Richard Wright Theorizes Surrealism

When Karl Popper’s The Open Society and its Enemies 1 was published in 1945, shortly after the second World War had ended, his work soon became a classic for the defence and support of the western alliance against Soviet communism and Stalinism in the cold war. This interpretation primarily provided by authors of conservative liberalism emphasised Popper’s criticism of the historicistic theories of Karl Marx as well as his new contributions for the defence of western democracy, to social philosophy and the philosophy of history. A different interpretation of Popper’s work was provided in the early seventies of the 20th century by authors of social-democratic orientation and by those who belonged to progressive liberalism.2 After having discarded Marxist thought as a theoretical foundation of practical politics, some social democratic and progressive liberal thinkers looked for new theoretical foundations that could serve as new guidelines for policy measures. In actual politics Marxist ideas as guidelines for policy measures had long been substituted by reform policies, and a new theoretical and philosophical foundation was required in order to solve the discrepancy between the theoretical basis and policy measures. Popper’s ideas with respect to the social welfare state, western democratic institutions, liberalism, policy measures and the methods of social science seemed to provide such a new theoretical foundation. Some authors even thought that Popper’s philosophy of Critical Rationalism ought to be regarded as revival of the so-called Bernstein tradition in (German) social democracy. However, although it seems that some ideas of Critical Rationalism indeed became a kind of theoretical guideline for social democratic policy measures, Critical Rationalism rather was regarded as a support of conservative liberalism and particularly in the late 70ies and 80ies as a kind illegitimate offspring of Hayekianism. Given this spectrum of possible interpretations of Popper’s ideas it is not surprising that politicians from the conservative right to the progressive left all quote parts of Popper’s work in order to support their positions.

Europeanization is part of globalization and in this context the European Union is propelled by wider forces of technological, economic, financial and political change. Cultural identity is discussed against this backdrop. If presently there is a surfeit of national and ethnic identity talk, evoked from parochial perspectives, there is a deficit of European identity and reflexivity in terms of politics, political economy and the social capitalism which Rhineland Europe used to represent. An open, casual definition of European identity may be appropriate on historical grounds, in view of the multicultural antecedents of European cultures; on theoretical grounds, considering that culture is open‐ended; on political grounds, in view of postnationalist definitions of citizenship. It may be welcome medicine for Eurochauvinism. It may also be pragmatic in relation to ongoing technological and economic changes. With a view to narrowing the split between disciplines and sensibilities it would be important to integrate cultural, political and economic analyses and to arrive at a forward‐looking combination of agendas.

Environments where uncertainty and change are necessary pave the way for the emergence of visionary leadership, which is a leadership understanding unique to the situation. Great Leader Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, who illuminated the environment like a torch at a time when the Ottoman Empire came out of the World War I and a nation was in despair, uncertainty and hopelessness, presented a vision of the future to his nation and emerged as a visionary leader. So much so that this vision is to establish a new fully independent Turkish state based on national sovereignty. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk made important decisions and activities during his journey from Damascus to Istanbul and from there to Samsun and Anatolia. Atatürk's leadership approach as a guide in today's political ground and the uncertainty and change-intensive environment experienced by organizations contains important notes. In this context, the development of the vision of the Independent Republic of Turkey put forward by Atatürk was handled within the framework of the Visionary Leadership Model of Westley and Mintzberg at the point of historical events, and an evaluation was made on the theoretical ground regarding the origins of the Republic, which completed its 100th anniversary. In this way, it is aimed to contribute to the visionary leadership literature by raising awareness about the visionary aspect of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the Republic of Turkey, which is emphasized by the world, and by presenting information about the establishment of the Republic in a systematic way in the historical process.

This chapter begins by discussing the line of demarcation between legal politics and other politics. It then covers the theoretical foundation and tasks of legal politics. With regard to the theoretical foundations, it argues that the necessary insight is the juridico-sociological knowledge of the causal connection between legal regulation and human behaviour; or the insight into the issue of how it is possible to influence human behaviour through the function of legal machinery—which, in turn, is determined by legal regulations. With regard to the tasks of legal politics, it argues that the first task is to examine the attitudes and objectives that are currently prevalent in influential social groups, and thereby determinative of the organs that have the formal power to legislate. The next step in a juridico-political inquiry is to describe the juridico-sociological facts and contexts operative in relation to the premise. The third and last step in the juridico-political investigation is the formulation of conclusions in the form of instructions to the legislator or the judge.

