Risk and Routine Courage on Ukraine´s Battlefield

Electronic Warfare capability has proven its value on the battlefields of Ukraine on a scale hitherto never seen. This applies to air, naval and land warfare, as well as to operations in the space, cyber and information domains. Information superiority has proven its worth once again, even on a tactical level using distributed EW. One contributing factor is the rapid technology development cycle which has enabled both sides to use uncrewed or even autonomous vehicles with assorted EW payloads, for example repeaters for increased range for remote sensing and communications as well as jammers. Against this background it is relevant to raise the question how the current rapid development will manifest itself in future warfare and what the limiting and enabling factors will be when aiming to beat the opponent in achieving the best inventive EW solutions. This paper aims to explore a consolidated, open source based view on lessons learned from Ukraine concerning Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations and their implications on tactics and operations in contemporary warfare. From this standpoint, the purpose of this paper is to describe challenges and opportunities in future warfare, based on observations in Ukraine and applied to an Arctic context. The method applied is a survey of the field, with the addition of a military contextual analysis and prognosis. The basis is a thematic overview using open source information sources, primarily originating from the Swedish Armed Forces, The Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) and the Swedish Defence Materiel Administration (FMV). Thereby this paper largely rests on information from three independent Swedish defence agencies. From observing the ongoing war in Ukraine this paper concludes that the current operational environment is under rapid and constant change, and the experiences made are vital to understanding the dynamic nature of contemporary and future warfare. The question is which factors will be the game changers, and therefore the most valuable lessons, if applied to combat operations in the Arctic?

The current war in Ukraine has drawn public attention to the treatment of war injuries. Follow-up treatment in Germany is portrayed the clover leaf of the TraumaNetzwerke DGU, is largely based on the demands of the Federal Ministries for Defence and Health and is intended to enhance resilience in war.The present article presents the special features of the care of severely injured patients during hostilities and should provide insights into the expected results of treatment and the actual procedures. We emphasise the unpredictability of the care of the severely injured during hostilities.On the basis of a search of the literature for the deployment of the German Army in Afghanistan and for the current war in Ukraine, we present the challenges and the typical patterns of injuries. We discuss the factors that can influence the procedures and the quality of the results during hostilities and how these may differ from civil polytrauma care in Germany - which is well established and standardised.Even during deployment of the Federal Army or (as planned) NATO, care of the severely injured is under standardised conditions, as based on the algorithmic ATLS care and which is concentrated on bleeding control. The corresponding equipment and personnel are well established, well prepared and well trained.However, there may be special local conditions or special deployments that make it inevitable that emergency medical care will be more delayed than in the civil system in Germany and can only take place after protracted transport. The objective is always that soldiers in combat should be able to receive medical care that is equivalent to that received by all accident victims in Germany, whatever the time and site of the accident.

