 52, 23 and 103 of the UN Charter, we shed fresh light on the only provision in the European Treaties that explicitly referred to the UN Security Council, i.e. the former Article 19 of the EU Treaty. We define that provision as a regional interpretation of Article 103 of the UN Charter and discuss its implementation in day-to-day decision-making, especially as for economic and financial sanctions measures. Hereby, we focus on the negotiations leading to UN Security Council Resolution 1822(2008).

The article examines the impact of history problems on Japan’s long-lasting efforts to gain permanent membership in the United Nations (UN) Security Council. It analyzes both the domestic stimuli behind Tokyo’s stance on the UN reform and the external constraints on the UN Security Council enlargement. It is argued that while problems with Japan’s bid for permanent membership in the UN Security Council stemmed mainly from divergent interests of member states, history issues constituted an additional obstacle that weakened Tokyo’s position in negotiations on the UN reform. The discourse on lack of repentance by Japan for the atrocities committed during the Second World War was instrumentally used by the country’s rivals, mainly China and South Korea, all in the effort to hinder Tokyo’s efforts on the international arena.

Purpose: In terms of UN peacekeeping deployments, the African region has received the most, just as it has contributed the most in terms of military personnel. The Liberian UN-ECOWAS joint peace operations are acknowledged by many as one of the most successful, globally. The study argues that experiences from these operations can enrich this global effort. Hence, the study sought to establish lessons from the operations that could guide future peacekeeping operations. 
 Methodology: The study adopted a research approach that was analytical, descriptive, legal, historical and sociological; where data was mainly gathered from secondary and tertiary sources. To this end, scholarly books, edited works, articles and periodicals (duly acknowledged in the reference list) within the study area of international peacekeeping and the Liberian Civil War, were reviewed. Policy and legal documents by the United Nations (UN) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), media stories, reports from non-governmental organizations, research reports and reports from the Liberian government in relation to the multi-functional peacekeeping operations in that country; were not left out when data was gathered for this write-up. Additionally, in terms of secondary sources, dictionaries, bibliographies, encyclopedia, databases, abstracts and indexing sources were used. 
 Findings: Main findings were that the joint operations brought lasting peace to Liberia and that lessons from those experiences have the potential of guiding future peacekeeping operations across the globe.
 Unique contribution to theory, practice and policy: The study which is useful for academic, policy-formulation and implementation purposes, recommends: that the UN Security Council institutes prompt, appropriate and adequately funded interventions that have clear, effective and purposeful mandates at the start of conflicts; ‘spoilers’, ‘trouble makers’ and warlords should be heavily sanctioned; and effective coordinative measures be put in place by the UN so as to regulate activities of Non-UN peacekeeping actors.

Since the 1960s and during the initial decades of the United Nations (UN) Africa has always had great representation inside the General Assembly. Besides the numerical advantage of Africa, the ties between the continent and the UN grew to be very specific and assumed multidimensional aspects due to the various issues related to the constant conflicts and social crises inside African territories. However, this engagement presents several complex aspects, including international, regional, and local issues. The engagement of Africa with the UN Security Council is based on two main pillars: conflict resolution and the claim of representation in a reformed Council. The problems related to these pillars are summarized in three broad categories considered problematic for this interaction: capacity, regional integration, and the political relation between the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council and the UN Security Council. The colonial background of the African continent left deep scars for its countries. Currently, Africa is the continent with the second biggest economic inequality in the world, besides the fact that its countries are hardly able to mobilize their forces to control domestic issues. Therefore, the capacity for collaboration and cooperation with UN forces is much reduced. At the same time, the continent was never united completely under a consensus and real integration, despite the existence of the AU – the former Organization of African Unity (OAU). African countries have been divided between two opposites: the need for integration and the defence of sovereignty. This division harmed even the African claims for fair representation inside the UNSC. This work intends to develop a discussion on how these problems must be overcome for successful engagement between the African continent and the UN Security Council.

A principal agent model is used to test the hypothesis that when proposed uses of force attract the support of the United Nations (UN) Security Council, the rally in support of the American president increases significantly. Regression analysis is applied to rallies during all militarized interstate disputes from 1945 to 2001. Results show that UN Security Council support significantly increases the rally behind the president (by as many as 9 points in presidential approval), even after including an array of control variables. This finding is generally robust across most model specifications. This effect is unique among international institutions because other actions by the UN or regional security organizations do not significantly affect rallies. These findings provide new insight into how international institutions can matter and influence the foreign policies of states by affecting public opinion.

Human rights are a fundamental principle and purpose of the United Nations (UN). Yet, UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs) exhibit substantial variation in their ability to engage in human rights activities. While existing research has investigated deployment and mandates, we explain what peacekeepers can actually do on the ground. We argue that the UN Security Council’s permanent member states (the P5) limit human rights mandates if they have private interests in PKO host countries, thereby diminishing peacekeepers’ ability to promote and protect human rights. Moreover, armed conflict shifts priorities away from human rights activities. We use novel data on 21 human rights activities in African countries (1991–2016) and item response models to capture PKOs’ latent ability to engage in these activities. Random and fixed effects regression and mediation analyses with sensitivity tests support our expectations. We find that the P5’s economic interests in the PKO host country negatively correlate with the strength of human rights mandate provisions, which in turn negatively correlates with PKOs’ ability to engage in human rights activities. We find similar, although less consistent, correlations for P5’s security interests. Yet, while mandates partly define the scope of PKOs’ activities, field-level conditions also have an influence. Specifically, ongoing armed conflict negatively correlates with PKOs’ ability to engage in human rights activities. Our results suggest that rising challenges to the liberal international order by powerful states, coupled with the more frequent deployment of PKOs in conflict zones, will likely increase the hurdles that UN PKOs need to overcome to meet expectations regarding their human rights engagement.

Although only one of the six ongoing United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations in Africa (as of November 1, 2021), the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) is unique in many ways. After a broader introduction about African troop and police contributions to UN peacekeeping, the aim of this chapter is to show how African countries are participating in the conflict resolution of the last colonized area of the continent. UN Security Council Resolutions, UN Secretary-General Special Reports, press releases, and other official UN documents are analyzed in order to show how the 54 African states are responding to the UN peacekeeping mission on the political level and in more practical terms, in contributing to the military or police force of MINURSO as well.

The applicability of international humanitarian law (IHL) to United Nations (UN) forces has long generated discussion. When peacekeepers have become engaged in hostilities of such a nature as to trigger the application of IHL (either via acts in self-defence, or in the course of carrying out a mandate as authorised by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations), questions have arisen as to whether they should be equally subject to the rules of IHL. Such questions arise as UN peacekeeping forces act on behalf of the international community and thus have a ‘just cause’, so to speak, to use force. Despite these questions, however, it now appears well settled that the distinction betweenjus ad bellum(the right to use force under public international law) andjus in bello(the law governing the conduct of hostilities) should be maintained, and that IHL applies in respect of UN peacekeeping operations whenever the conditions for its application are met. That said, questions regarding the conditions for the application of IHL, as well as its scope of application, continue to be relevant, particularly at a time when the Security Council is tasking UN operations with increasingly robust mandates.