German ordoliberalism originated at the end of the Weimar Republic (1918-1933) in a context of hyper-inflation, depression, mass unemployment and social unrest. For ordoliberalism, a free economy is premised on a sound political, legal, social and moral framework to secure its cohesion. The role of the state is to ensure a liberal economic order. Ordoliberalism is a contested account of post-neoliberal political economy: some argue that it offers a more restrained and socially just market order; others, in complete contrast, that is a form of authoritarian liberalism and that it is the theoretical foundation for the austerity politics that the EU has actively promoted in recent years. Foucault discusses ordoliberalism at length in The Birth of Biopolitics, and Bonefeld’s book provides a thought-provoking companion to those lectures by offering a more comprehensive investigation of the theoretical foundation of ordoliberal thought and its historical and theoretical contexts.

Second Language Writing

Empire, Borders, Place: A Critique of Hardt and Negri’s Concept of Empire Ian Angus (bio) It is now almost a commonplace to note that after the Seattle 1999 protests against the neo-liberal market-oriented version of globalization a new coalition against global market hegemony is struggling to emerge. While this emergence may seem to have been derailed by the more recent U.S. and British intervention in Iraq, it is more likely that it has entered into the global peace movement that sprang into existence simultaneously. New developments are bound to follow. This recent history has had the advantage of demonstrating the mutual relation between neo-liberal economics and the military and political imperatives of empire which has been popularly expressed in the slogan “No blood for oil!” Theorizing these components and their relationship will clearly become important to the thinking of the new global opposition. It is perhaps because of its appearance in the middle of these significant transformations (2000) that Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s book Empire has become a major point of reference for contemporary radical thought. Also, its attempt to synthesize a large number of developments previously called postmodernism, postcolonialism, autonomism, etc. and earlier radical theories such as Marxism, anarchism and syndicalism within a long historical narrative gives the book a scope that focuses many diverse and compelling issues. At times, the book appears to claim a status for contemporary struggles such as that occupied by Capital in the nineteenth century. Despite the merit of the book to have brought the concept of empire into international currency again, I will argue that its concept of empire is thoroughly misguided on both theoretical and political grounds.1 The key theoretical nexus of Empire is the close relation between lack of boundaries and the production of subjectivities (or, as they are more often called nowadays, identities). Whereas one previously moved from one institution to another, “the production of subjectivity in imperial society tends not to be limited to any specific places. One is always still in the family, always still in school, always still in prison, and so forth. . . . The indefiniteness of the place of the production corresponds to the indeterminacy of the form of the subjectivities produced.”2 The continuous overflowing of boundaries generates new subjectivities from which political opposition to empire can be expected. “Here is where the primary site of struggle seems to emerge, on the terrain of the production and regulation of subjectivities” (321). This analysis is based on the use of two theoretical terms that function throughout the text. One, the distinction between inside and outside and, two, the notion of history as overcoming the regulation and stability required by empire. Hardt and Negri’s claim that contemporary empire “has no limits” (xiv) is butressed by a historical argument that links capitalist expansion to the necessity to look outside itself because “the capitalist market is one machine that has always run counter to any division between inside and outside” (190). Postmodern capitalist production thus eliminates its outside such that contemporary empire is distinct from classical imperialism precisely because “the dialectic of sovereignty between the civil order and the natural order has come to an end” and “the modern dialectic of inside and outside has been replaced by a play of degrees and intensities, of hybridity and artificiality” (187–8). History is thus understood as this process of elimination of the outside that comes to an apogee in contemporary empire and which prepares the ground for overcoming the limits imposed upon subjectivity by imperial sovereignty. Empire is a “non-place” because power is “both everywhere and nowhere” even though it is “criss-crossed by so many fault lines that it only appears as a continuous, uniform space” (190). These fault lines are constituted by the “deterritorializing power of the multitude” which both “sustains Empire and at the same time [is] the force that calls for and makes necessary its destruction” (61). Understood in this way, as a non-place that has annihilated its outside, it is no wonder that it does not matter to Hardt and Negri from where the critique of empire is articulated. The inside-outside distinction and the...

