Abstract
Richard Rorty’s argumentative strategy – variously termed “pragmatist,”“postmodernist,” and “postphilosophical”– is examined in some detail in the context of his treatment of philosophical issues in general and of the views of other philosophers in particular, for instance, Putnam, Davidson, Quine, Sellars, Dennett, and Frazer. Attention is paid particularly to the compatibility between pragmatist, “analytic,” and postmodernist modes of argument; Rorty’s “redescriptions” of alternative philosophical views; and the philosophical import of Rorty’s “abandonment” of philosophical argument.
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