Southeast Asian States Have Their Own Views on the Ukraine War Jeffrey Reeves (bio) Just as Southeast Asia has emerged as the center of gravity for the countries of the global West's respective Indo-Pacific strategies, so too has the region become a priority area for Western diplomacy on the Russia-Ukraine war. Since the start of the conflict, the United States, in particular, has lobbied Southeast Asian states and the secretariat of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to condemn Russia's aggression and to comply with Western sanctions against Moscow. In May 2022, for example, the Biden administration raised the Ukraine war in discussions with Southeast Asian leaders at their summit in Washington and tried to insert language in a joint U.S.-ASEAN vision statement criticizing Russia's militarism, ultimately having to settle instead for more vague language on support for territorial sovereignty and international law.1 Similarly, in 2022, the entire Western cohort of the G-20 pressured then host Indonesia to include language criticizing Russia's invasion in the group's joint statement. According to one European sous-sherpa involved in the statement's drafting, China and India also partially supported this language, which therefore made it possible to include.2 In at least one instance, however, European leaders were unable to bring their Southeast Asian counterparts on side with their criticism of Russia. In a December 2022 joint statement following an EU-ASEAN summit, negotiators failed to draft a common critique of Russia's actions.3 Neither have Western leaders had much success in securing Southeast Asian state support in condemnation of the war at the bilateral level, aside from Singapore, which is unique in the region for its relative acceptance [End Page 55] of Western views on the Ukraine war. Indeed, for all the West's efforts to propagate a distinctly critical narrative of Russia in Southeast Asia, regional media, scholarship, and leadership remain either noncommittal to the idea of Russian censure or sympathetic to what they perceive as Russia's strategic logic. As the Ukraine war passed its one-year anniversary in February 2023, Southeast Asian states were decidedly less interested in the war and in criticizing Russia than before. Although in a March 2022 UN General Assembly resolution eight ASEAN members voted to condemn Russia (Vietnam and Laos abstained), polling now shows that Southeast Asian states lead the world in their disinterest toward the war.4 Large majorities of the public in Thailand (60%) and Malaysia (56%) and sizable numbers in Singapore (44%) and Indonesia (48%) believe that the war is not their business and that their states should not interfere.5 Far from being a region that is sympathetic to Western narratives on the Ukraine war, Southeast Asia stands out for its perceived detachment from the conflict. How can one explain Southeast Asian states' apathy toward the war at a time that stands out in many ways as a high-water mark for Western states' attention? While the diversity within and between Southeast Asian states makes it nearly impossible to answer this question comprehensively in short form, there are several trends and characteristics across the region that provide some degree of insight. First, there is a clear lack of consensus on the origins, strategic direction, and global impact of the Russia-Ukraine war among Southeast Asian states and within ASEAN. Second, most Southeast Asian states remain open to and interested in maintaining economic, political, and social ties with Russia despite Western pressure to limit or restrict engagement. Third, Southeast Asian states are, in general, more cynical about Western intentions toward the war than other states, particularly with respect to Washington's proclivity to use the conflict to justify the further isolation of China and NATO's attempt to use the conflict to expand its influence in Asia. In this essay, the author will draw on polling data, official statements, media, and scholarship from across Southeast Asia to detail regional states' contemporary views on the Ukraine war and demonstrate that Southeast Asian states are generally less concerned about Russia's invasion [End Page 56] of Ukraine than their European and North American counterparts, more critical of the war's...

The United States is the most important external guarantor of Poland’s security. For this reason, the Polish authorities have been seeking the closest possible allied relations with the USA for years, including its military presence on Polish territory. The outbreak of a full-scale war in Ukraine confirmed that the threat from Russia still exists and that it is necessary to increase deterrence and defense on NATO’s eastern flank. The aim of this article is to analyze and assess the possibility of locating a permanent base of the US Armed Forces in Poland in the context of the war in Ukraine. The hypothesis assumes that with the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the chance of permanent US military stationing in Poland has increased. We are currently observing a shift in the center of gravity of European security from Western Europe to Central and Eastern Europe. Due to Poland’s close relations with the US, increasing military potential, and a decisive response to the war in Ukraine, the American authorities perceive Poland as an increasingly important pillar of European security. The prevailing view among American scientists and experts is that after the outbreak of a full-scale war in Ukraine, the permanent stationing of US troops in Poland has become more realistic. However, such a decision will probably not be made during the war, as it could negatively affect its course. The final decision on this issue will depend largely on how the war in Ukraine ends. In addition, Poland must convince the US that it can competently bear responsibility for the security of NATO’s eastern flank. As part of the research, interviews were conducted with American scientists and experts. The article also used the method of content analysis of text sources.

