Ritual and Religion in the Xunzi ed. by T. C. Kline III, Justin Tiwald (review)

Abstract

T. C. KLINE III and JUSTIN TIWALD, eds., Ritual and Religion in the Xunzi. SUNY Series in Chinese Philosophy and Culture. Albany: SUNY Press, 2014. ix. 197 pp. US$80 (hb). ISBN 978-1-4384-5195-4 The unprecedented Western interest in the Chinese philosopher Xunzi 荀子 (third century BC) advances apace. Ritual and Religion in the Xunzi, a volume edited by T. C. Kline III and Justin Tiwald, with chapters by six other contributors (all white males, I could not help noticing), testifies to Xunzi’s continuing appeal to Western philosophers. The book addresses the question of whether Xunzi’s works fit usefully within the paradigm of religion. As one could surmise from the title, the contributors answer in the affirmative. The understanding of Xunzi’s relevance that all the contributors share (if I am interpreting them correctly) is most clearly stated by Kline himself (“Sheltering under the Sacred Canopy: Peter Berger and Xunzi,” pp. 159–78): Imagine a village full of discouraged, drought-weary, and hungry people. The rain sacrifice is performed. All of the villagers gather as the leaders of the village present offerings at the altar and ask the spirits to send down rain and relieve their suffering. The ritual expresses the community’s hopes and fears. It brings them together in a forum that allows such feelings to be publicly expressed and shared. This shared expression helps alleviate the individual despair and fear of the present dire situation and focuses the community’s attention and energy on their shared future prospects. The ritual sustains order and “humane culture” in an otherwise chaotic, disruptive, and debilitating situation. (p. 166) Kline presents this restatement of Xunzi’s conception of ritual in the course of a comparison with Peter Berger’s theory of “the sacred canopy.” While Xunzi is most famous for debunking the credulous notion that rain-making rituals truly bring about rain, it would be a mistake, according to Kline, to overlook a more subtle argument: “he strongly implies that these religious rituals play a critical role in human flourishing” (ibid.). One might object that Kline has loaded the dice by inserting the word “religious” before “rituals”—Xunzi calls them li 禮, not “religious li”—but otherwise the interpretation is well-founded. A. R. Radcliffe-Brown8 and Robert F. Campany9 published similar versions of this thesis, identifying Xunzi as an early Chinese antecedent of Émile Durkheim. Yet James Robson (“Ritual and Tradition in Xunzi and Dōgen,” pp. 135–157) shows that Xunzi differs from Durkheim in two important respects. First, rituals “do not necessarily always entail ecstatic rites and may be extended to the quotidian aspects of ordinary or everydaylife”(p. 140);10 second,whereasDurkheim theorized thatritualsbring about social cohesion by breaking down distinctions among the participants, Xunzi’s rituals 8 Structure and Function in Primitive Society: Essays and Addresses (New York: Free Press, 1968), 153–177. 9 “Xunzi and Durkheim as Theorists of Ritual Practice,” in Discourse and Practice, ed. Frank Reynolds and David Tracy (Albany: SUNY Press, 1992), 197–231. 10 I suggested similar limitations in Rituals of the Way: The Philosophy of Xunzi (Chicago and La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1999), 64f. 102 BOOK REVIEWS always establishand enforce socialdistinctions,especiallyhierarchies. This may partly explain why Kline finds Berger a more suitable Western analogue. The contributors also share a judicious interpretation of the role of ritual in Xunzi’s moral philosophy.11 Lee H. Yearley (“Xunzi: Ritualization as Humanization ,” pp. 81–106) summarizes it aptly: Defensible religious rituals do something extremely important: They modify emotions, especially those powerful emotions that certain kinds of situations generate. These modifications ensure that such emotions do not disturb the self’s equilibrium and proper functioning. Moreover, these modifications allow for the nurture of specific religious emotions by giving them an ordered space in which to develop. (p. 92) Here, too, one might charge Yearley with the fallacy of persuasive definition12 by translating li as “religious rituals” rather than simply “rituals.” Yet once again the argument is sound: by emphasizing the role of ritual in both moderating emotion and fostering development, Yearley’s account surpasses certain inferior analyses that treat ritual as little more than a system for regulating...