Russia and the Defeat of Napoleon (1812-14)
Although a vast and often excellent literature exists on Napoleonic Wars, there remain important gaps and misconceptions in our understanding both of wars themselves and of context in which they were fought. Probably most significant of these gaps and misconceptions concern Russia's role in international relations (including, of course, wars) of Napoleonic era, which is very imperfectly understood both in Russia and in the (1) Some reasons for misunderstanding are specific to Russian or Western historians: in other respects, however, Russian and Western scholarship on era shares similar weaknesses. In this article I look first at Western and then at Russian writing on Russia's role in Napoleon's downfall. I seek to explain why Russia's part in collapse of Napoleon's empire has been misunderstood and underestimated both in Russia and West. I also point to ways in which this has distorted a realistic and balanced understanding of defeat of Napoleon both in Russia and abroad. Given manner in which wars of this era were mobilized by nationalist mythmakers, it is perhaps not surprising that enormous Russian contribution to destruction of Napoleon's empire should have been played down by British, French, and German historians. A more interesting problem is why Russian historians have also contributed to this underestimation of their own country's efforts. This article points finger, above all, at Russian obsession with military operations in 1812, which existed before 1917 Revolution but grew even stronger in Soviet era. The reverse side of this obsession was that Russian historians largely ignored events of 1813-14. Not merely did this do no justice to immense military-operational and logistical efforts of Russian state and army in those years, it also seriously distorted understanding even of Russian strategy in 1812. Inevitably, it also allowed British, French, and German historians free rein to interpret Napoleon's overthrow in manner best suited to serve their own national myths and historiographical traditions. The fundamental purpose of this article is therefore twofold. As regards Western historiography, its aim is to bring Russia back into center of picture, where it belongs. Meanwhile, article seeks to alert Russian historians to importance of 1813-14 as a time not just when tsarist state and army overcame enormous challenges with exceptional skill, but also when Russia made an immense contribution to European peace and stability, to which Russian empire's own security was inseparably linked. In West, very few academics have ever written on Russian military or even diplomatic history in Napoleonic era. (2) one important reason for this is lack of access to Russian military and diplomatic archives until 1990s. (3) Although much memoir material and many volumes of official military (4) and diplomatic (5) documents were published in both tsarist and Soviet eras, there remain key aspects of Russia's role in Napoleonic Wars which can be understood only through extensive research in Russian military archives. Above all, this is true if one attempts to move away from traditional narrow focus of Russian historiography on military operations in 1812. For example, it would be difficult to write convincingly on crucial issues such as mobilization of Russian rear, logistics, formation of reserve forces, or even military operations in 1813-14 without using Russian archival sources. At least as important, however, is fact that military history, and above all history of military operations, has been very unfashionable in Western universities in recent decades. Diplomatic history is only slightly less marginalized. (6) In addition, post-1945 Western scholarship on (3) Access to archives is again becoming a problem, with key archival buildings closing and their holdings awaiting relocation. …
- Research Article
10
- 10.1111/1467-9256.12026
- Aug 27, 2013
- Politics
Russian political elites have long been aware of the power of myths to forge national unity. However, the past six or seven years have seen core myths increasingly situated within a highly selective narrative of Russian history. This narrative is accepted as contextual information for policy discussion, and so sets cognitive parameters for evaluations of Russia's history, identity and role. This standard narrative of Russian history prioritises the state, supports gradualism and continuity, and dramatically reduces the potential for re-conceptualising Russia's role in contemporary international relations.