British Journal of NursingVol. 31, No. 11 CommentThe impact of the war in Ukraine on HIV servicesIan HodgsonIan Hodgson(E-mail Address: [email protected])Researcher in Global Health, SheffieldSearch for more papers by this authorIan HodgsonPublished Online:9 Jun 2022https://doi.org/10.12968/bjon.2022.31.11.S6AboutSectionsView articleView Full TextPDF/EPUB ToolsAdd to favoritesDownload CitationsTrack CitationsPermissions ShareShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InEmail View article References Anonymous. Russia's war in Ukraine is killing cancer care in both countries. BMJ. 2022;376:o701. https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.o701 Crossref, Medline, Google ScholarHoff F, de Volder E; Freedom Fund. Preventing human trafficking of refugees from Ukraine: a rapid assessment of risks and gaps in the anti-trafficking response. 2022. https://tinyurl.com/2p8ptr4m (accessed 25 May 2022) Google ScholarThe Lancet HIV. Fate of people with HIV in jeopardy in Ukraine. Editorial. Lancet HIV. 2022;9(4):e223. https://doi.org/10.1016/S2352-3018(22)00074-1 Crossref, Medline, Google ScholarMannell J. Sexual violence in Ukraine. A devastating war crime with far reaching consequences. BMJ. 2022;377:o1016. https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.o1016 Crossref, Medline, Google ScholarMurphy A, Fuhr D, Roberts B, Jarvis C, Tarasenko A, McKee M. The health needs of refugees from Ukraine. BMJ 2022;377:o864. https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.o864 Crossref, Medline, Google ScholarSimoneau M, Khan H; Center for Strategic and International Studies. War amid a pandemic: the public health consequences of Russia's invasion of Ukraine. 2022. https://tinyurl.com/c8v64ekh (accessed 25 May 2022) Google ScholarUNAIDS. Global AIDS Monitoring 2019: Ukraine. Summary. 2020. https://tinyurl.com/27afpxkx (accessed 25 May 2022) Google ScholarUNAIDS. UNAIDS warns that the war in Ukraine risks a humanitarian catastrophe for people living with and affected by HIV. Press release. 13 April 2022a. https://tinyurl.com/2p948pab (accessed 25 May 2022) Google ScholarUNAIDS. SITREP: UNAIDS' response to the crisis in Ukraine. 9 May 2022b. https://tinyurl.com/2p989wtn (accessed 25 May 2022) Google ScholarUN High Commissioner for Refugees. Ukraine refugee situation (live statistics). 2022. https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine (accessed 25 May 2022) Google ScholarWheaton S; Politico. How to needle Vladimir Putin on HIV prevention. 13 July 2021. https://tinyurl.com/2p8f9sst (accessed 25 May 2022) Google ScholarWorld Health Organization. Ukraine public health situation analysis (PHSA). 3 March 2022a. https://tinyurl.com/2p8csrt4 (accessed 25 May 2022) Google ScholarWorld Health Organization. Ukraine crisis public health situation analysis—refugee-hosting countries. 17 March 2022b. https://tinyurl.com/yk5tnwte (accessed 25 May 2022) Google Scholar FiguresReferencesRelatedDetails 9 June 2022Volume 31Issue 11ISSN (print): 0966-0461ISSN (online): 2052-2819 Metrics History Published online 9 June 2022 Published in print 9 June 2022 Information© MA Healthcare LimitedPDF download