The immediate occasion for the composition of this work was the publication of Proudhon’s The Philosophy of Poverty. Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, a self-taught intellectual from Besançon who had started life as a printer, was at this time an important figure in the radical movement and he had met Marx in Paris in the winter of 1844–5.4 Proudhon may have had some influence on Marx’s views at that point, but by the time he published System of Economic Contradictions or The Philosophy of Poverty it seems clear that he and Marx had decisively parted company on theoretical and political grounds. Nearly twenty years later Marx recalled that just before Proudhon published The Philosophy of Poverty he wrote to Marx announcing this ‘in a very detailed letter in which he said, among other things: “I await the lash of your criticism”. This soon fell upon him in my Misere de la Philosophie’, Marx continued, ‘in a fashion which ended our friendship for ever.’5

The first part the article offers a critical examination of the three alleged properties of precariat as analyzed by Guy Standing in his seminal book The Precariat: The New Dangerous Class: its newness, its class character and its dangerous nature. Recognizing the value of Standing’s contribution the author argues that precariat possess none of these properties; it is rather just another consequence of primitive accumulation. As such, the urge to precarize is inscribed in the very logic of capitalist accumulation and can be found on every stage of its historical development, both in the past and in the present. The alleged class character of precariat is also called into question both on theoretical and political grounds. As it is demonstrated, precarization is happening to many social classes, however with different consequences on different levels of social hierarchy: those bestowed with some forms of capital (either material and symbolic) can actually benefit from what is called the flexible mode of accumulation). Finally, the article points to rather docile and passive character of precariat that does not seem to be dangerous for the capitalist status-quo. Dangers stemming from its existence are rather associated with the capture of precariat by right-wing extremism. In the second part the article focuses on the precarity of academic labour pointing to its negative impact on both teaching and research.

This essay draws on insights from ethnographic and historical research in Indonesia to challenge a stubborn dualism that presents farmers as subsistence-oriented and risk-averse, in contrast to plantation corporations which are assumed to maximize productivity and profit. Drawing on this dualism, and setting aside centuries of enthusiastic farmer engagaement in growing global market crops, oil palm plantation corporations and their government supporters maintain that farmers are not interested in growing oil palm, or cannot do so efficiently, while corporations can be trusted to get the job done. The essay troubles this dualism on theoretical, empirical, and political grounds.

While the notion of the ‘digital native’ has been widely critiqued on empirical, theoretical and political grounds, the conceptual structure of these arguments has received much less scrutiny. Through a critical engagement with the technologised essentialism that permeates lay and expert commentary on the implications of socio-technical innovation for emerging adults, I develop a conceptual framework (platform and agency) that avoids this tendency, built around the analysis of reflexivity and relations in tracing out interaction between people and technology over time in structured contexts. I apply this framework to the question of socialisation, developing the concept of ‘potential selves’ to explore the platform society as a cultural context for socialisation. The generations growing up within a platformised world, the younger millennials and the ‘zoomers’ who are coming after them, cannot be adequately understood as either digital natives or digital narcissists. They do, however, confront some unique existential challenges, which the economic, social and political ramifications of the crisis unfolding around us makes it even more urgent that we understand.