- Research Article
8
- 10.11610/connections.11.2.05
- Jan 1, 2012
- Connections: The Quarterly Journal
IntroductionRussia Has Lost its Army. This headline of an editorial published on the global defense and military portal DefenceTalk in October 2003 gives proof of the perception of the Russian military leadership at the beginning of the twenty-first century.1 The developments after the collapse of the Soviet Union led to multiple efforts to reform the Russian armed forces. In the early 1990s, former Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev initiated a number of military reforms, but met heavy resistance within the Russian officer corps (still strongly influenced by the Soviet era) who were trying to preserve their system and positions.2 Most of the additional reform efforts of the last twenty years - which were mostly limited to downsizing manpower and equipment, without addressing the larger military system and organizational structure - failed to achieve the goal of a restructured modern Russian military. This led the Russian military journalist Alexander Goltz to publish a book in 2004 titled The Army of Russia: 11 Lost Years, in which he concludes that between 1993 and 2004 the military reforms that were carried out in had no meaningful results.3 In response to the lack of progress in armed forces reform, the newly appointed civilian Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov introduced the so-called Look on 23 February 2008. Will the Look reforms lead to the reappearance of the Red Star, the symbol of the former Soviet Army? What are the possible implications of such a resurgence for NATO? To understand the imperatives behind Serdyukov' s Look, it is necessary to understand Russia's national interests, as every government will calculate their military reforms based on their perceived national interests, as well as on identified threats and risks.Key Aspects of Russian Foreign PolicySince the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia's national interests have remained basically unchanged, with one exception. The importance of economic prosperity with respect to oil, natural gas, and other extractive resources has risen considerably, as this wealth is perceived as the foundation of any Russian attempt to tackle existing and future domestic challenges, as well as a way back to gaining dominance in Russia's socalled abroad.4 Russia's traditional national interests, which are stated in the July 2008 Foreign Policy Concept and the 2009 National Security Strategy, include bolstering demographic health and security as well as maintaining security on its borders and within the near abroad. Additionally, wants to ensure that it remains the primary actor in the region, especially in Central Asia.5 The more recently published Military of February 2010 refers to the importance of the abroad and underlines Russian concerns about NATO encroachment in this region. To ensure its regional dominance and to protect Russian interests, the Russian armed forces might be used operationally outside Russia unilaterally, according to this doctrine.6 seems also to be more willing to deploy their forces within the arrangements of the Collective Security Treaty Organization.7 Russia's national interests and their translation into the New Military Doctrine as well as the ongoing focus on the abroad have to be considered when analyzing any efforts to reform Russia's military.After the Collapse of the Red Army: Russian Forces at the Beginning of the Twenty-first CenturyNot since 1941 has the Russian military stood as perilously close to ruin as it does now, stated Dr. Alexei Arbatov, the Deputy Chairman of the Defense Committee in the Duma in 1998.8 At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the Russian armed forces - which inherited the larger part of the Soviet Red Army in terms of soldiers and equipment - still struggled with a heritage that relied heavily on the mentality of the Soviet era and with the legacy of outdated equipment. The first review of Russia's military doctrine, carried out in 1993, was largely unsuccessful in organizing the Russian forces and in changing the old Soviet military mentality; Russian forces were spread out all over the expansive area of the former Soviet Union, with a lack of general strategy and organization. …
- Research Article
- 10.1353/see.2005.0075
- Jul 1, 2005
- Slavonic and East European Review
REVIEWS 549 transformationprocess in his chosen countries,which have been well chosen to illustrate the variety of approaches and experiences common to several more countries at that time. The reader is able to read across the chronicle and see the effectof each decision, largeor small,in the widerframework. Betz is also correct in emphasizing the value of interviews and personal comment in evaluating the process in each country. The fundamentalpolicy documents and institutionswhose various incarnationshe charts,quotes and footnotes extensively -which future historiansand analystswill find a very valuable resource - are often so bland that only their rapid creation from tabulaerasaeis remarkable. What is utterly invaluable is the way Betz accompanies this blandness with the trenchant views of those who were instrumentalin theircreation- views about content and function, and what the realissueswere. Insightslikethese are often lost to posterity,or ignoredby foreignresearcherspreoccupiedwith formand processratherthan power and substance. For this very reason Betz's book should be required reading for political scientists. Apart from occasional lapses in orthography,my only criticismis that the book does not cover as much as it could. Fuller treatment of two areas in particularwould have made Betz'streatmentexemplaryratherthan outstanding . First,given the degree of ignoranceof militarymattersin the 'civil'halfof