The eastern European and central Asian (EECA) region is facing the fastest-growing HIV epidemic in the world with 160,000 (130,000–180,000) people newly acquiring HIV in 2021, an overall 48% increase in the number of new acquisitions, and a 32% rise in AIDS-related deaths over the past 10 years [1]. The World Health Organization East European region is estimated to accommodate 1.4 million people living with HIV (PWH), with the majority of new transmissions reported to occur locally and to be unrelated to cross-country migrations [2, 3]. Sadly, according to UNAIDS, in 2022 only 62% of people living in the EECA region were aware of their HIV status and 51% of PWH received HIV treatment, which resulted in an overall viral suppression rate of 48% [1]. Common (>50%) late diagnoses (with either AIDS-defining condition or CD4+ T cell count <350 cells/µl at presentation) [4] further add to the epidemiological issues and complexity of client management [5]. Although the key acquisition risk in the region has changed from unsafe injection practices to heterosexual transmission, access to opioid agonist therapy (OAT) and needle and syringe programmes is often still limited (Kazakhstan) or unavailable (Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan), which results in OAT regional coverage as low as 4%, far below the UNAIDS target of 50%. Furthermore, pre-exposure prophylaxis (PrEP) and combination prevention services are of limited availability or not formally implemented across multiple countries in the region usually due to financial barriers to access, such as lack of state funding for medicines, limited technical capacity or cost of service delivery [6]. This results in a substantially larger HIV PrEP gap (the proportion of populations at risk of acquiring HIV "very likely" to use PrEP if accessible, compared with the proportion currently using PrEP) across countries located in the EECA region (up to 45%) compared to the overall median of 17.4% estimate for the European Union [7]. Moreover, there is a high level of stigma across the countries, especially against gay men and other men who have sex with men. The growing epidemic and the suboptimal access to prevention, testing and treatment are the main reasons that challenge the 2030 targets. The humanitarian crisis related to the Russian invasion and war in Ukraine has challenged the situation even further hindering testing and treatment efforts, forcing both internal displacement (estimated 3.7 million) and external migration of locals as refugees (estimated 6.4 million, as of March 2024) [8]. On top of massive casualties, civilian and healthcare infrastructures were destroyed, forcing refugees to seek safety, protection and assistance, including continued access to medical care. Ukraine is home to ∼260,000 PWH with >130,000 on antiretroviral treatment (ART). Although significant progress was made in the response to the HIV epidemic in Ukraine before the outbreak of war resulting in a 47% reduction in HIV incidence and an 81% reduction in AIDS mortality, the war has significantly affected the HIV and tuberculosis (TB) programmes, with internal displacement resulting in diminished service capacity, difficulty in ART provision and reduction in prevention services [9]. Despite notable hardship, Ukraine managed to maintain full access to ART, increased OAT rollout by 38% (reaching >27,000 people) and doubled the number of people on PrEP, which is now available free of charge [10]. A large proportion of the studies published in this supplement focus on Ukraine and the responses given during the war, providing good examples of resilience and strength and reflecting personal experiences in the setting of mass trauma. Mass traumas are especially important from the perspective of PWH, as these may bring out stress and exacerbate mental health issues. Owczarzak et al. analyse the bioecological model of mass trauma in the context of the Russian invasion and war in Ukraine among PWH with a history of injecting substance use [11]. This study reported the results of 18 interviews with people from four Ukrainian cities in autumn 2022. The study not only outlines personal experiences but also confirms the deep impact of war on the personal and healthcare-related wellbeing of participants, the necessity to respond to the triggering situations, such as the decrease in work opportunities, incremental costs and the necessity for internal displacement. All these factors were shown to be affecting ART access, adherence and general access to healthcare. Lazarus et al. analysed the non-governmental organization (NGO) response during the war and described service provision for key populations in Ukraine, using a mixed-methods project among geographically dispersed non-governmental (n = 24) and governmental (n = 2) organizations representing several Ukrainian regions [12]. Their analysis outlines the impact of the war on NGO work, including HIV prevention and treatment in a time when humanitarian aid is critical. Following the initial shock and the terror of war, the majority of the organizations quickly resumed work, limiting the duration of cessation of services, optimizing response and reallocating work to available staff. This study provides a strong story of resilience and support emphasizing the key work of NGOs in healthcare responses during unfortunate "big events" such as war. The topic of human rights and the context of war in Ukraine is further expanded by Lohman et al. by presenting an assessment related to human rights barriers to the prevention and treatment of HIV and TB [13]. The study consisted of a series of assessments covering the period of the Russian invasion and outbreak of war aiming to examine the progress in the scale-up and outcomes of human rights programmes. The paper describes an implementation learning evaluation using 25 interviews with programme implementers, community advocates and government officials, representing 14 organizations. Interview data clearly reflect the reduction of stigma in several domains, including a decrease in the proportion of PWH who faced unauthorized disclosure in the social environment (−19%), a reduction in the number of reported verbal abuses/personal threats (−13%) and improvement (+33%) in the perceived confidentiality of medical records. The war resulted in the expansion of regional coverage of legal and advocacy programmes and services, allowing a large number of the population to maintain access to key services. Ukraine is also one of few countries in the EECA region that have implemented numerous combination prevention programmes including HIV PrEP, where adherence remains challenging. In the follow-up of the study on oral daily PrEP with tenofovir disoproxil fumarate (TDF)/emtricitabine (FTC) [14] in 199 people who inject drugs (PWID) in Ukraine with or without the use of text reminders, Morozova et al. analysed longitudinal reported adherence patterns coupled with the measurement of tenofovir diphosphate and emtricitabine triphosphate in dried blood spots from study participants as objective measures of adherence [15]. The study enrolled people who have been injecting drugs for longer than 20 years (37%) with a high proportion of alcohol use (67%) and >50% with moderate to severe depression. In this highly challenging group, the perceived adherence was high to moderate in >90% of the cases with 81% reporting to take more than 95% of their TDF/FTC