Abstract
This paper examines riskating by candidates competing for political office. It demonstrates that risky strategies may be chosen even if voters are risk averse. Candidates seek to maximize their chances of electoral victory but are uncertain about the way political strategies translate into votes. The analysis begins with two-candidate plurality rule races. In selecting among options with the same expected vote share, the favorite takes as few chances as possible while the underdog selects the highest risk option. There is a ‘knife-edge’ at 50 per cent of the expected vote where a candidate shifts from the most risky to the most cautious strategy. The paper then contrasts this result with risktaking under other voting rules. The ‘knife-edge’ remains under supermajorities, appears in modified form in plurality rule with more than two candidates and in approval voting, and disappears under some forms of proportional representation.
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