Interpretations of and domestic life are increasingly deprivatized, that is, accomplished in various sites outside household. Addressing this situation, this article has two goals. First, it presents a constructionist approach to studies that views as a social object constituted through interpretive practice. Second, it documents how images and meanings are rationalized, public accomplishments. Featuring two interpretive conditions--local culture and organizational embeddedness--we illustrate socially situated construction of and discuss analytic implications of constructionist approach. The has long been cherished for its privacy. Its image in Western societies as an entity separate, distinct, and sheltered from other social institutions has flourished in popular culture, everyday discourse, and studies (Demos, 1979; Gubrium & Holstein, 1987; Jeffrey, 1972; Laslett, 1973; Skolnick, 1979). In this view, is a sphere or set apart from other realms, with distinct functions and discernible boundaries (Berger & Kellner, 1970; Hess & Handel, 1994; Parsons & Bales, 1955). For better or worse, domestic order is believed to exist authentically within households, family's natural habitat. Ultimately, inner reaches of home are fully accessible only to household members and close associates. Family life goes on backstage (Goffman, 1959), behind closed doors, in an intimate environment (Skolnick, 1987). Popular sentiment, traditional political interests, and professional scholarship have all--in their own fashions--placed in opposition to dehumanizing forces of modernity and bureaucracy, often going so far as to suggest that family, as it is conventionally known and valued, has been besieged by forces that undermine domestic sanctity. Perhaps Christopher Lasch (1977) articulated this most succinctly and poignantly when he portrayed as a haven in a heartless world. Lasch warned that traditional domain of domestic privacy was being invaded, overrun by myriad organizations and institutions of modern society. Adopting a version of private image, Lasch depicted as an endangered refuge from cruel world of politics and work (p. xxiv). Despite its popularity, ubiquity, and persistence, however, this vision of has been challenged on empirical, theoretical, and political grounds. The most notable assault accompanies a call to rethink family (Thorne & Yalom, 1982). With feminism as central galvanizing force, notion of a single, monolithic form has come under attack. The central argument is that THE FAMILY writ large--as in traditional image--is more ideology than empirical reality (see Bernardes, 1985; Osmond & Thorne, 1993; Thorne, 1982). At same time, feminists and others have assailed notion that is (or should be) insulated from external structures and forces. Family isolation, they argue, is illusory given close connections between families' internal lives and organization of economy, state, and other institutions. Matters of race, class, and gender further undermine public-private distinction (see Baca Zinn, 1992; Collins, 1989; Kessler-Harris, 1982; Osmond & Thorne, 1993). This suggests that, like monolithic family, the separation of private from public is largely an ideological construct, (Okin, 1989, p. 23)--more artificial than substantial--further demystifying dichotomy between public and spheres (Osmond & Thorne, 1993, p. 608). The growing repudiation of monolithic, private image has led to what some are calling a paradigm shift in studies (Allen & Demo, 1995)--a trend towards more inclusive theorizing and research (Baca Zinn, 1992) that increasingly recognizes pluralism and diversity (see Baber & Allen, 1992; Thompson, 1992; Walker, 1993). …

Participatory methods for conservation and development have been critiqued on practical, political, and theoretical grounds. In this article, we address these critiques but move beyond critique to propose ways to improve participatory techniques with local communities. We discuss a customary model of communication used by Maasai communities in Tanzania and Kenya (the enkiguena, meeting) as a starting point to begin thinking about ways to improve participation on the ground with Maasai and potentially others. We discuss the value of the enkiguena ideals as a theoretical model to build dialogues across, within, and between multiple knowledge expressions and power relations.Key words: Maasai, enkiguena, participatory techniques.

In this book, we have argued that social scientists interested in the relational ties that connect humans and animals must attempt to include other species in their work. We have noted that capturing animals' perspectives can, and probably will, be difficult and sometimes impossible, but that this should not be taken as reason enough to simply omit them. The omission of other creatures from social science is to silence them. We have argued against this silencing on theoretical, political and methodological grounds while remaining mindful that our project is shot through with indeterminacy and risk—the equivalent of being on a trapeze without a safety net (Barthes, quoted in Wood, 2016). We have considered what a posthuman or multi-species methodology might be and discussed how ethnography and its adaptations, particularly creative and arts-based techniques, help us adopt a less reductive, humanist positioning that better accounts for animal perspectives or "voices" in our research. We are cautiously optimistic about the potential of our project.

Many in the West are so fully embedded in their moral and political understandings that they take for granted that their moral intuitions reflect a global moral and political theoretical common ground. This conceit lies at the basis of the moral and political reflections of such contemporary Western thinkers as Ronald Dworkin, Jurgen Habermas, John Rawls, and even Richard Rorty. In different ways such presuppositions sustain the ideologies of such diverse parties as social democrats and neo-conservatives. The universality of these assumptions is radically falsified by China, which constitutes a moral, social and political counter-example. Although Western thinkers attempt to portray China as a country on its way to developing the moral and political commitments of the occident, China is in fact a country on its way to recapturing and rearticulating the Confucian moral and political commitments that lie at the foundations of Chinese culture and have a history reaching back even before Confucius (551–479 BCE) himself.