doses. Alarmingly, data from the dried blood spot metabolite analysis revealed the reality to be divergent from patient-reported adherence with >50% of participants without detectable TDF/FTC metabolite levels. This study provides unique data confirming the divergence between perceived and measured adherence among PWID, indicating that novel telemedicine or online interventions in combination prevention of HIV can be particularly useful in marginalized or difficult-to-reach populations. Migrants from central Asia moving to central eastern countries to work are disproportionately affected by HIV and sexually transmitted infections due to high-level stigma and poor working conditions, and have lower or no access to the health system and prevention tools compared to other groups. Kovtun et al. [16] focused on human rights violations related to sexual orientation, gender identity (SOGI), and HIV in six countries in eastern Europe, Caucasus and central Asia in 2022 (Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan), which have a background of a rapidly rising HIV epidemic, strict social and religious norms, high level of stigma and discrimination associated with sexual and gender minorities and HIV, and regional conflict. Using the Rights—Evidence—ACTion (REAct) tool, they analysed the data on rights violations upon complaints from gay and bisexual men who have sex with men and transgender women. The strikingly higher numbers of rights violations and violations solely based on SOGI in Ukraine compared to the Caucasus and central Asian countries suggest that despite all the achievements made in the country in the last decade in terms of harm reduction, testing, and access to ART and care, stigma and discrimination still prevails in the country. The effect of the recent war in Ukraine was also evident with more human rights violations by police and military staff, denials of private or social services, refusals of temporary accommodation services and denial of border crossings. The results of this study underscore the diversity of the region in terms of stigma, discrimination and human rights violations. Mackesy-Amiti et al. define a social intervention that aimed to reduce high-risk behaviours for HIV among Tajik migrants who inject drugs working in the Russian Federation [17]. This was a cluster-randomized controlled trial comparing the network-based, peer educator training with the general health education training. Male Tajik migrants were recruited as peer educators and trained on how to reduce personal risk for HIV acquisition and to deliver knowledge to peers. The interviews showed that the baseline percentages of binge drinking, condomless sex, and syringe and equipment sharing behaviours were considerably high, and needle cleaning behaviour and HIV testing were extremely low in both peer educators and peers. There was a significant reduction in needle-sharing behaviour following study intervention, but a modest effect on sexual behaviour. This study suggests that interventions tailored to the needs of specific groups and the inclusion of peers may be effective even in populations that are hard to reach. Stigma-associated issues were also addressed by Davis et al. who used a citizen science approach to address HIV-related stigma and increase HIV testing in adolescents and young adults in Kazakhstan [18]. These populations were called to develop digital materials, which would be assessed and rated in a contest with the aim to reduce HIV-related stigma and promote HIV self-testing. The submitted materials were judged by a board including peers of the contestants, healthcare professionals and representatives of NGOs, and highly rated submissions were awarded. Adolescents and young adults showed a high level of interest in the project both as contestants, which resulted in a high number of submissions, and as board members providing input in the development and implementation of the study, running social media procedures, creating promotional materials and providing feedback on the submission system. Inclusion of the community stimulated collaboration among adolescents and young adults, and increased knowledge of HIV-related stigma and the importance of HIV testing. Lastly, a study also from Kazakhstan on adherence to ART among PWH in association with mental health and cognitive disorders was presented by Mergenova et al. [19]. The size of the HIV epidemic in this country is increasing with the majority of acquisitions reported among people who inject psychoactive substances. The authors performed a cross-sectional questionnaire-based analysis of 230 PWH on stable (>6 months) ART, with the assessment of self-reported ART adherence in addition to depression, anxiety, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) symptoms, and cognitive and memory assessments. Notably, a third of the patients reported a history of mental illness, while only 25% reported injection drug use and 17% hazardous alcohol drinking. Moreover, mild depression or anxiety was reported in 20−32%, while in 6−10%, these mood disorders were at least moderate including PTSD symptoms observed in 7% of cases. Not surprisingly, these symptoms were associated with lower adherence—missing ART was more likely among participants with mild or moderate depressive symptoms, mild or moderate anxiety symptoms, PTSD symptoms or forgetfulness. On the contrary, better cognitive function was associated with better adherence to therapy. This study emphasizes the need for precise and regular assessment of not only ART but also mental health and cognitive function for better care of PWH in order to tailor specific responses and to provide mental health support for improving treatment adherence and maintaining optimal viral suppression rates. The long history of neglecting HIV in EECA resulted in rapid increases of transmissions. The high number of PWID and migrants who are disproportionately affected by HIV and the unique characteristics of each country with different cultures, beliefs and structures challenge the long-term efforts to address the epidemic. This supplement on the HIV epidemic in eastern Europe and central Asia presents a story of resilience, continued efforts to improve human rights, and innovative approaches to combination prevention, and summarizes key challenges related to stigma and other societal issues. While continuing these efforts, further international support, commitment and collaboration will be vital to achieve the new goals for 2030 to end AIDS in the region. The authors declare no competing interests. MP and DG jointly drafted and revised the editorial. All the authors read and approved the final version. We would like to express our sincere thanks to all the authors who prepared, submitted and revised manuscripts in response to this supplement request. We are grateful to all the research participants who volunteered to take part in studies in this supplement. We are also thankful to our co-Guest Editor, Dr Andriy Klepikov, Executive Director of the Alliance for Public Health, for his valuable role in the conceptualization and development of this supplement. The authors alone are responsible for the views expressed in this supplement and they do not necessarily represent the views, decisions or policies of the institutions with which they are affiliated. Data sharing is not applicable to this article as no datasets were generated or analysed during the current study.