the equation, I would have welcomed a discussionof the role (orfailure)of the media in enhancing mutualunderstanding. Secondly, as evidenced by the Russian military'sweak grasp of the new political processes (see p. I39 and footnote 107, P. I83), there could be more on the extent to which the militarythemselves adopted a new interfacewith the general population, as opposed to the political leadership and aspiring bureaucrats.Chronicling their defence of the need for conscription, or their dealswith local bigwigswould have rounded out the social dimension of civilmilitaryrelations . But these are minor quibbles. Betz has done us a great service in floodlighting and fixing an evanescent period in the democratization of GreaterEurope.Both futurehistoriansand those facedwith similardilemmas will have reasonto thankhim. Conflict Studies Research Centre ANNE C. ALDIS UKDefence Academy, Camberley Primakov,Yevgeny M. A World Challenged: Fighting Terrorism in theTwenty-First Centugy. The Nixon Center and BrookingsInstitutionPress,Washington D.C., 2004. viii + I50 pp. Notes. Index. Li6.50: $22.95. TERRORISM has emerged as the key security threat facing the international community in the early twenty-firstcentury, and the challenge it presents to governmentsas they seekto formulatecoherent and effectiveresponsesto the evolving terroristthreathas a particularresonance in Russia. Its decade-long conflict in Chechnya is perceived within Russia's security elites as part of a counter-terroristoperation and PresidentVladimir Putin believes it involves high stakes: the very survival of the territorial integrity of the Russian 550 SEER, 83, 3, 2005 Federation. Primikov is uniquely placed to offer an analysis of the subject, drawing as he does on his life-long experience of the Middle East and his inside knowledge of Russian intelligence as a formerhead of Russia'sForeign Intelligence Service (SVR) as well as his political appointments as foreign minister and prime minister under Boris El'tsinin the i990s, which he does with greatskilland academic care. The book itselfis divided into seven chapters:'Terrorism:A TerribleForce Unleashed in the World';'The Aggressionof Islam:Truthor Fiction?';'Peace in the Middle East:A New Approach is Needed'; 'The U.S. War on Terror'; Centers of Power: One or Many?'; 'Lessons For All'; 'Russia's Role in the ContemporaryWorld'.Primakovexplores the development of militant Islam as an unstableand growingfactorin the post-Cold Warsecurityorder,noting en route some uncomfortableaspectssuch as the role of the CIA in helpingto fosterthese elements during the Soviet-AfghanWar of I979-89. He explains that after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan militant Islamic groups began perceiving the US as their main adversary, making inevitable the targetingof the US by such terroristgroups.Ideas on co-operation in the War on Terror are mooted, such as the need to share intelligence on terrorist organizations and their members. For Primakov, enhanced intelligence sharing is one of the key lessons that must be learned from the events of I I September 200I. A recurringtheme throughout the work, which supplies the backdrop to many aspects of Russian thinking on counter-terrorism,relates to the shifts that have occurred since the end of the Cold War away...
- Research Article
2
- 10.5604/01.3001.0054.2238
- Dec 17, 2023
- Security Dimensions
The article focuses on the security of the eastern flank countries in the light of Russia's military operations in Ukraine, including: the security of the eastern flank in respect of military operations in Ukraine, Western efforts to secure the eastern flank, the challenges for the security of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in relation to refugees and migration. In the search for an answer to the question: What impact does Russia's military operations in Ukraine have on the security of the eastern flank countries? the literature on the subject was studied, Russian normative acts were analysed and official statements of experts in the media were quoted, as well as the views of specialists dealing with the security issues of the countries of this region. Directions of actions improving the security of these countries were presented. The results of the conducted research indicate that the eastern flank countries alone would not be able to repel a possible Russian aggression against any of these countries at the current stage of modernization of their armies. Only close cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the deployment of more American troops on the territory of the eastern flank countries guarantee security. The content cited in the article aims to update opinions on the level of security of the eastern flank countries.
- Single Book
24
- 10.1017/cbo9780511845598
- Apr 1, 2010
The history of ideas has played a central role in Russia's political and social history. Understanding its intellectual tradition and the way the intelligentsia have shaped the nation is crucial to understanding the Russia of today. This history examines important intellectual and cultural currents (the Enlightenment, nationalism, nihilism, and religious revival) and key themes (conceptions of the West and East, the common people, and attitudes to capitalism and natural science) in Russian intellectual history. Concentrating on the Golden Age of Russian thought in the mid-nineteenth century, the contributors also look back to its eighteenth-century origins in the flowering of culture following the reign of Peter the Great, and forward to the continuing vitality of Russia's classical intellectual tradition in the Soviet and post-Soviet eras. With brief biographical details of over fifty key thinkers and an extensive bibliography, this book provides a fresh, comprehensive overview of Russian intellectual history.
