Revolution as the Foundation of Political Philosophy

Abstract

Klaus Hartmann has articulated an increasingly systematic political philosophy whose aim seems to be the avoidance of politics. Hartmann was aware of the paradox. For example, in the first paper I heard Hartmann deliver, in 1966, he explained the theoretical necessity of “taking the transcendental turn” and then replied to those who demanded more realism from philosophy that “even if we were to reach the conclusion that the problem cannot be solved, it is only on the level of transcendental philosophy that we can see that it cannot. The problem would indicate that there is nothing to be ‘understood.’”1 Some years later, in “Hegel: A Non-Metaphysical View”, Hartmann insisted on “a philosophy devoid of existence claims”, which, he admitted, answers only “luxury questions”. Yet, after repeating that “such a pursuit is a luxury” even “in philosophy”, his conclusion recognized the need to “apply insights from such a [non-metaphysical] reading to concrete problem areas that without them must be relinquished to uncomprehending positivism” ([5], pp. 110, 113, and 124). What such an application might mean, beyond his proposal to develop “a theory of theory construction” was not spelled out. Yet Hartmann has felt it necessary to cross lances with nearly all contemporary attempts to expand the reach of philosophy. Alongside his two books on Sartre, and his — unjustly neglected — reconstruction of all of Marx’s work stand articles on Habermas and Husserl, Heidegger and Luhmann — even an (unpublished) lecture on Marcuse, delivered in the United States in 1970, at the height of the student movement.KeywordsCivil SocietyPolitical PhilosophyPolitical StateJudicial ReviewContract TheoryThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.