It is assumed that violence is functional at both individual and societal levels. A model developed for violent individuals is compared with a proposed model for interstate wars. In both domains, the data are consistent with the assumption that violence is functional. At the societal level, the contingencies of training are provided by official staff and require reasonably well-socialized soldiers. At the individual level, reinforcers are provided by victims, and aggressors are usually socially incompetent. In the societal model, decision makers receive rein-forcers for initiating and winning wars. The combat soldiers' behavior is somewhat paradoxical. Soldiers are thought to remain in harm's way out of love for their buddies. The actual reinforcers for their combat behavior are unknown.

Teesid: Uurimuses analüüsitakse ajaloomeeme Vene sõja kohta Ukrainas. Leidsime materjalis korduvad motiivid ning vaatlesime suhteid meemide ajalooalasete viidete ja hoiakute vahel. Selgus, et ajaloomeemid võivad olla vahendiks, kuidas õigustada tänapäeva sündmusi, tekitada vaenlaste suhtes üleolekut, anda hinnanguid sündmustele ning naeruvääristada või tunnustada olukorraga seostuvaid inimesi. Analüüsides meemides ajaloolisi viiteid, tuleb arvestada hoiakute mõjuga viidete valikule. On 24 February 2022, Russia started the full-scale war in Ukraine. It provoked a lot of parallels with earlier conflicts in the vernacular reactions. There was an abundance of serious and humorous reactions and comments on the war, and the creation and dissemination of memes soared. Some of these used historical motives to underline the stance and message of the utterance. Historical memes are widely spread cultural units that explicitly relate to a particular historical event or personality. They are linked to memory practices that strengthen or help to propagate the meme. Historical memes reanimate the past with the help of historical artefacts (such as photos and videos), to adapt the memories of the past to the circumstances of the present. In times of war, or in any other conflict context, memoricity plays a significant role in narratives related to collective security and evokes affective responses by re-activating feelings associated with past experiences. Historical memes accentuate the emotional and intertextual load by tying contemporary commentary to emotionally charged historical and cultural motifs such as visual and/or verbal references to historical events, characters, catch phrases, etc. They function as shortcuts to basic categorisations of “us” and “them”, friends and enemies. Our aim is to analyse how historical motives contribute to the meaning-making in memes: which historical memes are commonly used in the context of the Russia–Ukraine conflict from 2014, which recurrent motifs transpire in the data, and what the relationship between the historical references and stance of the memes is. Memes offered a vernacular viewpoint on this conflict already since the illegal annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014, and have been actively used throughout the years up to the ongoing military invasion. Some of the memes referred to (pre) historical events, but most of the references res ort to the history of 20th century. The motif of WWII was the most prevalent historical reference in memes on the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine that circulated in Ukraine, Russia and Belarus. While the references to ancient and mediaeval times are generally used to create a certain distance to the 2022 war and place its events and participants in a completely different context, references to the Russian Empire and WWII often draw direct parallels between historical and the contemporary events. The instrumentalist approach to history that is consciously employed by the state can also function on a vernacular level by employing and recognising certain historical references in memes. The results show that historical memes can offer a way of legitimising contemporary events through history. The current actions and political decisions acquire firmness and justification if they are linked to historical events and actors that everyone remembers from school. They also contribute to establishing superiority over enemies, as the audiences find proof in their reasoning when they compare the past with the present. Memes ridicule or praise the people involved with the help of intertextuality pointing at well-known historical personae like Hitler, Goebbels or Stalin. In doing that, memes with historical references seem to demand a more nuanced cultural literacy, while other memes simply depend on the more basic shared cultural background of their creators and audiences to be understood and spread. Approaching historical memes from this angle, we can reveal the workings of intertextuality and their role in different kinds of memes, given that previous research has shown that not all the references and allusions need to be understood to find a meme funny.