- Research Article
- 10.1353/see.2016.0139
- Jul 1, 2016
- Slavonic and East European Review
SEER, 94, 3, july 2016 554 his religious feeling is certainly evident, but he also comes across in this volume as a man capable of independent thought, rather than a blinkered reactionary. The impression is one of considerable military competence, coupled with an increasingly subtle political sensibility; the latter was also evident in his cautious role in the civil war period, and in the emigration. This is a valuable and balanced study which increases our knowledge of a dead end in Russian history. It is well researched using archives in the Russian Federation, the United States and elsewhere, in addition to a wealth of published documents and memoir material. The text is supported by sixty pages of valuable endnotes, and accompanied by maps and photographs. University of Glasgow Evan Mawdsley Kowalsky, Sharon A. Deviant Women: Female Crime and Criminology in Revolutionary Russia, 1880–1930. Northern Illinois University Press, Dekalb, IL, 2009. xii + 314 pp. Tables. Notes. Selected bibliography. Index. $42.00. This is a book of two halves. The first is dedicated to a history of Russian and Soviet criminology, tracing the development of the field from the late Imperial period into the early years of the Soviet regime. Sharon A. Kowalsky traces the evolution of various schools of thought regarding criminality, discussing European influences, as well as Russian-specific intellectual perspectives. She also outlines the establishment of the institutions of criminology and the professionalization of this field of study. The second half is devoted to a series of case studies in which Kowalsky explores the way in which Russian and Soviet criminology was applied to understand and punish particular crimes including prostitution, illicit alcohol production and infanticide. Crossing the revolutions of 1917 and the crises of the Civil War years, the case studies make clear the continuities in explanations for women’s criminality, as well as highlight the ways in which these theories were adapted to suit the new political regime and the changed gender relations it sought to foster. The central thread of the book which unites both halves is the analysis of the gendered perspective which criminologists took towards female criminality. At its heart, women’s biology was used to explain both the low levels of women’s crimes, but also the nature of crimes which they did commit. Women were viewed as the weaker sex, physically, mentally and morally, due to their experiences of menstruation, pregnancy, child birth and menopause, and to the fact that their biological role as bearers of children confined them REVIEWS 555 to the domestic realm. As a result, it was argued, women did not experience the struggles of the public domain which led men into criminal behaviour. On the other hand, that very domesticity meant they were most likely to commit crimes against their family or crimes which could be conducted in the household, like illicit alcohol production. If women were removed from that domestic sphere by circumstances, they were more prey to the influence of other criminals, but once again most likely to commit crimes related to their sexuality, like prostitution. Kowalsky demonstrates how such expectations of women’s criminality continued into the Soviet era, but were over-layered with socialist theory and expressed in the language of the new regime. Prostitution was understood as a crime born of the last vestiges of the old economic system and, after the Civil War, of the capitalistic elements of the New Economic Policy. Illicit alcohol production was framed as a rural crime committed by backward peasant women who, due to their biological and gender-related frailties, had not embraced socialism. The rural nature of this crime remained even if committed by women living in urban areas, the assumption being that they were new arrivals in the cities who had yet to integrate fully into socialist modernity. Similarly, given the new laws outlawing illegitimacy and legalizing abortion, criminologists viewed women resorting to infanticide as tending to still adhere to the now obsolete moral code of Imperial Russia. Women’s backwardness and their criminality were so conflated in the minds of criminologists that they actually viewed positively any diversification of women’s crime from the ‘domestic’ to the more ‘general’, that is to the...
- Research Article
- 10.1080/00182370.2021.1999049
- Jul 3, 2021
- The Historian
Since the late nineteenth century, the landscapist Isaak Levitan (1860–1900) has been praised for his ability to convey the Russian countryside’s beauty and mood. Throughout the czarist and Soviet eras, Levitan remained respected and often admired, and in post-Soviet Russia, Levitan is considered one of Russia’s foremost landscapists. Although Levitan has remained an important figure in Russian cultural history, he is somewhat understudied in the English-speaking world. Moreover, scholars who have discussed Levitan in English- and Russian-language publications have situated him within the context of a specific timeframe, such as late-Imperial Russia or the Soviet era. In order to gain insight into the reasons for the continuous respect and appreciation for Levitan amid Russia’s changing political dynamics, my examination focuses upon the writings of art critics and historians in late-czarist/imperial Russia (1890–1917), communist Russia/Soviet Union (1917–1991), and post-Soviet Russia (1991-Present). Specifically, my inquiry expands upon existing research 1) through an analysis of scholars’ perceptions of the Russian Realists’ (the Itinerants) and Western European artists’ influence upon Levitan, and 2) through an exploration of the varying interpretations of two of his most famous paintings, Tikhaia obitel (Quiet Monastery) (1890) and Nad vechnym pokoem (Above Eternal Peace) (1894). Through a study of these two topics, my article demonstrates that writings from scholars in the late-czarist, Soviet and post-Soviet eras reflect prominent political ideas and ideological beliefs within these three eras, and that these scholars’ interpretations emphasize aspects that have defined and that currently accent Russia’s distinct character.
