Abstract

Using a unique database of 87 Tunisian non-financial firms over the period 1998–2014, we analyse risk-taking behaviour of family firms. We find evidence that family ownership is positively related to corporate risk-taking. But family firms undertake less risky projects when the manager is not a member of the family or when the founder is no longer active in the firm. Our results show also that in these cases, family ownership becomes negatively associated to risk-taking. Finally, we find that family firms take more risk only when they belong to diversified groups, especially those operating in several industries.

Highlights

  • Business plays an important role in the economy, especially in emerging markets where this type of firms is prevalent

  • Most empirical studies examining this feature predict that risk-taking in family firms is higher when the founder is still active in the firm

  • Most empirical studies examining the relationship between the presence of founding family and firm performance conclude that family ownership creates value only when the founder is still active in the firm, either as a CEO or a chairman with a hired CEO (Villalonga and Amit, 2006; Muttakin et al, 2014)

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Summary

Introduction

Business plays an important role in the economy, especially in emerging markets where this type of firms is prevalent. Another set of papers content that family-firms are more long term oriented and invest more in risky projects such as R&D and innovative investments They are assumed to undergo lower agency conflicts between managers and shareholders (Zahra, 2005; Nguyen, 2011; Schmid et al, 2014). In this paper, we examine whether risk-taking behaviour of Tunisian family firms may be affected by their affiliation to a group and by the degree of the diversification inside their groups Another stream of research focuses on the effect of governance characteristics in family firms such as family management and the active role of the founder. We contribute to the literature on corporate governance characteristics of family firms by documenting how risk-taking behaviour may change when the founder is no longer active in the firm or the manager is not a member of the family.

Risk-taking in family firms
Family management
The active role of the founder
Sample
Risk-taking
Family ownership
Group affiliation
Family firm characteristics
Control variables
Descriptive statistics
Univariate analysis
Multivariate analysis
The impact of family ownership on risk-taking
Group affiliation and risk-taking in family firms
Firm governance characteristics and risk-taking in family firms
Alternative measures of corporate risk-taking
Alternative measures of profitability and firm size
Alternative sample excluding the after-revolution period
Additional control variables
Findings
Conclusions
Full Text
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