Abstract
In this paper, I should like to argue against both eliminative materialism and substance/property dualism, aiming more specifically at the reductionist arguments offered by the Churchlands’ and Swinburne’s versions thereof, insofar as they undermine moral beliefs qua first-personish accounts dismissed as folk psychology by the former, as the latter regards them as supervening on natural events extendedly, that is, necessarily both ways of the biconditional linking mental and physical substances (for every A-substance x there is a B-substance y, such that necessarily if y exists x exists).
Highlights
Resumo: Este artigo procura argumentar contra o eliminacionismo e o dualismo de substância ou de propriedade, visando mais especificamente os argumentos reducionistas oferecidos pelo casal Churchland e por versões de dualismo propostas por Swinburne, na medida em que põem em causa as crenças morais enquanto relatos de primeira pessoa, desconsiderados como psicologia popular pelos primeiros e como supervenientes pelo segundo
Since the 1950s and 60s, research in neuroscience had already shaken apparently insurmountable problems in various models of substance dualism, property dualism, and of several others that have emerged in the following decades, with alternative proposals to patterns of behavior conditioning, theories of identity, the physical states of the brain and their causal roles and functions in a complex economy of internal states, mediating sensory data inputs and behavioral outputs
Patricia Churchland would speak of connectionism as a descriptive, materialist critique of functionalism, as the former pursues the central empirical hypothesis that cognition itself must be regarded as a species of computation: The computer metaphor is prominent, for a number of reasons
Summary
Resumo: Este artigo procura argumentar contra o eliminacionismo e o dualismo de substância ou de propriedade, visando mais especificamente os argumentos reducionistas oferecidos pelo casal Churchland e por versões de dualismo propostas por Swinburne, na medida em que põem em causa as crenças morais enquanto relatos de primeira pessoa, desconsiderados como psicologia popular pelos primeiros e como supervenientes pelo segundo (como eventos naturais que se estendem necessariamente, em ambos os sentidos do bicondicional ligando substâncias mentais e físicas: para toda substância-A x existe uma substância-B y, de modo que necessariamente se y existe, x existe). Damasio manages to articulate the social, intersubjective, and neurobiological processes that explain the evolution of the human brain and the emergence of consciousness, the “I,” memory, language, subjectivity and their representations and creative constructions and carriers of meaning.
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