Maritime containerized shipping has recently suffered from various problems and challenges caused by stochastic shocks such as the Covid -19 pandemic or the war in Ukraine. The pandemic and recent war have clearly indicated shortfalls and weaknesses of maritime containerization and have triggered various attempts at identifying the potential for its further development determined by the new reality (after global shocks and with the consideration of new ones). The paper presents a holistic analysis of factors that globally affect the potential for further development of containerized maritime transport. The entire research design comes as an attempt made at identifying and updating the determinants and predictions of prospects for development of containerization in the current geopolitical situation and global trade conditions in the post-pandemic era, also taking the aspects of the ongoing Russian invasion in Ukraine and the post-war recovery into consideration. The results of the research are presented as a matrix of the eight main determinants Det 1-8 (each supported by two key factors F1, F2) that have been originally identified. Each factor is described by an originally developed calculation methodology (as an Index). The indexes are calculated for the period of 2018-2020 and subsequently discussed. Moreover, there is a potential for further utilization of the presented matrix as a universal tool that will define the future aspects of management in the field of the expected architecture of global supply chains and maritime transport of containerized cargo after the absorption of global shocks.

The celebrated idea of Prussian war strategist Carl von Clausewitz regarding conventional warfare played a dominant role up to the First World War in the West. In his seminal work “On War”, Clausewitz posits: “If you want to overcome your enemy, you must match your efforts against the power of resistance!” In a way, his idea was akin to annihilating the enemy’s army in major battles. However, this idea was challenged by British military strategist Basil Henry Liddell Hart in his book, titled “The Strategy”, by proposing a different military theory called “Indirect Approach”. The objective of this paper is based on making a comparative analysis between Clausewitz and Liddell Hart regarding the utility of their military theories in modern warfare. While taking a methodology based on a comparative analysis of the utility of the two doctrines, this paper explores the effectiveness of those military strategies against the current asymmetries in modern warfare. To buttress the reliability of this research, the examples from the Ukrainian war and the Sri Lankan civil war between 1990 and 2009 will be examined. The main objectivity of this paper lies in creating a novel discussion on the merits and demerits of Clausewitz and Basil Liddell Hart’s theories of war in contemporary warfare. The results emerging from this research will demonstrate the relevance of re-reading both Clausewitz and Liddell Hart in an era where the orthodox idea of warfare is at stake.

The celebrated idea of Prussian war strategist Carl von Clausewitz regarding conventional warfare played a dominant role up to the First World War in the West. In his seminal work “On War”, Clausewitz posits: “If you want to overcome your enemy, you must match your efforts against the power of resistance!” In a way, his idea was akin to annihilating the enemy’s army in major battles. However, this idea was challenged by British military strategist Basil Henry Liddell Hart in his book, titled “The Strategy”, by proposing a different military theory called “Indirect Approach”. The objective of this paper is based on making a comparative analysis between Clausewitz and Liddell Hart regarding the utility of their military theories in modern warfare. While taking a methodology based on a comparative analysis of the utility of the two doctrines, this paper explores the effectiveness of those military strategies against the current asymmetries in modern warfare. To buttress the reliability of this research, the examples from the Ukrainian war and the Sri Lankan civil war between 1990 and 2009 will be examined. The main objectivity of this paper lies in creating a novel discussion on the merits and demerits of Clausewitz and Basil Liddell Hart’s theories of war in contemporary warfare. The results emerging from this research will demonstrate the relevance of re-reading both Clausewitz and Liddell Hart in an era where the orthodox idea of warfare is at stake.

