Russia's Political Youths

Abstract

Abstract: Although most Russian youths are politically apathetic, a small cross section is engaged in political activity--mostly consisting of protest actions--in preparation for the upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections. Youth-based political and civic organizations can be defined generally by their support for, or opposition to, President Vladimir Putin and the party of power. Ideological differences between opposition youth organizations have prevented the formation of an effective civic movement. Putin's administration has employed a number of tactics, including the creation of the pro-Kremlin youth organization Nashi (Ours) to counteract anti-Kremlin youth groups such as Youth Yabloko, The National Bolshevik Party, and Oborona. Western nongovernmental organizations, along with youth alumni of the revolutions, have been helping Russian opposition youth to overcome these difficulties, much to the dismay of the Putin administration. Keywords: democracy assistance, elections, Orange Revolution, politics, youths ********** Russia's youths are preparing for battle. With the State Duma and presidential elections approaching, youth-based civic and political organizations, aided by Western nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and alumni of the so-called colored revolutions in Ukraine, Georgia, and Serbia have been gearing up for a contest against the firmly entrenched United Russia Party (YeR) and the administration of President Vladimir Putin. Meanwhile, the Kremlin has been pumping millions of rubles into its own youth groups with the hope of thwarting a Ukrainian-style revolution. Enhanced focus on youths in Russia has come mainly in response to the Orange Revolution in Ukraine. Youth-based organizations have played an important role in the colored revolutions that have swept across the postcommunist space in the last five years. The knowledge of organizational techniques and movement management developed in Serbia by Otpor and a host of Western-based NGOs has infiltrated into Georgia and Ukraine, helping to fuel the rise of democratic culture if only in response to flagrant infringements on democratic principles. In Ukraine, organizations such as Pora and Znayu not only provided the passion and sense of purpose that contributed to the spirit of the Orange Revolution, they also played a major role in mobilizing the Ukrainian people to challenge the authorities. Following their success, activist youths from Ukraine have joined their colleagues from Georgia and Serbia, along with a number of Western-based NGOs, in exporting organizational knowledge and democratic participation to other countries in the former Soviet Union. Many of these organizations have focused on Russia as a small number of youth-ased political and civic organizations prepare for parliamentary elections in 2007 and presidential elections in 2008. Activists from Pora and Znayu have held seminars on organizational techniques and movement development with their counterparts in Russia. NGOs from the United States and Europe have provided funding for these activities in addition to running their own programs for Russia's youths. These efforts have drawn the ire of the Putin administration, which has launched its own campaign targeting Russia's youths in an attempt to counteract a potential Orange Revolution in Russia. I have conducted an investigation into the activities of Russian youth-based political and civic organizations and their support network of Western NGOs and colored revolution alumni to assess their political effectiveness in confronting the political monopoly of the Putin administration and YeR in 2007 and 2008. Although an opposition youth movement in Russia has been developing some of the elements that made groups such as Otpor in Serbia and Pora in Ukraine successful civic mobilizers, internal divisions, public apathy, resource deficiencies, and countermeasures by the authorities have all undermined its ability to wage a successful civic campaign. …