- Book Chapter
- 10.7765/9781526164643.00011
- Apr 26, 2022
Soviet military planners divided the world into continental and oceanic “theatres of military action” (teatri voennykh deistvii (TVDs)). These TVDs allowed the Soviet General Staff to take a regional approach to the consideration of the military geography, or the political, military, economic, physical-geographical, and cultural variables essential for military planning. Due to technological advances first observed in the 1991 Desert Storm operation and its aftermath, Russian military thinkers began developing theories about what impact these technological advances would have on regional TVDs, and even the possibility of global TVDs. Although the Russian military was in dire straits after the collapse of the Soviet Union, its fortunes have significantly improved under the reign of Vladimir Putin, as the Russian military now has the capabilities to begin implementing these theories. The Russian military is now thinking and planning in terms of globally integrated operations and uses terminology such as “aerospace TVD” and “informational TVD”. These new global TVDs have not displaced the regional TVD concept, but rather these systems appear to complement one another. This chapter outlines the TVD concept in the Soviet era, discusses the implications of Vladimir Slipchenko’s view of the changing character of war on the TVD concept, and argues that technological developments and thinking about global TVDs are driving changes in Russian force design and capability development.
- Research Article
1
- 10.31862/1819-463x-2020-5-67-73
- Jan 1, 2020
- Science and School
The article considers the role of educational concepts as a tool for improving the quality of Russian education. The stages of the development of the Concept of the academic subject „History” are highlighted, starting with the appearance of the Concept of a new educational and methodological complex on Russian history, which includes the Historical and Cultural Standard (2014). The reasons for the separation of two educational courses („History of Russia” and „General History”), which make up a single academic subject „History” at the level of basic documents, are analyzed. The author considers and substantiates the need for a unified concept of school history education in the Russian Federation: general scientific-historical, didactic, methodological approaches; the role of Russia in key events in world history, the importance of Russian culture: through the general historical context; using the educational potential of history, etc. The question is raised about the expediency of developing a holistic concept of school history education, which would include the following structural and thematic units: the course „History of Russia”, the course „General history”, the regional component on history education, the system of additional history education.
- Research Article
- 10.1353/jmh.2006.0097
- Apr 1, 2006
- The Journal of Military History
Reviewed by: The Russian Officer Corps in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, 1792–1815 Jonathan Grant The Russian Officer Corps in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, 1792–1815. By Alexander Mikaberidze. El Dorado Hills, Calif.: Savas Beatie, 2005. ISBN 1-932714-02-2. Illustrations. Tables. Charts. Bibliography. Pp. lxvi, 480. $64.95. While many thousands of volumes have been written detailing the wars of the French Revolution and Napoleonic eras, the Russian army has not been as thoroughly studied in the Western language scholarship. Alexander Mikaberidze seeks to help fill this void by presenting a much-needed reference work on the tsarist officer corps of the period. The book consists of two parts. First, the author provides an essay giving an overview of the officer corps. Here he paints a collective portrait of the corps from the time of Peter the Great through 1815. Using very effective tables and charts, the essay tracks officer origins, enlistment, promotions, literacy, and education. The economic and social dimensions, such as serf and estate ownership, noble status, and national composition, also receive due attention. Finally, the essay concludes with explanations of ranks and military orders. Out of this collective portrait, the author finds that by 1812, despite being overwhelmingly noble in social origins (86.5 percent), 77 percent of Russian officers owned neither property nor serfs, and almost all foreign officers held no assets within Russia and depended on their salaries to sustain themselves. The author also finds that by the 1812 campaign the tsarist officer corps had become dominated by Russian nobility (1,579 Russian nobles compared to [End Page 504] only 45 foreign nobles). The second part, which comprises the bulk of the volume, consists of over eight hundred biographies of junior and senior officers. Entries address all the generals, many colonels, and even some lieutenants. Beginning with Andrey Ivanovich Abakumov and concluding with Peter Yakolevich Zykov, each officer's origins, education, and military career are systematically detailed. This work represents a significant scholarly contribution to the field of Napoleonic studies generally and Russian history specifically. Russian specialists and general Europeanists will benefit from the information that Mikaberidze has judiciously culled from the files of the Russian State Military Historical Archive. The entries, ranging from a single paragraph to several pages, are concisely written and highly informative. The author has put at our fingertips an easily accessible encyclopedia, and in the process has accomplished his mission of bringing the Russian army out of the shadows and into the light of mainstream western scholarship. Jonathan Grant Florida State University Tallahassee, Florida Copyright © 2006 Society for Military History