The celebrated idea of Prussian war strategist Carl von Clausewitz regarding conventional warfare played a dominant role up to the First World War in the West. In his seminal work “On War”, Clausewitz posits: “If you want to overcome your enemy, you must match your efforts against the power of resistance!” In a way, his idea was akin to annihilating the enemy’s army in major battles. However, this idea was challenged by British military strategist Basil Henry Liddell Hart in his book, titled “The Strategy”, by proposing a different military theory called “Indirect Approach”. The objective of this paper is based on making a comparative analysis between Clausewitz and Liddell Hart regarding the utility of their military theories in modern warfare. While taking a methodology based on a comparative analysis of the utility of the two doctrines, this paper explores the effectiveness of those military strategies against the current asymmetries in modern warfare. To buttress the reliability of this research, the examples from the Ukrainian war and the Sri Lankan civil war between 1990 and 2009 will be examined. The main objectivity of this paper lies in creating a novel discussion on the merits and demerits of Clausewitz and Basil Liddell Hart’s theories of war in contemporary warfare. The results emerging from this research will demonstrate the relevance of re-reading both Clausewitz and Liddell Hart in an era where the orthodox idea of warfare is at stake.

On February 24, Russian troops came into Ukraine from Belarus in the north, Crimea in the south, and the east. Multiple lines of attack suggested that the Russian military wanted to quickly take the capital, Kyiv, overthrow the democratically elected government, and take over as much as the eastern two-thirds of Ukraine. Since the war started on February 24, Russia has been wrong about four things: that the Ukrainian government would fall and Russian forces would quickly take Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities; that the European Union would struggle to show resolve and respond to this aggression; that the "Western world" would react in a split and uncertain way; and that the rest of the world would not condemn Russia's invasion. Russia has been building up its military along its border with Ukraine, which wants to join NATO. Russia has said that its deployment of troops is a response to the steady expansion of NATO to the east. Russia says that it is doing these things to protect its own security. The stance that India has taken on the conflict between Russia and Ukraine is being applauded everywhere therefore, the study highlighted and analysed the India’s stand on Russia – Ukraine war by adopting descriptive cum analytical method to reach on conclusion also the study utilised extensively thematic analytical tool MAXQDA for qualitative investigation to explain and analyse the India’s stand on Russia – Ukraine war.

IntroductionIn times of war, sourcing becomes a major challenge for journalists. Information is often unavailable because access is restricted or because reporting on the ground is prohibited, too dangerous, or even simply too costly for media having to work with limited resources. Which sources actually shape the news is a highly relevant question because news media still constitute the main channel of information for many citizens, especially when it comes to wars abroad. For a long time, scholars have diagnosed a dominance of official sources in war coverage but have not analyzed whether this is still the case with the advent of social media platforms, which potentially offer journalists other sources. Moreover, the integration of social media sources, such as Twitter or Telegram, is just one of many interdependencies in hybrid media environments. We aim to provide a more holistic understanding of sourcing practices in times of war by analyzing to what extent information from government and military sources, social media, other news media, and news agencies is featured as a main source in reporting on the war in Ukraine.MethodsIn our paper, we examine how 13 online media in Switzerland cover the war in Ukraine during the first 3 months after Russia's invasion—an example of a period in which journalists must typically identify reliable sources for reporting on the events surrounding such a war. Using a manual content analysis of 1,198 news articles, we analyze the sourcing practices that are visible in the reporting.ResultsOur results clearly show that information from other news outlets and social media and, above all, from news agencies plays an important role. Structural features of media types lead to distinct sourcing practices. Heavily commercialized, advertising-based media rely on news agency reports, other news media, and social media much more than subscription media or public service media. However, in all media types, actors from the government and the military are the most important source type.DiscussionOur study reveals patterns old and new in terms of sourcing practices war coverage in a European country not participating in, but affected by, the major war in Ukraine.

War and food insecurity in Ukraine