Abstract
A photon-number-splitting (PNS) attack against differential-phase-shift (DPS) quantum key distribution (QKD) is described. In the conventional 1984 Bennett-Brassard protocol, using weak laser light, the PNS attacks, which involve installing a lossless transmission line and blocking pulses from which extra photons cannot be picked up, impose a limit on the transmission distance. In contrast, use of a coherent pulse train in DPS QKD prevents the PNS attack and removes the distance limitation imposed by it. We carried out a DPS QKD experiment that simulated the situation where some pulses are blocked. The result showed that extra bit errors are induced in an eavesdropped condition, indicating the robustness of DPS QKD against PNS attacks.
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