- Research Article
- 10.15826/qr.2025.2.976
- Jun 29, 2025
- Quaestio Rossica
The role of Soviet women in achieving the victory of the Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War against Nazi Germany and its allies is a topic with a long historiographical tradition. In the latest studies carried out by both Russian historians (including late Soviet ones) and historians from other countries, this topic is considered in the mainstream of several major trends. One of them is related to the issues of economic history. Along with teenagers and elderly people, women became the most important labor resource during the war, massively replacing men of working age who went to the front. Their participation in the staffing of all sectors of the Soviet state economy is an unprecedented example of the implementation of one of the models of the mobilization economy caused by the war. But this gives rise to another trend: due to what, by what methods was it possible to carry out a mass mobilization of female labor? The classical version of Soviet historiography unambiguously characterized this process as a labor feat based on a high and nationwide sense of patriotism. Some post-Soviet and many Western historians see it primarily as a result of Soviet propaganda and state coercion. Finally, the position of women in production during the Great Patriotic War, their working and living conditions are considered in the context of the “new social history”, i. e. the history of everyday life, gender history, etc. Based on statistical indicators, this article summarizes the empirical material proving that Soviet women, in fact, for the first time in the world, turned out to be a determining force in meeting the needs of the military economy. Their labor achievements, material support for the front through the Defense Fund, and the donor movement were mainly the result of a sincere and selfless desire. It was caused by hatred of the enemy and the desire to support the fighting men, which, among other things, reconciled them with the strict labor legislation and difficult working and living conditions inevitable in the conditions of total war.
- Research Article
- 10.1017/s0025727300006268
- Jan 1, 2011
- Medical History
Matthew P. Romaniello and Tricia Starks (eds), Tobacco in Russian History and Culture from the Seventeenth Century to the Present, Routledge Studies in Cultural History, No. 10 (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), pp. X + 295, £60.00, hardback, ISBN: 978-0-415-99655-6. - Volume 55 Issue 1
- Research Article
1
- 10.37547/tajssei/volume02issue12-07
- Dec 11, 2020
- The American Journal of Social Science and Education Innovations
This article gives full information on representation of applying the method of oral history in Russian history. The practical application of this method in historical researches was discussed in detail by Russian historians in scientific seminars in the last years of the Soviet Union. Therefore it is logical to include some scientific works created during the Soviet era in categorizing the researches on oral history in Russia. So, our aim is to discuss the method of oral history in Russian researches.
- Research Article
4
- 10.12737/2587-6295-2022-6-1-85-97
- Apr 1, 2022
- Journal of Political Research
The article is devoted to the results of a sociological survey of participants in the international scientific conference of students and graduate students «Young people's view of the Soviet era: between the prospects of new identities and the challenges of memory wars », organized by the Faculty of History, Political Science and Law of the Moscow Region State University on October 27, 2021. The main methodological optics were the principles sociological survey. The survey was aimed at studying the attitude of modern Russian youth towards the Soviet era. A feature of the sociological study was the high educational level of young people, a deeper knowledge and involvement of respondents in the history of Russia. It is indicated that wars of memory in the post-Soviet space arise precisely because of different interpretations of the history of the Second World War and the Great Patriotic War. The theoretical contribution of the work lies in the fact that the analysis of scientific literature has shown that the wars of memory, their chronology are closely dependent on the characteristics of the processes and stages of the formation of new post-Soviet identities. The conclusions note that in relation to the younger generations to the Soviet era, in the assessment of its figures and events, there are significant changes in comparison with previous periods. The Soviet era as a whole receives more positive assessments, there is a rethinking of the assessment of its leaders. The results of the study allow us to form an idea of today's assessments of the young generations of the Soviet past, trends in the information field that shape the interpretation of history and influence the current processes of identification.
- Research Article
3
- 10.5617/ao.4839
- Jan 1, 1970
- Acta Orientalia
Afanisy Nikitin (? - 1472) as a Russian merchant from Tver, a city not far from Moscow. Nikitin visited India in 1446-1472 and described his travels in a short travelogue known as The Journey Beyond Three Seas The story was first discovered in a monastary by Nikolai Karamzin, one of the leading historians of 10th century Russia; and since that time. Journey has fascinated both Russian and Western historians as well as political-thinkers who envisage Russia's special role in Asia. In fact, a bibliography of Journey exists in the Western and RUssian languages. What is the significance of The Journey Beyond Three Seas?